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With historical case studies ranging from the Revolutionary War to the war 
in Iraq, this book shows how the US military is caught between two civilian 
masters – the president and the Congress – in responding to the challenges 
of warfi ghting, rearmament, and transformation.
By exploring the role of Congress and its unique relationship with 
the armed forces, Charles Stevenson expands the study of civil–military 
relations from its usual focus on the president as commander-in-chief and 
shows how the US military can appeal to congressional leaders in order to 
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Congress to support his war efforts. Through analyses that range from the 
Revolutionary War, Civil War, and the Vietnam War to the struggles over 
radical innovations pushed by Theodore Roosevelt, Robert McNamara, and 
Donald Rumsfeld, the author demonstrates that this triangular struggle is 
rooted in the US Constitution and has recurred time and again throughout 
US history.
Illustrating this dual system of civilian military control in a series of case 
studies, this new volume starts from the way the Continental Congress ran 
the Revolutionary War by committee and concludes with the George W. 
Bush/Donald Rumsfeld efforts to transform the US military into a modern 
terrorist-fi ghting force.
This book will be of great interest to students of the US military, US 
politics, civil–military relations and of military studies in general.
Charles A. Stevenson has witnessed and taught about US civil–military 
relations for over four decades while serving as a US Senate staffer and a 
professor at the National War College. He also served as a member of the 
Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff specializing in political–military and 
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Preface
Most writers on civil–military relations focus on the balance of power 
between the government leadership and the armed forces and defi ne civilian 
control in terms of the integrity of the chain of command. They ask top-down 
questions of command and control. Is the military truly subordinate to civil 
authority? How great is the danger of a military coup? When the president 
or prime minister gives an order, do the armed forces comply faithfully?
This book has a somewhat different focus. It is about the United States, not 
other countries, both because I know America best and because the United 
States has some historically unique features which give it a more unusual 
system of civil–military relations. The US Constitution was framed by men 
distrustful of standing armies and any concentrated power. They established 
a government with separated institutions sharing power. In particular, they 
created a dual system of civilian control – direct command from the President 
within the Executive Branch but also control by the Legislative Branch by 
means of laws and money. Other countries may have strong presidents or 
strong prime ministers based in powerful parliaments, but few come close to 
America’s system of truly separate and roughly co-equal branches of power.
I came to appreciate this dual system during more than two decades’ service 
on the staff of four US Senators. I observed and frequently participated in 
legislative efforts to recommend, direct, fund, and control the activities of 
the US armed forces and even the President. I witnessed and heard military 
complaints, outside the chain of command, about policies and actions of 
senior civilian leaders, often with entreaties to take countermanding measures. 
I became convinced that the US military is a very loyal and subordinate 
institution, but it is often cross-pressured by its two masters and it often feels 
compelled to turn to one for relief from the other.
Later, as a professor at the National War College, I developed a course 
on civil–military relations organized around the dilemmas faced by senior 
offi cers and their civilian leaders. When and how can one dissent from 
offi cial policy? What are the proper roles of civilians and military leaders 
in planning and executing combat missions? How should military offi cers 
relate to the Congress? Should offi cers avoid or engage in partisan politics? 
I teamed with a military faculty colleague in order to counteract my own 
biases on these issues. We drew upon historical examples from American 
experience with these and other questions.
Preface xiii
This book is an effort to expand the examples available for study. It 
seeks to show how US civilian and military leaders coped with periods of 
extraordinary stress and controversy – fi ghting wars, rearming to meet 
emerging threats, and radically changing the structure and missions of the 
armed forces. It is not a comprehensive history of US civil–military relations. 
It does not cover instances, such as the conduct of the First and Second 
World Wars, when the president or Congress was relatively quiescent or 
inactive in applying their levers of civilian control. Instead, I have picked 
signifi cant and illustrative episodes and have tried to tell the story of how the 
triangular relationships worked in practice. I have discovered patterns, more 
continuities than change, which make me believe that this is a useful focus 
on the issues of civil–military relations.
I am especially grateful to my colleagues over the years – in the Senate 
and at the National War College. They helped me to understand and apprec-
iate the quite different perspectives which senior leaders bring to their 
responsibilities. My contribution in return, and in this book, is to explain 
and defend the political factors which often infl uence policy. Civil–military 
relations in America is not necessarily a struggle, but it is certainly a contest 





The peculiar nature of US 
civil–military relations
A Standing Army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always 
dangerous to the Liberties of the People. … Such a Power should be watched 
with a jealous Eye.
Samuel Adams, 17761 
The Union itself, which [the Constitution] cements and secures, destroys 
every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous.
James Madison, Federalist, 41
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most 
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power 
by a single hand. 
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist, 74
United States armed forces take an oath to support and defend a piece of 
paper – the Constitution. The British military take an oath of allegiance 
to the monarch. German forces swear to defend the law and liberty of the 
people. The Japanese vow to maintain the nation’s independence and peace. 
Russians swear loyalty to the Fatherland. Perhaps not surprisingly, the French 
armed forces, after fi ve republics, two empires, numerous monarchies and 
several attempted military coups, take no oath.
The oath to the Constitution means that US military personnel must protect 
not only the structure of the Federal Government but also its processes. It 
means that they must even accept outcomes that are contrary to the wishes 
and interests of those in uniform. The dirty secret about democracy is that 
its test is fairness and faithful observance of the rules, not the wisdom or 
justice of the outcomes. To be a voter in a democracy one does not need 
to be informed, or smart, or consistent – only registered. Similarly, the top 
leaders and lawmakers in a democracy do not need to be wise or moral or 
logical – only elected.
The US government is unusual, too, because of the strength and 
independence of its branches of government. In parliamentary democracies, 
the legislature is supreme. In presidential systems, even when the parliament 
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is nominally important, the president is usually dominant, especially with 
regard to control of the military. Warriors prefer hierarchical systems because 
they value the unity of command – the clear line of authority so important 
in the stress of battle. In the United States, however, the commander-in-
chief, the President, controls only the immediate chain of command for 
the issuance of orders. The Congress controls the system of issuing orders, 
the organization of the forces, and, most importantly, the funds for their 
equipping and use. Responding to these dual sources of civilian control gives 
US military personnel special challenges and opportunities. This will be 
illustrated throughout this book.
Since the Constitution is the basis for civil–military relations in the United 
States, we must turn to the substance of that document and the history of 
its application to the armed forces. How the process works in wartime is 
particularly important and diffi cult. But it is also valuable and informative to 
consider how civil–military relations work in other challenging circumstances 
– in periods of rearmament and preparations for war, and in periods when 
the civilian leaders try to transform the military to deal with new threats and 
new technologies. From over 230 years of history, this book has selected a 
handful of signifi cant episodes to illustrate the major patterns of US civil–
military relations. These case studies were chosen both because they seem 
interesting and signifi cant and because most prior studies have neglected or 
minimized the role of Congress in these events. This book seeks to redress 
those omissions with fresh analysis.
Legacy of distrust of power
The founders of the American republic were familiar with ancient history. 
They recognized the role military forces and commanders had in the making 
and unmaking of governments in Athens and Rome. And they were acutely 
aware of recent British history, especially the ouster and execution of King 
Charles I, the Civil War, and the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell. Samuel 
Adams was only one of countless American patriots who believed that 
standing armies were a threat to representative government. As he wrote in 
1776, 
A Standing Army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always 
dangerous to the Liberties of the People. Soldiers are apt to consider 
themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of the Citizens. They have 
their Arms always in their hands. Their Rules and their Discipline is 
severe. They soon become attached to their offi cers and disposed to 
yield implicit obedience to their Commands. Such a Power should be 
watched with a jealous Eye.2
Americans in 1776 revolted not only against British taxation without 
representation, but also against military domination. The Declaration of 
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Independence complained that King George III had kept standing armies 
“among us, in Times of Peace” without local consent and that he “has 
affected to render the Military independent of, and superior to the Civil 
Power.” As will be seen in Chapter 2, the American revolutionaries fought 
their war of independence with unusual procedures precisely in order to 
forestall a military dictatorship. 
The fi rst system of government devised by the Americans, while the 
war for independence still raged, imposed tight restraints on the creation 
and use of military forces. The Articles of Confederation gave the central 
government “sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace 
and war” as well as authority to pay for “the common defence” out of a 
“common treasury.” There was no separate executive, only a congress which 
could act, with each state having one vote, by supermajorities of nine. The 
congress also had the powers of: “appointing all offi cers of the land forces, 
in the service of the united states, excepting regimental offi cers – appointing 
all the offi cers of the naval forces, and commissioning all offi cers whatever 
in the service of the united states – making rules for the government and 
regulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their operations.” 
The states were forbidden to maintain land or naval forces in peacetime 
above the number congress might deem “requisite.” These powers were 
undercut, however, by the fundamental weakness of the central government. 
It could not tax directly, but had to ask the states to raise funds proportionate 
to land values. It had no standing forces of its own in peacetime. Moreover, 
the Articles declared that “every state shall always keep up a well-regulated 
and disciplined militia” with suffi cient weapons and equipment and with all 
offi cers of colonel or below appointed by the state legislatures.3 
The government under the Articles could not even decide whether to 
create a peacetime military establishment to staff western forts and otherwise 
guard against Indians. And it was so inept at paying troops that it required 
an emotional appeal from George Washington to prevent a mutiny at 
Newburgh, NY in 1783.4 
When the delegates gathered in Philadelphia in the steamy summer of 
1787, they were determined to create a stronger government, better able to 
deal with threats at home and from abroad. While most historians credit the 
internal security concerns demonstrated by the tax revolt in Massachusetts 
called Shay’s Rebellion as the strongest impetus for the Constitutional 
Convention, Richard Kohn argues persuasively that the United States faced 
several other security threats – from the British in Canada to the Spanish in 
Florida and Louisiana as well as from the Indians along the frontier. Kohn 
also notes that of 18 explicit provisions of the Constitution listing Congress’ 
powers, 11 related to security.5 
The Framers had a theory of government, derived from Montesquieu 
and Locke, which called for divided government and safeguards against the 
concentration of power. What they created was a framework of separated 
institutions sharing power, in which action was possible only with the 
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concurrence of at least two of the three components of the government. 
It is misleading to call the Constitutional system a “separation of powers” 
because the actual powers are shared: no expenditures by the executive 
without appropriations by the Congress; no enactment of laws without the 
concurrence of the President; no enforcement of the laws without support 
of the judiciary. Each branch of government had some checks and balances 
on the other two.
The Framers had a theory of national strategy that permitted isolation 
from and neutrality with regard to the wars in Europe. The Atlantic Ocean 
was a huge defensive barrier to the east; thus the only major threat was 
from the European empires and their potential Indian allies on the frontier. 
To deal with those threats, the political and military leaders planned to 
rely on the local militias, with the possibility of federal command in acute 
circumstances. 
Over half the delegates to the Constitutional Convention – 30 of the 
55 – had served in uniform during the Revolutionary War. At least 15 had 
seen serious action.6 They were wary of a standing army but recognized 
the ultimate necessity of military capability. As William Paterson of New 
Jersey said when he presented the plan favored by the small states, “[N]o 
government could be energetic on paper only, which was no more than 
straw; there must be a small standing force to give every government weight.” 
Many of the delegates also had had enough experience with ragtag militia 
units to want a more professional army. They knew, Gouverneur Morris of 
Pennsylvania noted, “that to rely on militia was to lean on a broken reed.”7 
George Washington felt the same way: “They come in you cannot tell how, 
go you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where, consume your 
provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment.”8 
Despite these doubts about its effectiveness, the delegates saw the militia as 
a counterweight to the small standing army and voted to allow the states to 
choose militia offi cers. 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, later famous as Vice President under 
James Madison and designer of a state legislative district that looked like a 
salamander and gave rise to the term “Gerrymander”, was the most vocal 
opponent of a standing army at the convention. He was joined by George 
Mason of Virginia, another foe of a strong central government. When the 
delegates debated the military provisions in the draft document in August 
1787, Gerry argued vigorously that “There was no check here against standing 
armies in time of peace.” He proposed limiting the force to two or three 
thousand men. George Washington is said to have uttered a loud whisper 
that the document should also limit invading forces to the same number.9 
The numerical limitation never gained much support, but the delegates did 
approve a two year limit on the availability of funds for the army.
The delegates also changed the draft text from the Committee of Detail, 
which had given Congress the power to “make” war. After some delegates 
questioned the legislature’s ability to meet and act in a crisis, Madison and 
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Gerry proposed changing the wording to “declare” war. Madison argued 
that the new language would allow “the executive the power to repel sudden 
attacks.” And Roger Sherman of Connecticut agreed, saying “the executive 
should be able to repel and not commence war.”10 
Ultimately, Gerry refused to sign the Constitution, as did George Mason. 
And one of the strongest criticisms raised by the Antifederalists during the 
ratifi cation debates was the issue of the standing army. Patrick Henry, for 
example, argued that the Constitution provided “a government of force, 
and the genius of despotism expressly.” Other opponents used similar 
infl ammatory arguments, calling the standing army “the nursery of vice”, 
“engines of despotism”, the “bane of freedom.”11 
One proof of the power of these arguments is that nearly every state’s 
ratifying convention urged further amendments to the Constitution, such as 
limits on Congress’ power to raise forces and a ban on quartering of troops 
in private homes. Several states also urged restrictions on federalizing the 
militia. To respond to these concerns, early in the First Congress, Madison 
included provisions on weapon ownership and troop quartering as the 
second and third amendments in his Bill of Rights.12 
Constitutional safeguards
The Framers wrote a Constitution fi lled with what now may seem quaint 
details regarding military forces. But at the time they were considered 
necessary safeguards against a large standing army that could repress the 
rights of citizens. By design, the army and navy were intended to be creatures 
Figure 1.1 Signing of the US Constitution, 1787 (National Archives)
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of the Congress. In enumerating the powers of the legislative branch, the 
Constitution specifi cally provides that the Congress could “raise and support 
Armies” and “provide and maintain a Navy.” But it was also specifi cally 
empowered “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval forces” and “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute 
the Laws of the union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” Those 
were the threats the Framers feared and for which they were willing to create 
armed forces. But the militia – the citizen-soldiers living at home – was the 
primary force envisioned for local defense. To give some coherence to such 
forces, however, the Constitution also specifi cally authorized Congress “To 
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia” – so that the 
troops might easily be melded into a federal force. They remembered the 
diffi culty Washington and General von Steuben had training the Continental 
army.13
The Framers gave Congress three additional powers to control the 
military. Most important was the power “To declare War”, words carefully 
chosen to give the legislature the right to authorize combat, while letting the 
executive branch control its conduct. The Philadelphia convention revised 
the original wording – “to make war” – to recognize this distinction. Second 
was the power given to the Senate to advise and consent to nominations for 
military offi cers as well as civilian offi cials of the government. While this was 
probably intended as a check on the appointment of unqualifi ed or corrupt 
people, it became over time an important source of congressional leverage 
on the executive branch.
The third power, the power of the purse, applied to all of the executive 
branch, not just the military: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”14 Over the years since 
1787, Congress has authorized some deviations from a strict reading of this 
language, such as permitting later reimbursement for “food and forage” 
for troops in remote areas and allowing some secret accounts that do not 
need to be publicly reported, though Congress must be informed. But this 
basic requirement makes the military beholden to the legislature for pay and 
weapons and peacetime bases – and subject to the limitations on expenditures 
the lawmakers frequently have wanted to impose.
As evidence of the particular concern over standing armies, the Framers 
specifi cally provided that “no Appropriation of Money [for the army] shall 
be for a longer Term than two years.” In theory, each new Congress must re-
establish the army, or it would be forced to demobilize. In practice, the law 
now allows money for weapons procurement and research and development 
– though not for pay or operations – to be spent over a longer period of 
years.
Congress has claimed for itself another power, fully accepted by the 
other two branches of government: the power to oversee and investigate the 
military. As one might expect, this has been used – ever since Washington’s 
administration – to look into military disasters, such as failed campaigns 
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against the Indians, and to expose mismanagement of government contracts. 
While the authority for oversight is linked in theory to the development of 
new laws, in practice it is another instrument to use for political purposes, 
especially the embarrassment of those being investigated.
The President also has important powers over the military, ones more 
direct and practical than those of the Congress. The Constitution designates 
the President as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual 
Service of the United States.” He also has the power to make nominations 
– to pick the senior offi cers for various units – subject of course to the 
advice and consent of the Senate. Once confi rmed, however, offi cers may be 
removed from their positions only by the President. The Constitution gives 
Congress the power to impeach and remove from offi ce only “civil offi cers” 
of the government, including the judiciary, not “military offi cers.”15
The Framers were not very detailed in listing the powers of the president, 
for they anticipated that Washington would be the fi rst to hold the offi ce 
and they recognized his good judgment and leadership qualities. They were 
not worried about limiting the power of the executive branch because they 
thought that the Constitution imposed suffi cient limits. 
The Supreme Court fi lled a logical vacuum in the power balance by assert-
ing its right to declare laws unconstitutional, thus checking even a united 
legislature and executive. On questions of war fi ghting and civilian control of 
the military, however, the court has historically been quite deferential to the 
other two branches. Presidents have been given wide berth in their conduct 
during major wars, and the court has avoided deciding what it considers 
“political questions,” such as the constitutionality of the war powers act. Yet 
it remains as a potential player in disputes between warriors and politicians 
if compelling circumstances arise.
The framework established by the Constitution was given fl esh and motion 
in the early years of the Republic. This book pays special attention to these 
periods because America’s initial political and military leaders set precedents 
which infl uenced later history. George Washington tried to consult with the 
Senate on treaties and military operations, but was rebuffed. The Congress 
investigated and criticized a disastrous operation against the Indians. Adams 
used partisan criteria in picking military offi cers. Congress maintained tight 
control over the expenditure of funds for the army and navy, and directed 
contracts to favored localities. Peace and war decisions, which arguably 
should have been made with regard to a common national interest, in fact 
became embroiled in domestic politics and partisan disputes. Not all of these 
early precedents have survived to the present day – but only because of 
conscious decisions to act differently in response to other developments in 
the course of US history. This book cannot cover all of these twists and turns, 
but it does try to illustrate some key patterns.
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Three challenges
In peacetime, civil–military relations fall into a comfortable pattern, 
accommodating the interests and concerns of the various institutions of 
government. Short, limited deployments – such as the numerous operations 
of the 1980s and 1990s in places like Lebanon, Somalia, and the Balkans 
– may provoke controversy and friction, as indeed they did, but those effects 
subside.16 
This book deals with the much more stressful challenges of wartime, 
rearmament, and transformation – situations which last longer and are viewed 
by the participants as much more consequential. If a political system can 
handle these cases, then civil–military relations can be judged in balance.
Wartime is the greatest challenge. Lives are at stake. Costs are high. The 
risks are substantial but not always knowable. War forces agonizing decisions 
on civilian leaders, not the least of which is how much trust and discretion 
to give to military leaders. Combatant commanders face obverse problems 
– how to obtain needed guidance and resources from their superiors without 
compromising their professional standards and judgment. The longer the 
confl ict, the more elusive the desired victory, the more friction builds up 
between warriors and politicians.
For this book, I have chosen to describe US civil–military relations in 
three lengthy and diffi cult wars of the distant past, plus the still-unfolding 
story of the wars and military transformation of George W. Bush and Donald 
Rumsfeld. The Revolutionary War discussed in Chapter 2 is signifi cant not 
only because it was America’s fi rst war as a nation but also because the civilian 
and military leaders learned key lessons which they applied to the design of 
the Constitution and its republic – in particular the need for a well-resourced 
central government and a military under singular, hierarchical control. The 
Civil War was America’s most deadly, the only one that truly threatened its 
existence, and the one that raised for its warriors and politicians the most 
profound political as well as military questions and choices. While thousands 
of books describe Lincoln and his generals, few explain, as I do in Chapter 
3, the signifi cant impact that Congress had on events. The Vietnam War was 
America’s longest confl ict, its least successful, the only one to bridge two 
presidencies, and second only to the Civil War in its divisive consequences 
for American politics. Thus the story in Chapter 4 describes deft political 
calculations, angry military leaders, and profound Constitutional battles. 
There are other episodes that could be examined, given enough time 
and space. Thomas Jefferson fought an undeclared war against the Barbary 
pirates, setting precedents for after-the-fact involvement of Congress. James 
Madison, briefl y and ingloriously, took fi eld command of US forces in the 
War of 1812, a confl ict spurred by one region and strongly opposed by 
another. James K. Polk engineered a war which he wanted to fi ght with 
Mexico and left his political opponents sputtering and helpless. The stories 
of the Spanish–American War and the two world wars have been ably and 
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extensively told in other books, which the curious reader should seek 
out.17 
Rearmament stresses civil–military relations in different ways. It requires a 
strategic judgment that confl ict is approaching and then strong leadership to 
persuade the people and their representatives to shift resources from peacetime 
pursuits to military requirements. The military, too, must be responsive to 
the new situation and willing to undertake different ways of dealing with the 
expected threat. In Chapter 5 I describe the fi rst real rearmament undertaken 
by the US government, to deal with the growing threat from the French in 
the 1790s. This was the time when the United States fi nally created a navy 
and a standing army, and it occasioned vicious political disputes between the 
emerging political parties. This case also demonstrates that even the staunchest 
American patriots, men who had fought the revolutionary war together, were 
unwilling to suspend their political disagreements to confront a foreign foe. 
Quite the contrary: the question of whether America’s national interests were 
best served by closer ties to Britain or France was the basis for the development 
of the fi rst two political parties.
Chapter 6 tells the story of Franklin Roosevelt’s deft maneuvers to prepare 
America for what became the Second World War. The issue was deeper than 
military preparedness, which all politicians favored. Roosevelt challenged 
the long American tradition of neutrality and isolation. He succeeded both 
through his own skill and through bipartisan political support. He was also 
fortunate in having and choosing military leaders who were knowledgeable 
and willing to share the political burdens with him.
Chapter 7 covers Harry Truman’s slow acceptance of military rearmament, 
despite his prompt willingness to use political and economic instruments 
to contain Communism. It also shows how Truman accepted and asserted 
leadership in an unexpected war in Korea, including how he dealt with an 
insubordinate but popular commander. 
Other rearmament episodes could have been studied, and perhaps also 
the disarmament and demobilization that occurred under Jefferson, Andrew 
Johnson, and Woodrow Wilson – for postwar adjustments are often as stressful 
for politicians and warriors as the buildup to confl ict. America did rearm 
in anticipation of the First World War, and the military greatly expanded 
after the fi rst Soviet sputnik in 1957 and in the 1980s.18 The cases studied 
here, however, involved profound strategic decisions and reorientations, not 
simply a muscling up to deal with a recognized threat.
Military modernization and transformation pose different problems, 
concentrating more on the armed forces themselves than on strategic judg-
ments by politicians. Yet history has shown that military institutions tend 
to make radical changes only in response to defeats, and that successful 
militaries are slow to change what they believe provided past victory. When 
outsiders try to impose their own vision of a modern military, they tend to 
confront tough resistance from the offi cer corps – unless they make strategic 
alliances with those mavericks who advocate major innovation. 
10 Introduction
Modernization stories here tell of wrenching change imposed by two 
strong personalities who sustained political support until their efforts took 
root. Chapter 8 recounts Theodore Roosevelt’s bullying efforts to turn the 
US military into a force worthy of a world power and capable to police 
a growing empire. Chapter 9 describes Robert McNamara’s centralization 
of power in the offi ce of the Secretary of Defense and his imposition of a 
new language – systems analysis – for thinking about budgets and strategy. 
How he subdued the generals and admirals, and kept support in Congress, 
is an amazing tale – all the more tragic because of his subsequent failure in 
Vietnam. Chapter 10 gives a different example of transformation imposed 
from outside – the case of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation that forced the 
US military to set aside their longstanding service parochialism and think and 
act more jointly. This case shows that Congress, too, can be an instrument of 
valuable innovation, even against a reluctant Pentagon. 
There is a large body of literature on US military innovation, with many 
tales of heroes and villains and exciting stories of success against long odds, 
like the brave efforts to develop aviation in the period between the two world 
wars. There are also examples of failed innovation, when the politicians and 
warriors did not embrace the new concepts and technologies we now see as 
vital. It is depressing to consider how long the US navy resisted steam power 
and ironclad ships, how slow that navy was to appreciate aircraft carriers, 
or how many obstacles it placed in the way of Hyman Rickover’s efforts to 
build nuclear-powered submarines. It is instructive, but not surprising, to 
study how long the US air force smothered the development of unmanned 
aerial vehicles so that pilots could remain the lords of the sky. It is only mildly 
reassuring to examine how the US Army eventually accepted helicopters, 
special forces, and lighter, more rapidly deployable combat units.19 
At the strategic level, the most important military transformation not 
included here was Dwight Eisenhower’s “new look,” his effort to reduce 
conventional forces and thereby the defense budget while relying on nuclear 
weapons for deterrence and possible war fi ghting. The army’s efforts to 
resist the president’s strategy were an important part of the politico–strategic 
debate in America in the crisis period launched by the fi rst sputnik and 
continuing through John F. Kennedy’s election.20 
All three challenges – warfi ghting, rearmament and transformation – 
came together under George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld. The top civilian 
leaders entered offi ce determined to reshape the US military in radical ways; 
they then got involved in two geographic wars and a global fi ght against 
terrorists which required a different type of rearmament. Initial military 
resistance to the transformation efforts in 2001 was replaced by a surge of 
patriotism and political support following the September 11 attacks. And 
congressional actions during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq followed a 
different pattern from many earlier confl icts. 
These case study chapters are simple narratives. In the concluding chapter, 
I try to point out some patterns and draw some lessons about civil–military 
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relations in the United States. But this is not a book about theory. Many other 
scholars have done interesting work in that area,21 but they fall short, in my 
judgment, because they give insuffi cient attention to the role of Congress and 
the triangular relationship, the dual sources of civilian control, that is a key 
feature of the American system. The fi nal chapter offers thoughts on how to 
view and understand these unique aspects of US civil–military relations.

Part I 
The challenge of 
warfi ghting

2 Revolutionary war by 
committee 
[The Congress] think it but to say Presto begone, and everything is done.
George Washington, 17771
We don’t choose to trust you Generals, with too much Power, for too Long 
Time.
John Adams to General Horatio Gates2 
George Washington was torn by the Continental Congress’ offer to lead 
the army assembled outside of Boston in June, 1775. Like other eighteenth 
century gentlemen, he welcomed the chance to demonstrate his military 
prowess and win fame and glory. But he knew the risks were great and his 
family and estate might suffer. As he wrote to his wife Martha on June 18, 
enclosing his hastily drafted will, “life is always uncertain, and common 
prudence dictates to every man the necessity of settling his temporal concerns 
while it is in his power ….” He also proclaimed, “I shall rely, therefore, 
confi dently on that Providence which has heretofore preserved and been 
bountiful to me, not doubting but that I shall return safe to you in the fall.”3 
In fact, Washington was to be on duty and away from home for the next 
seven years, except for 10 days just before the climactic battle at Yorktown 
in 1781. Besides enemy forces and the privations of eighteenth century 
military encampments, Washington also had to contend with the Continental 
Congress, a body ill-suited to manage a life-or-death confl ict. The Congress 
was a part-time group of lawyers, merchants, and farmers gathered from 
the 13 colonies to fashion a common response to British policies in North 
America. It had no power to raise money or armies, but was dependent on 
the voluntary responses of the various provincial legislatures to its requests. 
Prior to independence, foreign recognition, and the election of new state 
governments under new constitutions, it had questionable legitimacy. Twice 
it was forced to fl ee its home base of Philadelphia to escape capture by the 
British. Yet it wrote the rules and gave the guidance to Washington and his 
Continental army, and struggled to acquire the weapons and supplies that 
allowed it to survive and fi ght and ultimately win. In that long process of 
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war and diplomacy, fund-raising and law-making, consideration of matters 
profound and mundane, the Continental Congress and Washington set 
precedents and practices which have endured into the twenty-fi rst century. 
The civil–military relations during the Revolutionary War established the 
model, including tensions and fl aws, for later confl icts.
Decisions for war 
It was by no means inevitable in June 1775 that the 13 colonies would declare 
their independence or be successful in achieving it. The First Continental 
Congress, meeting in the fall of 1774, declared its fealty to King George 
III and blamed parliament for “unjust, cruel, and oppressive acts” against 
the people of Massachusetts. The delegates called for a boycott of British 
goods and passed Articles of Association to monitor its implementation 
through local committees of correspondence. They hoped that redress could 
be achieved peacefully. When sending copies of its resolutions to Benjamin 
Franklin in London, the Secretary of the Congress, Charles Thomson, wrote, 
“Even yet the wound may be healed & peace and love restored: But we are 
on the brink of a precipice.”4 
By the time the Second Continental Congress assembled on May 10, 
1775, however, blood had been shed at Lexington and Concord and an 
army of perhaps 18,000 New Englanders had gathered near Boston to fi ght 
the British force. The delegates authorized several preparations for war even 
as they named a committee to draw up a petition to the king for peace. 
On June 3, the congress set up a committee to consider ways and means of 
borrowing £6000 to buy gunpowder. On June 14 it called 10 companies 
of expert rifl emen be raised in Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia and 
sent to Boston. The same day it appointed a committee to “draft rules and 
regulations for the government of the army.” On June 15 it voted to name 
George Washington “to command all the Continental forces.” And on June 
16 it adopted a plan of organization for the army and established a committee 
to prepare instructions.5 The next day, redcoats and patriots clashed in what 
came to be called the battle of Bunker Hill. 
Washington was chosen because the New Englanders recognized the value 
of having a Virginian in charge of what were then mostly local soldiers. 
John Adams made the nomination, and the assembly agreed unanimously. 
Connecticut delegate Eliphaler Dyer wrote that it was “absolutely Necessary 
in point of prudence” to pick someone from outside New England because 
“it removes all jealousies, more fi rmly Cements the Southern to the 
Northern, and takes away the fear of the former lest an Enterprising eastern 
New England Genll. Proving successful, might with his Victorious Army 
give law to the Southern or Western Gentry.”6 Congress’ endorsement and 
Washington’s leadership made Boston’s fi ght America’s fi ght. 
Dyer’s comment demonstrates that, even if fi ghting for their liberties, the 
colonial leaders were concerned about the threat from a standing army. They 
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knew quite well what Oliver Cromwell had done barely a century earlier 
in Britain when he led his New Model Army fi rst against the king and later 
against any who opposed his dictatorship. Samuel Adams warned, 
Soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the 
rest of the Citizens. They have their Arms always in their hands. Their 
Rules and their Discipline is severe. They soon become attached to their 
offi cers and disposed to yield implicit obedience to their Commands. 
Such a Power should be watched with a jealous Eye.7 
Even the Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George Mason, explicitly 
said, “that standing armies in time of peace should be avoided as dangerous to 
liberty; and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination 
to, and governed by, the civil power.”8
While the Continental Congress sometimes gave near-dictatorial powers 
to Washington and other commanders for specifi c operations in particular 
regions, it remained on guard, and with tight purse strings, throughout the 
revolutionary struggle. And the Framers of the Constitution took special 
pains to guarantee civilian control in the new government by numerous 
provisions, including a reliance on a militia force rather than a standing 
army.
Washington‘s commission from the Congress told him “punctually to 
observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as you shall 
receive from this, or a future Congress of these United Colonies, or committee 
of Congress.”9 His formal instructions listed as the fi rst requirement to report 
back as soon as possible on the status of his own troops and their provisions. 
He was, however, given the power “to use your best circumspection and 
(advising with your council of war) to order and dispose of the said Army 
under command as may be most advantageous ….”10 In deference to this 
provision, or perhaps from an excess of caution, Washington felt compelled 
at least until 1777 to consult his senior subordinates and obtain majority 
approval from that a council of war before undertaking major operations.11 
A persuasive explanation for why Washington accepted Congress’ nitpick-
ing and micromanagement, and tolerated its frequent failures to provide 
adequate resources, comes from his defi nitive biographer, Douglas Southall 
Freeman: 
In dealing with Congressmen and in winning their support, Washington’s 
experience as a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses was of value 
beyond calculation. Nothing he possessed, save integrity, helped him 
so much, from his very fi rst day of command, as his sure and intimate 
knowledge of the workings of the legislative mind. In the discharge of 
every duty to Congress and in the presentation of every request, his 
approach could be accurate, informed, and deferential. … Now that he 
had met and had conversed with some of the best men of every Colony, 
he was able to understand their problems and those of America.12 
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Congressional guidance reached a surprising level of detail in the general 
orders approved on June 30. These articles of war were a slightly revised 
version of the existing British provisions, running through 69 paragraphs. 
They included: a recommendation “diligently to attend Divine Service” 
– article II; a 4 shilling penalty for “profane cursing or swearing” – article 
III; demotion to private of any noncommissioned offi cer for neglect or 
waste of ammunition, arms, or provisions – article XV; immediate death 
penalty for anyone who “shamefully abandon[s] any post committed to 
his charge” – article XXV; a limitation on non-capital punishments to 39 
lashes and fi nes of two months pay – article LI; a ban on selling liquor or 
entertainment “after nine at night …or upon Sundays, during divine service 
or sermon” – article LXIV.13 By the end of 1776, however, in response to 
military setbacks, Congress increased the number of permitted lashes to 
100 and also increased the number of crimes for which the death penalty 
could be imposed.14
Not content to pass resolutions and appoint committees, more than half 
the delegates journeyed to Cambridge after their August 1 adjournment in 
order to see the fl edgling army fi rsthand.15 They returned in September eager 
to continue the military buildup.
War aims
Prior to the Declaration of Independence, the Continental army had a limited 
objective: “for the defence of American liberty and for repelling every hostile 
invasion thereof,” in the words of Congress’ instructions to Washington. In 
passing the articles of war on June 30, Congress acknowledged that British 
reinforcements were headed toward Boston and declared that an American 
force “be raised suffi cient to defeat such hostile designs, and preserve and 
defend the lives, liberties and immunities of the Colonists.”16
In practice, these words meant removal of the British troops from Boston, 
repeal of the other sanctions imposed on Massachusetts, and a restoration 
of pre-1774 colonial liberties. Although Congress urged a direct attack on 
General Gage’s troops in Boston, even offering a bonus of a month’s pay in 
case of success, Washington instead maneuvered. In a nighttime surprise, his 
troops seized Dorchester Heights, thus allowing them to threaten British land 
and naval forces. The Redcoats’ withdrawal on March 17, 1776 was part of 
a strategic decision by the new British commanding general to relocate his 
expanding forces to New York and try to sever the New England colonies 
from their brethren to the south.
By that time, sentiment throughout the colonies was turning in favor of 
independence. George III had proclaimed the colonies in a state of rebellion 
in August 1775 and ordered that “all our Offi cers, civil and military, are 
obliged to exert their utmost endeavours to suppress such rebellion, and 
to bring the traitors to justice.”17 Local assemblies began petitioning the 
Congress to declare independence, but many delegates, especially from the 
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middle colonies, felt that the time was not yet ripe and held out hope that 
British peace commissioners might arrive with conciliatory proposals.
Although British troops had been withdrawn from Boston, the Crown was 
assembling a huge force of British and German troops, more than 32,000, to 
send against the rebels. Anticipating an attack, even the moderates supported 
measures to prepare for war. In the spring of 1776, Congress approved funds 
for presents and bribes for Indian leaders, to try to keep them neutral, and 
summoned Washington to Philadelphia for consultations at the end of May. 
Those conferences led to decisions to send 6,000 reinforcements to Canada, 
to raise a force of 13,000 for New York, and to establish what was called a 
10,000-man “fl ying camp” of militia that could be deployed where needed.18 
A few months before, Congress had authorized privateering against British 
ships and building four armed ships for a new American navy.
On June 7, Richard Henry Lee offered the radicals’ three-fold plan for 
dealing with the British threat. The fi rst provision was the famous declar-
ation “That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and 
independent States ….” But the second and third provisions were equally 
signifi cant. They called for “the most effectual measures for forming foreign 
Alliances” and for “a plan of confederation.”19 The rebels recognized that 
independence required support from abroad and greater unity at home.
Throughout the long confl ict, the congressional leaders never wavered 
from their insistence on full independence. Even when their major cities 
were captured by the British, when the army was nearly destitute at Valley 
Forge, when the currency collapsed, when soldiers turned mutinous over 
inadequate pay – the patriots held fi rm. 
 And they suffered for it. By the time the war ended, more than half the 
members of the Continental Congress had seen their property looted or 
destroyed. Many were imprisoned or driven into hiding. Of the 342 men 
elected at one time or another to the Congress, 134 served in the militia 
or the Continental army – and of them, one was killed in action, 12 were 
seriously wounded, and 23 were taken prisoner.20 In these and other ways, 
they paid a price for their patriotism. Their pledge of their lives, their 
fortunes and their sacred honor was not mere rhetoric. 
Strategy 
From Congress’ standpoint, the way to achieve independence was to persuade 
others of the justness of the American cause, to enlist foreign support, to 
raise a large local force to fi ght the British when they approached, and to 
capture Canada so that the British had no foothold in North America. 
In support of this strategy, Congress took numerous actions in the month 
after voting to create a Continental army in June 1775. It approved a formal 
“Address to the Inhabitants of Great Britain” complaining that “our Petitions 
are treated with Indignity; our Prayers answered by insults.” It also sent 
letters to the people of Ireland and Jamaica and the “oppressed inhabitants” 
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of Canada, expressing the hope “of your uniting with us in the defense of 
our common liberty.”21 
On July 6, 1775, Congress issued a declaration “setting forth the causes 
and necessity of their taking up arms.” This document, a blend of drafts 
from moderate John Dickinson of Pennsylvania and the radical Thomas 
Jefferson of Virginia, summarized the history of “These devoted colonies” 
and their “peaceful and respectful behaviour” until the British government 
decided to change the established form of government and impose a new 
despotism. The declaration charged that British troops “have butchered 
our countrymen” and “spread destruction and devastation.” It asserted that 
“Honour, justice, and humanity, forbid us tamely to surrender that freedom 
which we have received from our gallant ancestors.” Yet it stopped short 
of independence. “We have not raised armies with ambitious designs of 
separating from Great-Britain, and establishing independent states.” Instead, 
it pleaded for “reconciliation on reasonable terms.”22
In addition to these rhetorical appeals, Congress took several concrete 
actions in the same period. On June 22, the delegates approved the issuance 
of $2 million in bills of credit to pay for the army. On June 27 it ordered 
preparations for talks with Indian tribes, to assure their neutrality in the 
confl ict. The same day, it directed Major General Schuyler to seize St. Johns, 
Montreal, and any other parts of Canada “which may have a tendency 
to promote the peace and security of these Colonies.” And on July 15, it 
Figure 2.1 Washington and a Committee of Congress at Valley Forge (National 
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voted an exemption from the boycott law for trade in gunpowder, saltpeter, 
sulphur, cannon, muskets and other munitions. On July 18 it recommended 
that each colony take steps to defend its harbors and seacoasts. And on 
July 21 it received for later consideration Benjamin Franklin’s proposal for 
Articles of Confederation.23 In December, Silas Deane of Connecticut would 
be sent to France to seek moral and material support.
These measures demonstrate Congress’ approach prior to the Declaration 
of Independence – public appeals, military mobilization, search for allies, 
and political cooperation. The intended role of the army was to drive Gage 
from Boston and to capture Canada. 
Washington saw the strategic problem differently. He thought that not 
to lose was to win, that the British would ultimately tire of a protracted 
confl ict. He was at fi rst dubious of obtaining suffi cient foreign support and, 
as an infantryman, failed to appreciate the impact of the French navy in 
diverting and defeating the Royal Navy. He opposed excessive reliance 
on the militia, rather than the Continental army, because he repeatedly 
witnessed its shortcomings – poor training and command, brief enlistments, 
and a tendency to retreat from battle. “Are these the men with whom I am 
to defend America?” he cried at the battle of Kip’s Bay in New York. Earlier, 
he had described the forces assembled at Cambridge as he took command 
as “an exceedingly dirty and nasty people.” He was indifferent to the 
congressionally mandated invasion of Canada, which ultimately failed.24
The commander-in-chief adopted a defensive strategy, hoping to avoid 
a decisive battle which could result in a decisive defeat. As Russell Weigley 
wrote, “the strategy of the American armies in the Revolutionary War had to 
be a strategy founded upon weakness.”25 Washington said he could not divide 
his army without risking great losses. And he opposed making major attacks 
“since the Idea of forcing their lines or bringing on a General Engagement 
on their own Grounds, is Universally held incompatible with our Interest.”26 
As a result, Washington avoided confrontation with main British army units 
whenever possible.27 
Congress was ill-equipped to manage the war but felt responsible for its 
conduct. A legislative body, by its nature, cannot easily make timely decisions 
or regulate the implementation of its orders. It is better at retrospective 
oversight than day-to-day management. Yet there was no other entity to 
run the war effort. There was no other government that involved all of the 
colonies.
Starting in 1776, Congress felt obliged to be in session almost continuously 
until 1784, recessing only for a few days at a time. That reduced attendance, 
as members went home from time to time to take care of personal business, 
but it preserved some sort of government in being throughout the war. The 
demands were even heavier on those appointed to serve on committees, which 
dealt with particular issues. At fi rst, the assembly created new committees for 
each subject and proposal, from drafting documents to handling relations 
with Indian tribes. By the end of 1775 it created standing committees to 
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replace the ad hoc ones. A Secret Committee was set up to import munitions 
and other necessary supplies. It later became the Commerce Committee. 
A Committee of Secret Correspondence maintained communications with 
American agents and informants abroad. It later became the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. One of the most important panels was the Board of War and 
Ordnance, which was concerned with supplying the army. It acted as the 
executive over the army until 1777, when Congress created a subordinate 
Board of War, consisting of full-time offi cials who were not delegates to the 
Congress. Only in 1781 did it create executive departments – for foreign 
affairs, war, and the navy.28
There was a voluminous correspondence between the Congress and 
the commander-in-chief. The general requested supplies and guidance and 
received a healthy dose of the latter. In addition, there were six special 
commissions sent to Washington’s headquarters, at least one each year, mainly 
to investigate problems and report back to the Congress. As John Adams 
wrote, “This is the Way to have things go right: for Offi cers to correspond 
constantly with Congress and communicate their Sentiments freely.”29
Washington sometimes resisted, as in this letter of March 14, 1777. 
“Could I accomplish the important objects so eagerly sought by Congress 
– ‘confi ning the enemy within their present quarters, preventing their 
getting supplies from the country, and totally subduing them before they are 
reinforced’ – I should be happy indeed, But what prospect or hope can there 
be of my effecting so desirable a work at this time? The enclosed return, to 
which I solicit the most respectful attention of Congress, comprehends the 
whole force I have in Jersey.”30
In practice, Congress meddled more with the armies in the north and south 
than in the middle states, where Washington was usually headquartered. 
Although he was the overall commander, he acceded to those forces’ greater 
autonomy from him and greater oversight by Congress in those regions.31 
War by committee proved unsatisfactory, leading to the creation of executive 
agents under the committees and eventual regular departments to manage 
particular activities. These experiences persuaded the revolutionary leaders, 
when they met to craft a new Constitution, to create institutions that 
vested power and authority in a strong executive – and in a strong central 
government. But those lessons came only after painful experiences.
 Personnel 
Just as Washington had been selected for geographical as well as military 
reasons, Congress named other general offi cers for the same reasons. Major 
general commissions went to Artemus Ward, head of the Massachusetts 
militia; two former British offi cers now Virginians, Charles Lee and 
Horatio Gates; and Israel Putnam of Connecticut and Philip Schuyler of 
New York. Brigadier commissions went mainly to New Englanders, since 
theirs was the only real force in being at the time. Regimental offi cers 
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were supposed to be recommended by provincial assemblies, subject to 
Washington’s approval.32 
After two years of pleas and demands from would-be generals and their 
congressional patrons, Congress fi nally in February 1777 adopted what was 
called its Baltimore resolution on the subject: “In voting for general offi cers, 
a due regard shall be had to the line of succession, the merit of the persons 
proposed, and the quota of the troops raised, and to be raised, by each 
state.”33 In practice, both Washington and the Congress worked through the 
local governors in picking local commanders.34 
As the war went on, Congress came under pressure to give high ranks 
to foreign offi cers recruited in Europe by Silas Deane. Some, like Steuben 
and Lafayette, proved enormously able. Others had infl ated credentials 
and insuffi cient skill. American offi cers also used their political contacts 
to try to advance their promotions and careers – a pattern also followed 
in later decades. Congress insisted, during the revolution and as part of 
the Constitution, on having ultimate power over the selection of military 
offi cers. 
Junior offi cers and enlisted personnel were recruited locally, though 
Congress requested particular force levels during the course of the war. 
Those in the militia typically served only a few months each year, and even 
the Continental army had trouble obtaining people for more than a year at 
a time. One reason for Washington’s dramatic 1776 Christmastime attack 
across the Delaware against the German troops encamped at Trenton was to 
make use of his men before they returned home as their enlistments expired 
at the end of the year. He also desperately needed a morale-boosting victory 
after his defeats earlier that year around New York and while retreating 
across New Jersey.35 Congress tried to boost enlistments with various bonuses 
and pension promises, but these proved less successful as the currency lost 
value. 
During the course of the war, the Congress named 73 general offi cers. 
Fifty-two had previous military experience – 16 in an English or European 
army, and 36 in the colonial militia. Even some with no prior experience 
performed amazingly well, including Henry Knox, who organized the 
American artillery units, and Nathanael Greene, who learned so well and 
so quickly that he often commanded in Washington’s absence and later 
organized an innovative guerrilla campaign in the south.36 On the other 
hand, seven of the 29 major generals resigned, one died, one was discharged, 
and one committed treason.37 
The Continental army never had more than about 17,000 under arms 
at one time, although over the course of the war as many as 232,000 men 
were formally enlisted. Perhaps one-fourth of the continental soldiers took 
unauthorized leave at some time. Militia forces were much larger throughout 
the war, but they served under short, irregular enlistments and were less well 
trained. The largest force in any one year, regular and militia, was estimated 
to be 47,000 men in 1776. Britain nearly doubled the size of its pre-war army, 
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including hiring 30,000 German mercenaries – uniformly labeled Hessians, 
though they came from many Germany states. In 1776, it sent 50,000 troops 
to garrison Canada and fi ght the rebellious colonies. The armies directly 
confronting Washington ranged from 28,000 to 34,000 soldiers.38 
The Continental navy was a much smaller force, and it faced the large 
and powerful Royal Navy. While some delegates such as John Adams saw 
the value of a fl eet, other shrank from the high shipbuilding costs. Congress 
named a navy committee in October 1775. A few months later it purchased 
eight ships and ordered the building of 13 new frigates. In addition they 
sought to draw upon state naval forces, which never amounted to more 
than 40 boats overall. Consequently, the bulk of the commerce-raiding done 
by American ships was done by privateers. More than 2,000 got letters of 
marque authorizing them to attack and seize British ships. Interdiction by 
American and European ships was substantial – over half the 6,000 British 
ships involved in overseas trade fell into enemy hands at some point in the 
war.39 
American shipbuilding, however, was far less successful. Only six 
American-built frigates ever got to sea, and only one survived the war. Only 
one larger ship-of-the-line was fi nished before the end of the war. In July 
1777 Congress was so upset at the escalating costs of ships being built it gave 
permission to its committee to “put a stop” to construction because of the 
“extravagant prices now demanded for all kinds of materials used in ship-
building, and the enormous wages required by tradesmen and laborers.” 
Despite the cost problems, the committee felt the need was too great, so it 
approved continued payments.40
Supply 
Congress also had the clear responsibility of obtaining the supplies for the 
army it had created and paying its people. These proved to be enormous 
challenges, poorly met. Three weeks before declaring independence, after 
repeated requests from Washington for the delegates to set up some system of 
management, Congress created a fi ve-member Board of War and Ordnance 
under John Adams as chairman. It was to keep records of all personnel and 
equipment and was responsible for “the raising, fi tting out, and dispatching all 
such land forces as may be ordered for the service of the United Colonies.”41 
Later, in July 1777, a subordinate Board of War was created, with three full-
time offi cials, not members of Congress. Only in 1781 did Congress create 
a regular war department. 
The Board had an impossible set of tasks. There was little domestic 
production capability for key items – no gunpowder, saltpeter, iron and 
steel, or canvas for ship sails. Special committees were established to search, 
inquire, beg, and contract for needed items. The army in the fi eld was often 
successful in capturing British supplies of needed items or in seizing them 
locally, often from British loyalists. Privateers also captured signifi cant 
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supplies at sea and turned them over to the army. Congress also let contracts 
to American suppliers for food and clothing and some other supplies, using 
early forms of advertising, bids, and proposals. When this system broke down 
in 1780, mainly because of the depreciation of the Continental currency 
used to pay for purchases, Congress turned the supply problem over to the 
individual states for the duration of the war.42
Even when supplies were available, logistical problems sometimes 
prevented goods from reaching the army. It has been estimated, for example, 
that there was enough food in the area to feed the forces starving at Valley 
Forge in the winter of 1777, but that there were not enough wagons available 
to transport it to Washington’s camp.43 
The contracting system showed many of the problems and dysfunctions 
that have plagued US military procurement over the centuries. Paperwork 
was burdensome; suppliers cheated; when complaints arose, Congress 
investigated. Nevertheless, a mere handful of overworked offi cials developed 
a system of contracting and delivery that equipped and fed a victorious 
army. 
Congress tended to control even the smallest projects with its approval 
required for each payment. While it set specifi cations for army items, it used 
on-site supervision of shipbuilding. As Lucille Horgan notes, “No matter 
which organization or government offi cial was given contracting authority, 
Congress usually reserved the right to approve or disapprove the terms of 
individual contracts, and especially of fi nal approval for payment.”44 
Individual soldiers were usually required to supply their own fi rearms, 
blankets and knapsacks. Sometimes unit commanders were given 
authorization to provision themselves by foraging locally.45 
To pay the troops and to buy their supplies, Congress had no money. 
There was no indigenous national currency, so Congress printed what it 
needed and asked the colonies to pay proportionate shares of their own 
taxes. Within fi ve years Congress had circulated $200 million of these bills 
of credit, and few Americans would willingly accept them as payment for 
anything. “Not worth a Continental” became the slogan. As part of its 
measures in 1780 to put the government on a sounder footing, Congress 
devalued the currency, 40–1, so that the nominal debt shrank to only $5 
million. 
Meanwhile, offi cers were demanding the British system of half-pay for life 
for veterans. Despite repeated requests from Washington, Congress resisted 
this pension plan until October 1780, though it did vote death benefi ts 
for offi cer and enlisted families and half pay for life for those disabled in 
wartime.46 Eventually it created a more generous pension system.
 Tactics 
As might be expected of a legislative body trying to manage a war, Congress 
swung between intrusiveness and desperate delegation, seeking but rarely 
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fi nding an agreeable balance between civilian and military responsibilities. 
Fortunately for American democracy, George Washington accepted Congress’ 
authority and deferred to its practices, despite frequent frustrations. 
His fi rst clear mission was to drive the British from Boston, which he 
accomplished in March 1776. The congressionally inspired invasion of 
Canada was conducted by other forces. While they succeeded in capturing 
Montreal, they were forced to retreat from Quebec in the spring of 1776. 
Washington recognized that the British were likely to attack New York, so 
he positioned his expanded army there, only to be defeated in a series of 
dispiriting engagements in the summer and fall of 1776.
Less than six months after confi dently declaring independence, the 
fright ened Congress fl ed to Baltimore on December 12. Two weeks later 
lawmakers voted to vest Washington “with full, ample and complete powers 
to raise and collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from 
any or all of these United States, 16 battalions of infantry, in addition to 
those already voted by Congress” as well as “to arrest and confi ne persons 
who refuse to take the continental currency, or are otherwise disaffected to 
the American cause.”47 
So guilty did the delegates feel about their abdication of civilian control 
that three days later they issued a circular letter to the 13 states explaining 
“Congress would not have Consented to the Vesting of such Powers in the 
Military Department … if the Scituation of Public Affairs did not require 
at this Crisis a Decision and Vigour, which Distance and Numbers Deny 
to Assemblies far Remov’d from each other, and from the immediate Seat 
of War.”48 Once the crisis passed with Washington’s victories at Trenton 
and Princeton, John Adams counseled against letting Washington retain too 
much power. As he told the delegates, “It becomes us to attend early to the 
restraining our army.”49
Congress adopted the same desperation measures in June 1780, after the 
surrender of a large American force at Charleston, South Carolina, when it 
gave General Gates command of the southern army and empowered him “to 
take such other measures, from time to time, for the defence of the southern 
states as he shall think most proper.”50
Congress returned to Philadelphia in March 1777, but had to fl ee in 
September when General William Howe occupied the city. The delegates 
relocated fi rst to Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and then to York, where they 
stayed until Howe’s evacuation in June 1778. Washington fought the British 
inconclusively at Germantown and Brandywine and then established winter 
quarters at Valley Forge.
The most important battle of 1777, and perhaps of the war, was fought at 
Saratoga, in New York, where British General John Burgoyne was defeated 
by forces led by General Horatio Gates. Thereafter, British infantry action 
was confi ned to the southern states – and the French government decided 
that the rebels had enough chance of success that they deserved their aid and 
support.
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Congress had been seeking foreign alliances from the start of the confl ict. 
It sent Silas Deane to France in 1775, following with Benjamin Franklin 
and John Adams in 1776. These and other American emissaries courted 
public opinion, negotiated treaties, and procured supplies. What had been 
a localized British–American confl ict became a European war, with the 
Royal Navy threatened by the French fl eet in Europe and the Caribbean and 
Gibraltar threatened by Spain.
When the British sent a peace delegation in 1778, the Congress spurned 
it, demanding recognition of American independence as a precondition 
to any talks. Despite the many positive developments, the war dragged 
on through inconclusive engagements in 1779 and into a major crisis in 
1780. That year the British took control of the three most southern states, 
defeating American forces at Charleston and Camden, South Carolina. 
Congress devalued the currency and confronted angry debt holders and 
soldiers, including a mutinous Pennsylvania army that threatened to besiege 
the Congress in January 1781.
Fortunately the French responded with its fl eet, some soldiers, and six 
million livres for the Continental army. Congress also moved to make 
the government more streamlined, professional, and effi cient by creating 
executive departments for foreign affairs, fi nance, war and the navy. And on 
March 1, the Articles of Confederation went into effect, following a three-
year delay as Maryland insisted that other states drop their claims to western 
lands, thus leaving them open for settlement as new states and territories.
The new government was still so weak and poor, however, that when the 
express rider arrived in Philadelphia on October 22 with word of the British 
defeat at Yorktown, there was not enough hard money in the treasury to 
pay him, so members of Congress each had to contribute a dollar of their 
own.51
 War termination 
Even then, the war was not really over, for British troops continued to 
occupy Charleston and still held New York, as they had since 1776. But the 
key American objective had been achieved: independence was not at issue in 
the peace talks.
Congress wanted to reduce the army in 1782, pending the conclusion of 
a formal peace treaty, but Washington and other offi cers resisted. It fi nally 
adopted a plan of voluntary retirement for offi cers, beginning in 1783.
Meanwhile, the most serious civil–military clash of the entire war 
occurred among Washington’s troops at Newburgh, New York in March 
1783. Although peace commissioners had been meeting during 1782, British 
envoys waited until October to indicate a willingness to grant independence. 
Preliminary articles of peace were signed in January 1783 and the formal 
British announcement of a cessation of hostilities was announced only on 
February 20. Meanwhile, the continental army was being cut back, but 
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without the promises of substantial pensions desired by the soldiers. The 
army could not be disbanded because British troops still controlled, among 
other positions, New York – as they would until November 1783.
A junior offi cer circulated a paper among the disgruntled offi cers which 
threatened Congress with disobedience unless offi cers gained greater 
respect and remuneration from the legislature. The document also criticized 
Washington for siding with the lawmakers. A few weeks earlier, a group had 
petitioned Congress claiming: “We have borne all that men can bear – our 
property is expended – our private resources are at an end.” These soldiers 
asked that their half-pay pensions be commuted to fi ve years of full pay. 
Otherwise, they warned, “any further experiments on their patience may 
have fatal effects.”52 The latest circular threatened not to disband or not to 
fi ght unless their grievances were resolved. Washington responded by calling 
a general meeting. Addressing the offi cers, the general at fi rst argued against 
the substance of the paper. Then he pulled out his spectacles to read a letter 
from a congressman explaining the fi nancial problems. Few had seen him 
with glasses before. He explained, “I have grown gray in your service and 
now fi nd myself growing blind.” His gesture, the humanity of his appeal, 
turned the tide of sentiment, and some offi cers openly wept. The Newburgh 
Conspiracy evaporated.53 The day Congress learned of these events, it voted 
full pay for fi ve years for offi cers and full pay for four months for enlisted 
men. It left unresolved whether the payment would be in cash or securities 
with 6 percent interest. But the crisis had passed.54
Washington saved the day at Newburgh, as he had protected and deferred 
to the authority of Congress during the war. But the incident reminded the 
American politicians that they had to be wary in their dealings with the 
warriors. Those fi nal months witnessed the disintegration of the Continental 
army as its members returned to civilian life. By the summer of 1784, by 
order of Congress, the army was cut to 80 men, left to guard military stores 
at West Point and Fort Pitt.55
In diplomatic and economic terms, the peace settlement was a victory for 
the new nation. Having lost the colonies, the British were eager to regain a 
profi table trading partner. Having been defeated in their attempts to conquer 
Canada, the newly united states now had uninhibited access to lands west of 
the mountains. 
 Lessons of the war 
The Revolutionary War demonstrated that a disorganized group of colonials 
could come together and prevail against the greatest military power of the 
day. Their appeal was conservative in requesting rights that were fundamental 
to Englishmen and radical in calling for government by the consent of the 
governed. In a few months, these colonials went from letters and newspapers 
circulated by committees of correspondence to a representative congress 
making decisions and issuing orders that were actually obeyed. They fought 
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a war without a real government, without the power of taxation that enables 
governments to raise funds for armies and navies, and without a bureaucracy 
or offi cer corps to fi ght for the independence their congress declared.
If one miracle was that such a hodgepodge succeeded, a second miracle 
was that its chosen military leader was a man of such integrity and devotion 
to political principle that he accepted and endured the frustrations and 
indignities of legislative control. As Richard Kohn argues, “George 
Washington never succumbed to temptation.” He never used his authority 
or celebrity to challenge the Congress and the ineffi cient process it had 
created. Before, during, and after Newburgh he rejected calls for military 
insubordination. But as one observer noted in his journal, “The offi cers look 
upon Congress with an evil eye, as men who are jealous of the army, who 
mean them no good, but mean to divide and distress them. It is surprising 
with how much freedom & acrimony they declare their sentiments.”56
Washington bridged the civil–military gap and set the mode of restraint 
and deference for future generations. Congress, too, in its own way, set 
the precedents for future conduct in wartime: hard work, close oversight, 
inadequate material support, and political responsiveness to public opinion. 
More immediately, the war taught lessons for the new American leaders 
who were trying to make their independent government succeed. It reinforced 
their view that the government needed – for national security reasons at 
least – to be strong enough to tax in order to raise armies and navies, to 
be cohesive enough to make foreign treaties and alliances. It convinced 
them that they could create and sustain a Lockean government of separated 
institutions sharing powers while still being strong enough to preserve their 
national integrity. The war set the stage for peace; the Continental Congress 
set the model for the new government; and George Washington played the 
key role as a deferential commander-in-chief.
3 Lincoln, Congress, and the 
generals 
The particulars of your plans I neither know or seek to know. You are vigilant 
and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints 
or restraints upon you.
Abraham Lincoln to Lt. Gen U.S. Grant, April 30, 18641 
I can’t tell you how disgusted I am becoming with these wretched politicians; 
they are the most despicable of men … The Presdt [sic] is nothing more than 
a well meaning baboon.
General George McClellan2
I have done everything in my power here to separate military appointments 
and commands from politics … but the task is hopeless.
General-in-Chief Henry Halleck3 
[Army offi cers who] indulge in the sport [of politics] must risk being gored. 
They can not, having exposed themselves, claim the procedural protections 
and immunities of the military profession.
Secretary of War Stanton to Lincoln, January 18634 
There must be something in these terrible reports, but I distrust Congressional 
committees. They exaggerate.
Navy Secretary Gideon Welles5
We are here armed with the whole power of both houses of Congress. They 
have made it our duty to inquire into the whole conduct of the war; into 
every department of it. We do not want to do anything that will result in 
harm or wrong. But we do want to know, and we must know if we can, what 
is to be done, for the country is in jeopardy.
Senator Benjamin Wade, Chairman of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War6
The top item on Abraham Lincoln’s desk when he entered the White House 
the morning after his swearing-in was a letter from the Union commander 
at Fort Sumter reporting that his dwindling supplies would last only another 
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six weeks and expressing his professional opinion that only reinforcement 
by at least 20,000 men could save the fort. The new president promptly 
asked his civilian and military advisers what they thought should and could 
be done.7
Lincoln was then buffeted with confl icting advice on how to save the Union 
and whether to try to defend the fort in Charleston harbor. Radical anti-
slavery members of his own Republican Party pressured him to assert control 
over federal facilities in the seceding southern states while his new Secretary 
of State was in secret talks with representatives from those rebellious areas. 
Navy offi cials recommended re-supplying and strengthening Fort Sumter, 
but army leaders considered it indefensible. Instead, they favored a mission 
to Fort Pickens in Florida, the only other major federal outpost in the south 
still in Union control. The cabinet was 5–2 against any re-supply missions as 
too provocative.8 
Abraham Lincoln believed that it would help the Union cause if the 
Confederates fi red the fi rst shot, but he was unsure how to achieve that goal. 
In fact, he was woefully ignorant of how to be commander-in-chief since he 
had only “a few months’ token service as a junior militia offi cer in the Black 
Hawk war of 1832, where his military experience included a (lost) wrestling 
contest with another captain for whose company would occupy a choice 
campground.”9
Lincoln sought information and consulted widely and frequently with 
his cabinet and other offi cials. He pleaded with the senior army general 
to keep him informed. “Would it impose too much labor on General Scott 
to make short, comprehensive daily reports to me of what occurs in his 
Department?”10 He even sent friends to provide fi rst-hand reports on 
conditions in Charleston. Despite the pessimistic views of army leaders, he 
decided to send Fort Sumter a relief mission by sea under the command of 
his attorney general’s brother-in-law. He also secretly approved an army-
sponsored plan to send supplies to Fort Pickens. Bureaucratic foul-ups 
prevented both missions from being carried out as planned – a harbinger of 
events throughout his administration. Both the army and navy planned to 
use the navy’s premier warship, the Powhatan, and confl icting orders were 
sent to its base in New York City. The ship sailed toward Florida, with its 
captain disbelieving last-minute orders from the president to go to South 
Carolina.11 On April 10, Confederate forces demanded the surrender of Fort 
Sumter and two days later began the bombardment that started the war.
The Civil War severely tested the established patterns of civil–military 
relations. By war’s end, Lincoln had a senior general he trusted, a loyal 
and effective Secretary of War, a strategy acceptable to most offi cials, and a 
Congress more supportive than disruptive. But that state of affairs was far 
from inevitable. In the early stages of the war, there were serious confl icts 
between the president and Congress, between each branch of government 
and senior military offi cers, and between career military men and the new 
volunteers. These confl icts were sometimes political, sometimes personal, 
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sometimes over strategy, sometimes over minor tactical or technical matters. 
Normal disagreements were exacerbated by poisonous levels of distrust. 
Over time, however, the constitutional system worked. The president became 
the de facto as well as the de jure commander-in-chief; Congress raised the 
revenues, wrote the necessary laws, and approved the key appointments; 
and military commanders deferred to the civilian leaders even when they 
held them in contempt.
Reluctant dictator 
As soon as he learned of the attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln convened his 
cabinet for the fi rst of many lengthy sessions on handling the war. The 
cabinet was a fractious group, not least because Lincoln offered positions to 
four of his rivals for the Republican nomination, several of whom remained 
convinced that they were better qualifi ed than the backwoods lawyer from 
Illinois. Throughout his term these ambitious politicians maneuvered against 
each other and even against the president, hoping to succeed him as the 
Republican nominee in 1864.12 
Lincoln had won election with only 40 percent of the popular vote, 
winning the electoral votes of all of the free states except New Jersey, 
which split its votes between Douglas and Lincoln, and none in the south or 
border states. His Republican party had been formed only six years before. 
And as one historian described it, “The so-called party comprised several 
groups, under chieftains personally hostile and full of jealousy and rivalry, 
who had come together upon one question only.” What they agreed on was 
opposition to extending slavery into the new territories of the west. They 
disagreed, either as a matter of principle or as a question of political tactics, 
on whether slavery should be abolished where it then existed. Their 1860 
platform, which Lincoln had quoted in his inaugural address, had declared 
“the right of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions 
according to its own judgment exclusively.”13 
Preserving the union without abolishing existing slavery remained 
Lincoln’s goal in the immediate aftermath of the attack on Fort Sumter. 
He wanted to prevent additional secessions that could make Washington 
vulnerable or make military action against the rebels infeasible.
On April 15, he issued a proclamation calling on the states to mobilize 
75,000 men in their militias for Federal service and summoning the Congress 
into special session starting July 4. The newly mobilized troops were to take 
back the forts and other property seized from the Union so that the laws 
could be properly executed. Lincoln also appealed “to all loyal citizens to 
favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and 
the existence of our National Union.”14 
Two days later Virginia voted to secede, and two days after that Lincoln 
ordered a blockade of southern ports to help put down what he called an 
insurrection. He remained concerned about Maryland, which was torn by 
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pro-slavery and pro-Union factions. To secure the lines of communication 
and to prevent pro-secession uprisings, Lincoln declared martial law in 
Maryland on April 27 and allowed detentions without trial by suspending 
the writ of habeas corpus, the fi rst of eight similar actions during the course 
of the war.15 
Lincoln took many acts of borderline constitutionality, hoping and 
expecting that Congress would later authorize his emergency measures – 
though the lawmakers waited until March 1863, to authorize his suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus. In one dramatic case, Union soldiers arrested John 
Merryman, who had allegedly burned bridges and destroyed telegraph wires 
during the April, 1861 riots near Baltimore. The case was heard by the Chief 
Justice, Roger Taney, who ruled that Lincoln’s order was unconstitutional, 
since only Congress had the power to suspend the writ. Lincoln refused to 
comply with the ruling. Taney had to be content fi ling a report. Merryman 
was released a few weeks later when military authorities concluded that he 
could never be convicted by a Maryland jury.16
Lincoln also had to take steps to rein in some abolitionist fi rebrands, such 
as General Benjamin F. Butler, who ruled escaped slaves “contraband of war” 
and refused to return them to their owners. When the popular Republican 
General John C. Fremont proclaimed slaves in Missouri free, Lincoln 
revoked the order and shortly thereafter relieved Fremont of command. The 
president was still worried that abolitionist actions might drive Kentucky to 
secede, and that, he feared, would doom the Union cause. The most Lincoln 
could accept was the law passed by the special session of Congress in early 
August. It allowed confi scation of property – including slaves – but only if 
they had been directly employed by Confederate armed forces.17 
Meanwhile, the cabinet members undertook their duties in support of the 
war. Secretary of State William Seward notifi ed foreign governments of the 
US action; Navy Secretary Gideon Welles sent orders imposing the blockade; 
and Secretary of War Simon Cameron began planning for the equipping of 
the additional troops. 
On May 3, Lincoln called for an increase in the size of the regular army 
by 23,000 as well as 18,000 more sailors and a force of 42,000 volunteers 
for a three-year enlistment.18 In the ensuing weeks, troops streamed into 
Washington. Lincoln and his cabinet members often reviewed them and met 
with their commanders. Both sides prepared for what they thought would 
be a short, decisive battle.
The most senior military offi cer, however, proposed a different strategy, 
one of limited means for limited ends. General Winfi eld Scott was an aging, 
infi rm, and perhaps senile relic of a former era. Already 75 in 1861, Scott 
had been a general in the War of 1812, was a hero in the war with Mexico, 
ran for president on the Whig Party in 1852 while still in uniform, and 
remained loyal to the Union despite his Virginia birth. He was called “Old 
Fuss and Feathers.” In the spring of 1861 he devised a plan to strangle the 
south with a naval blockade of the coasts and naval and ground force seizure 
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of the Mississippi River. This plan, dubbed “Anaconda”, had the advantage of 
limiting Union casualties and the disadvantage of requiring time to assemble 
the necessary forces.19 
Lincoln and the politicians did not want to wait. They wanted to use the 
90-day volunteers in some kind of battle, and believed that the capture of 
the new Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia, would bring a quick 
end to the war. At a strategy conference on June 29, Lincoln told the fi eld 
commander, General Irwin McDowell, who wanted more time for training, 
“You are green, it is true, but they are green, also; you are all green alike.”20
When that fi rst major encounter came, on July 21 along the creek called 
Bull Run near the Virginia town of Manassas – Union forces tended to name 
their battles after streams, Confederates after nearby towns – the outcome 
was a powerful setback for the Union. Federal forces fl ed in disarray, shocking 
members of Congress who had ridden out to observe the anticipated Union 
victory. 
Three months later, after Confederate forces established defensive 
positions along the Virginia border and General George McClellan prepared 
for combat without actually launching any attacks, Union forces did move 
against Ball’s Bluff on the Potomac River. Union forces suffered a quick 
and ignominious failure, including the death of Colonel Edward Baker, a 
close friend of the president and Senator from Oregon. These two defeats 
prompted the Congress, when it met in December, to establish an investigative 
committee.21
Congress was also primed to investigate problems in contracting and 
supply for Union forces. The man in charge of supply was Simon Cameron, a 
former Democrat who had become the Republican party boss in Pennsylvania 
and US Senator when Lincoln nominated him to head the War Department. 
Lincoln liked Cameron and wanted a Pennsylvanian in his cabinet, but tried 
to withdraw his offer of a position after being besieged with numerous 
reports of Cameron’s corruptness. Cameron reportedly ran his political 
machinery with bribery and intimidation. Another Pennsylvania Republican, 
Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, when asked by Lincoln whether Cameron 
was an honest man, replied, “I don’t think he would steal a red hot stove.” 
Even the incoming Vice President, Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, said that 
naming Cameron would have an “odor about it that will damn us as a 
party.”22 
Cameron soon lived up to his sullied reputation. Facing wartime urgency, 
Cameron ignored existing legal requirements for competitive bidding and 
awarding contracts to low bidders. He favored suppliers and middlemen 
from his home state and paid dearly for poor quality goods. As two historians 
of the period concluded, “Cameron conducted the War Department as if it 
were a political club house; he used contracts freely to pay off old political 
debts and to shower additional favors on his henchmen.”23 In one celebrated 
case, the War Department paid $58,200 plus $10,000 for transportation 
to acquire one thousand horses for a Kentucky cavalry regiment – 485 of 
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which had to be rejected as diseased and worthless.24 Lincoln confi ded to 
his secretary that Cameron had proved to be “utterly ignorant … Selfi sh 
and openly discourteous to the President[,] Obnoxious to the country [and] 
Incapable of either organizing details or conceiving and advising general 
plans.”25 The fi nal straw came in December 1861, when Cameron, without 
consulting with the president or informing him of his plan, released a report 
to Congress and the press calling for the creation of an army of former slaves 
– a policy Lincoln strongly opposed at the time.26 
Lincoln responded to these setbacks not by changing strategy, but by 
changing personnel. In the fall, he decided to change the leadership of the 
army and the war department. He accepted the resignation of General Scott 
and forced the resignation of Secretary Cameron. In their places, he put 
General George McClellan and Edwin M. Stanton. 
Coalition of rivals 
These events of 1861 show that the Union leadership was hardly unifi ed. 
Republicans were divided between abolitionists and union preservationists 
who were willing to tolerate slavery confi ned to the south. Democrats were 
split between those supporting war to preserve the union and those favoring 
negotiations for a peaceful settlement, either with separation or with 
reunion keeping slavery intact. Many of the generals considered themselves 
Democrats, and they hoped for an agreement that avoided massive bloodshed. 
McClellan and his West Point compatriots tended to favor European-style 
wars of maneuver rather than decisive battles or strategies of annihilation 
of enemy forces. Radicals dominated the Congress, and Lincoln was left to 
juggle the many disparate views.
The mood in Washington in January 1862, was captured by Congressman 
Henry Dawes of Massachusetts, who wrote to his wife: “Confi dence in 
everybody is shaken to the very foundation. The credit of the country is 
ruined – its army impotent, its Cabinet incompetent, its servants rotten, its 
ruin inevitable.”27 Everyone hoped that McClellan and Stanton would be the 
heroes who would turn things around. 
George McClellan had a distinguished career at West Point and in the 
war with Mexico. He had resigned his commission in 1857, in order to 
become an offi cial of railroad companies in Ohio and Illinois. He was 
made a major general after the war broke out and was given command of 
the Army of the Potomac after McDowell’s defeat at Bull Run. A lifelong 
Democrat, he had a low opinion of the Republican administration. As he 
wrote to his wife, “I can’t tell you how disgusted I am becoming with these 
wretched politicians; they are the most despicable of men … The Presdt 
[sic] is nothing more than a well meaning baboon.”28 He wrote of being 
“bored and annoyed” at an October 1861 cabinet meeting. “There are 
some of the greatest geese in the cabinet I have ever seen – enough to tax 
the patience of Job”, he wrote.29
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Lincoln made a valiant effort to consult with his top general, frequently 
visiting his home in the evening to discuss strategy. But McClellan rebuffed 
his commander-in-chief. In one notorious case, on November 13, the general 
returned home from a wedding party and went to bed, deliberately ignoring 
the president and secretary of state, who had been waiting over an hour to 
talk to him.30 Lincoln would spend the next year cajoling, pushing, reassuring, 
and supporting McClellan before fi nally deciding to replace him.
Edwin M. Stanton was another inauspicious choice, but one who turned 
out to be a loyal, devoted, and very effective cabinet offi cer. He was a pro-
union Democrat from Ohio who had been attorney general in the fi nal 
months of the Buchanan administration. He had a passing acquaintance with 
Lincoln in 1855, when he was involved in the McCormick reaper patent case, 
in which the Illinois lawyer had been retained in case the trial were heard in 
Chicago. Stanton was rude and snobbish to all of his underlings, but Lincoln 
held no lasting grudge from the encounter. Stanton openly disparaged the 
new president in 1861, referring to him as “the original gorilla.” He also 
wrote to just-departed President Buchanan, “No one speaks of Lincoln or 
any member of his cabinet with respect or regard.”31 
The Ohio lawyer had many friends in that cabinet and Lincoln wanted to 
give prominent positions to pro-war Democrats, so Stanton was a welcome 
addition when the president lost confi dence in Cameron. Stanton was also 
well regarded in Congress and, perhaps ironically, by McClellan. Soon after 
Bull Run the general turned to the lawyer as a legal adviser and friend, 
frequently using Stanton’s house as a refuge from other offi cials, even the 
president. Ultimately, however, McClellan bitterly concluded that “His 
purpose was to endeavor to climb upon my shoulder and then throw me 
down.”32
McClellan became general-in-chief in November, when Scott was forced 
into retirement. Stanton took over the War Department in January, when 
Cameron was reassigned as Minister to Russia. The general continued his 
preparations for a spring offensive, while the secretary of war seized effective 
control of his department and, more broadly, of the running of the war.
Stanton took offi ce determined to improve administration and push the 
army into action. As he wrote to Charles Dana, “As soon as I can get the 
machinery of the offi ce working, the rats cleared out, and the rat-holes 
stopped, we shall move. This army has got to fi ght or run away; and while 
men are striving nobly in the West, the champagne and oysters on the 
Potomac must be stopped.”33 
The new secretary seized control of communications, both with fi eld 
armies and the press, by moving the telegraph offi ce, which had been at 
McClellan’s headquarters, next to his own. This action also meant that the 
president was a frequent visitor, walking next door from the White House 
and often staying for hours at a time. Stanton set aside two rooms for 
McClellan to use as headquarters, but the disgruntled general seldom used 
them. The secretary also created a separate military telegraph system which, 
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by the last year of the war, employed more than 1,000 men and stretched 
over 5,000 miles of lines.34 
Stanton tightened the administration of military contracting with a return 
to competitive bidding and closer oversight. Through old friendships and 
persuasive powers he won funds from Congress to refurbish his department’s 
dilapidated building and to hire several dozen additional personnel. He 
also won passage of a law giving the president power to seize the railroads 
and telegraph for military purposes. In fact, the railroads had been very 
cooperative, but Stanton used the law as a lever to negotiate reasonable rates, 
standardized gauges and signaling, and military cargo priority. He then used 
railroads to engineer the rapid supply of Union forces during and after key 
battles, as demonstrated at the time of Antietam and later Chattanooga.35 
The civilian secretary tried to forge close professional ties with McClellan 
and advised the general on ways to improve his standing with the cabinet. 
Early on, the two men spent entire days together, in apparent harmony. But 
eventually Stanton, wanting an alternative, disinterested military viewpoint, 
hired a retired general, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, who had a distinguished 
military record and had been commandant at West Point. Hitchcock was 
often amazed at how willingly and earnestly Stanton accepted his military 
advice.36 
The secretary cultivated close ties to Capitol Hill. He welcomed frequent 
meetings with key legislators. He defl ected one investigator who had been 
making wild charges about disloyal offi cials by meeting with one of the 
congressman in question, going over his bulging fi les, and then dismissing 
one offi cer and three clerks. He made a special effort to engage with the joint 
committee set up to investigate the conduct of the war, attending many of its 
secret sessions and even using it to elicit information and uncover fraud.37 
Surprisingly, Stanton also forged an extremely close and loyal relationship 
with the president. Lincoln warmed to the man he called his “Mars”, telling 
a journalist that his cabinet offi cer was “utterly misjudged.” One of the army 
telegraphers called the president and his secretary the heart and the head 
of the war. Grant later observed that “Stanton required a man like Lincoln 
to manage him”, that Lincoln dominated his subordinate by “that gentle 
fi rmness.”38 
Each could veto the acts of the other, but Stanton would ultimately defer 
if he was confi dent that the president had reached a fi rm decision. Lincoln 
himself described the arrangement. “I want to oblige everybody when I can; 
and Stanton and I have an understanding that if I send an order to him 
which cannot be consistently granted, he is to refuse it. This he sometimes 
does.”39 
Stanton’s biographers report an incident which illustrates this relat ion-
ship. 
Once when Lincoln sent a petitioner to Stanton with a written order 
complying with his request, the man came back to report that Stanton 
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had not only refused to execute the order but had called Lincoln a 
damn fool. Lincoln, in mock astonishment, asked: ‘Did Stanton call me 
a damn fool?’ Being reassured on that point, the President remarked 
drolly: ‘Well, I guess I had better step over and see Stanton about this. 
Stanton is usually right.’40 
Organizing for victory 
When it came to fi ghting the war in 1862, the warriors and politicians 
clashed repeatedly. McClellan and much of the offi cer corps disagreed with 
the president and secretary of war over grand strategy, domestic politics, 
military professionalism, and the command and control of major military 
operations.
On many issues related to the war and slavery, Lincoln tried to preserve 
his freedom of action and avoid premature commitments by claiming, “My 
policy is to have no policy.” But he had a clear vision of what he thought 
the army should do: attack, attack repeatedly, and destroy the Confederate 
army. He disparaged what he called “strategy”, but what he meant was 
the Napoleonic war of maneuver. He favored decisive battles with Union 
victories as the best way to end the war quickly. What today’s soldiers would 
call the enemy’s “center of gravity”, the capture of which would lead to 
its collapse, was to Lincoln the rebel army. “I think Lee’s army and not 
Richmond is your true objective point”, he wrote in 1863, expressing a view 
he held throughout the war after the initial battle at Bull Run. McClellan 
and his successors, until Grant, seemed to prefer wars of maneuver and the 
capture of political objectives like the Confederate capital.41 
Domestic politics also divided the Republican civilian politicians from 
much of the military leadership. While some generals were viscerally anti-
politician – General William T. Sherman complained to General U.S. Grant, 
“I am not a politician, never voted but once in my life, & never read a 
political platform”42 – many were professed Democrats. 
Of the 110 generals in the Union army in 1861, according to a Republican 
Senator, 80 were Democrats. According to a Republican congressman in 
1863, four-fi fths of the brigadier- and major-generals in the Union army 
were Democrats. As one historian has noted, “Most Union generals, through 
whatever mixture of conviction and self-interest, displayed rather than 
disguised their political leanings.”43 
Those political leanings should not be surprising, however, since most 
senior offi cers had risen in the ranks under Democratic administrations 
and with partisan sponsorship. Until Lincoln took offi ce, Democrats had 
controlled the White House since 1828 except for two single terms won 
by war heroes – William Henry Harrison and Zachary Taylor – running as 
Whigs. Democrats had also controlled both houses of Congress for all but 
six of those years. Moreover, the Republicans were a new national party, 
having elected its fi rst members to Congress only in 1854.
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The newly empowered Republicans remained suspicious of the offi cer 
corps, and even critical of West Point. Many viewed the military academy 
as “the hotbed in which rebellion was hatched”, and they decried the 
many regular army offi cers defected to the Confederacy – about one in 
every four in the army in 1861. Republicans claimed, however, that no 
enlisted men turned traitor.44 The distrust between career soldiers and the 
militia leaders, rooted in the Framers’ suspicions about a standing army 
and continuing through most of American history, had political overtones 
in the Civil War. 
In the mobilization for war, there were essentially Republican and Demo-
cratic armies. Mostly Democratic offi cers led the regular army regiments, 
while the newly formed volunteer units were often peopled and led by 
avowed Republicans who were willing to fi ght for their political beliefs 
regarding slavery and the Union. Of course, many pro-war Democrats were 
commissioned to lead volunteer units, but they too were taking up arms for 
the sake of their political views. Major General Jacob D. Cox, founder of 
the Republican party in Ohio and never before in the military, explained the 
rise of political generals. 
 In an armed struggle which grew out of a great political contest, it was 
inevitable that eager political partisans should be among the most active 
in the new volunteer organizations. They called meetings, addressed the 
people to arouse their enthusiasm, urged enlistments, and often set the 
example by enrolling their own names fi rst.45 
Lincoln claimed that “in considering military merit … I discard politics.”46 But 
in fact he was quite adroit in building a bipartisan administration and army 
with careful attention to political affi liations and factors. The general-in-
chief after McClellan, Henry Halleck, complained, “I have done everything 
in my power here to separate military appointments and commands from 
politics … but the task is hopeless.”47 What the president and Stanton did 
do, however, was to quash those offi cers who tried to play politics against 
the administration. As Stanton wrote to Lincoln in January, 1863, “[Army 
offi cers who] indulge in the sport [of politics] must risk being gored. They 
can not, having exposed themselves, claim the procedural protections and 
immunities of the military profession.”48
Warriors and politicians also clashed over their respective roles and 
responsibilities, by way of differing views of military professionalism. Lincoln 
went out of his way to show deference and respect for military commanders, 
such as by going to see Scott and McClellan rather than summoning them 
to the White House. His letters to his commanders were unfailingly polite, 
even when remonstrating them or issuing clear orders. In a letter to General 
Joseph Hooker, for example, he praised the offi cer’s abstinence from politics 
as well as his ambition and self confi dence. But he also pointed out, “there 
are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfi ed with you”, and 
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went on to criticize, as we shall see, Hooker’s call for a dictatorship in 
Washington.49 
On paper, Lincoln subscribed to the notion that military operational 
plans were beyond his purview. Writing to Grant in 1864, he declared, “The 
particulars of your plans I neither know or seek to know. You are vigilant 
and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints 
or restraints upon you.” Only a few days later, however, he ordered specifi c 
changes in Grant’s plans for the Red River campaign. In fact, as Eliot Cohen 
has demonstrated, Lincoln remained “deeply immersed in the details of 
military operations”, exercising strong oversight, though he did it more by 
questioning, prodding, and suggesting than by direct orders.50 
The commander-in-chief also made several visits to the front lines to 
confer with his generals and to observe the condition of the men and their 
equipment. He and Stanton also sent their own bureaucratic spy, Charles 
Dana, who was ostensibly investigating military pay problems, but in fact was 
instructed by Stanton that “your real duty will be to report to me every day 
what you see.” Dana was even given a special cipher to use in his reports.51 
Generals like McClellan, however, resented political intrusions, either by 
the president or the investigative congress. Few of the congressional fi re-
brands had any military experience, yet they gratuitously offered their advice 
on strategy and tactics. The commanders resented the pressure to launch 
attacks before their troops were trained and ready to their professional stan-
dard. The ritual complaint from the politicians became, why don’t they 
attack? Many of the West Point professionals also disliked the presence 
of so many newly commissioned generals who had political connections 
but little military experience. These cultural clashes were not unique to 
nineteenth century America, but they did at times infringe upon the conduct 
of the war.
In one famous incident, Lincoln dismissed from service a politically well-
connected major, John Key, who was overheard declaring that the army 
wanted a negotiated peace and was avoiding major battles. “That is not the 
game”, Key said. “The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of 
the other; that both shall be kept in the fi eld till they are exhausted, when we 
will make a compromise and save slavery.” When Key sought reinstatement, 
the president refused, saying “I had been brought to fear that there was 
a certain class of offi cers in the army, not very inconsiderable in number, 
who were playing a game to not beat the enemy when they could, on some 
peculiar notion as to proper way of saving the Union …. I dismissed you as 
an example and a warning to that supposed class.”52
In January 1862, Lincoln held several meetings to discuss the conduct 
of the war. On January 6, he met with the new congressional committee 
investigating the conduct of the war and heard their criticisms of McClellan 
and their demands for decisive action. He said he had no knowledge of 
McClellan’s plans or the reasons for delay, but that he had no intention of 
interfering with the commander. Afterward, he wrote to McClellan, who 
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had been confi ned to his sickbed for several days, urging him to meet with 
the committee members as soon as possible.53
On January 10 he began a series of meetings with his cabinet and senior 
generals. At one point he visited the Quartermaster General, Montgomery 
Meigs, and told him, “The people are impatient; [Treasury Secretary] Chase 
has no money, and he tells me he can raise no money; the Gen[eral] of the 
Army has typhoid fever. The bottom is out of the tub. What shall I do?”54 
McClellan fi nally showed up on January 13, but still refused to give details 
of his plans for fear of a leak. The same day, Lincoln replaced Cameron with 
Stanton, and the new secretary of war began holding lengthy meetings with 
the congressional committee.55 
Responding to the political pressures for action, Lincoln then prodded 
McClellan on January 27 by issuing General War Order No. 1, which 
commanded all Union armies to make a coordinated advance on all fronts by 
Washington’s Birthday, February 22. Four days later he issued a special War 
Order No. 1 to the Army of the Potomac, directing it “after providing safely 
for the defense of Washington,” to seize Manassas Junction and advance 
toward Richmond by that date.56
McClellan objected in a 22-page letter, revealing that he preferred to 
attack Richmond from the east. Lincoln sought the views of McClellan’s 
division commanders and found eight in favor and four opposed, but only 
two of the four supported the president’s idea of a direct assault. “We saw 
ten generals afraid to fi ght”, commented Stanton.57 But Lincoln acquiesced 
in the judgment of the men in the fi eld.
On February 19, Stanton corralled McClellan to meet with some 
members of the congressional investigating committee. When the general 
explained that one reason for delay was to secure a line of retreat, Senator 
Benjamin Wade of Massachusetts exploded. The Army of the Potomac, he 
said, could “whip the whole Confederacy if they were given the chance; if 
I were commander, I would lead them across the Potomac, and they should 
not come back until they had won a victory and the war ended, or they came 
back in their coffi ns.”58 The general noted that Stanton did not once speak 
up in his defense.
By early March, however, with McClellan still preparing but not advanc-
ing, Lincoln came under renewed pressure from Congress and his advisers 
to discipline his top general. The committee members urged the removal of 
McClellan, but had no one to propose in his place. “Anybody will do for 
you”, Lincoln told Senator Wade, “but I must have somebody.”59 Stanton 
agreed with the congressional recommendation for a reorganization of 
the army into corps d’armée instead of the existing division structure. On 
March 8 Lincoln endorsed McClellan’s plan for the peninsula campaign but 
ordered the reorganization of the army. He also conditioned his approval on 
McClellan’s leaving enough forces behind to secure Washington. On March 
11, he took away his commander’s title as general-in-chief, leaving him only 
in charge of the Army of the Potomac.60 A month later, he warned the general 
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that the country was watching him, that “it is indispensable to you that you 
strike a blow. I am powerless to help this.”61  
From March until Henry Halleck was promoted to general-in-chief in July, 
Lincoln and Stanton effectively ran the war. They faced a diffi cult task since 
there was no unity of command, but eight separate commands reporting to 
Stanton. The amateur generals did reasonably well, coordinating operations 
in various theaters, including an offensive in the west. Halleck turned out 
to be indecisive, however, forcing Lincoln and Stanton to maintain close 
control.62 
Meanwhile, McClellan’s move toward Richmond was stalled and then 
turned back by the new commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
Robert E. Lee. Anxious and shaken, McClellan wired a hysterical message 
to Stanton. “If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe not thanks 
to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to 
sacrifi ce this army.”63 Lincoln responded with a promise of reinforcements, 
but faced continued pressure to replace his failing commander.
Figure 3.1 Abraham Lincoln and General George McClellan at Antietam, 1862 
(Library of Congress)
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Lee then moved north, winning a second battle at Bull Run at the end 
of August and attacking into Maryland in September. Desperate to defend 
the capital, Lincoln overruled his cabinet by putting McClellan in charge of 
forces around Washington. After the bloodiest single day of the war, in the 
battle at Antietam Creek, Lee headed south, allowing the Union to claim a 
victory. Lincoln ordered McClellan to follow Lee and deliver a knockout 
blow, but the Union general claimed logistical problems.
New team, new strategy 
These events – the continuing, inconclusive, deadly war with no immediate 
prospect of victory – helped convince Lincoln to change his war aims, using 
the sense of victory after Antietam as the occasion to announce it. Until then, 
the president had insisted that his only goal was to restore the Union. He 
avoided the issue of slavery. But by the late summer of 1862 he decided to 
announce his intention to proclaim the emancipation of slaves in the south, 
at least in those areas which had not returned to the Union by January 1, 
1863. He knew this would be popular in Republican areas, and he hoped to 
strengthen his party in the 1862 congressional elections. He also had to deal 
with the practical problems raised as Union forces moved into rebel territory 
and had to do something about the slaves they encountered. 
Lincoln also realized that McClellan did not favor the kind of vicious, all-
out war that the president believed was necessary to defeat the rebels. The 
two men made clear their differing views in July, when they met at Harrison’s 
Landing, Virginia. The general gave the president a long letter, arguing that 
the war “should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian 
Civilization.” He opposed “confi scation of property, political executions of 
persons” and “forcible abolition of slavery.”64 Lincoln and the Congress were 
moving in the opposite direction, both with a new confi scation act liberating 
the slaves of those who supported the rebellion and with orders by General 
John Pope, approved by Stanton, ordering his army to live off the country, 
to not worry about protecting the private property of rebels, and to arrest 
all disloyal males and females. As Stanton told a journalist who asked about 
the treatment of captured guerrillas, “Let them swing.”65
Immediately after the 1862 elections, Lincoln fi nally ousted McClellan, 
turning command over the General Ambrose Burnside, the fi rst of several 
offi cers who tried and failed to achieve a decisive victory over the next 
year and were promptly replaced. After suffering heavy casualties at 
Fredericksburg, Lincoln gave command to General Joseph Hooker. But the 
president gave the new commander an explicit warning:
I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying 
that both the the Army and the Government needed a Dictator. Of 
course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you 
the command, Only those generals who gain successes, can set up 
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dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk 
the dictatorship.66 
Within fi ve months, however, Hooker had been defeated at Chancellorsville 
and was refusing to defend Harper’s Ferry as Lee moved north. Hooker 
resigned in protest, and Lincoln selected General George Meade to take 
command – just two days before the two armies stumbled into the giant 
battle at Gettysburg. Once again, the Union prevailed, Lee retreated, and 
the Union commander failed to attack the withdrawing troops. Lincoln 
wrote a tough letter to Meade – “Your golden opportunity is gone, and I 
am distressed immeasurably because of it” – but then decided not to send it. 
Meade, learning of the president’s dismay, offered his resignation but was 
persuaded by General Halleck to withdraw it.67 
Meade held important commands for the duration of the war. But he 
seemed to have no grand plan for victory, and Lincoln turned instead to a 
newly victorious general in the west, U.S. Grant, who did. Grant believed 
in, and practiced successfully, a war of annihilation of the enemy. He was 
willing to suffer heavy casualties in order to defeat the enemy. As he told one 
offi cer, “The art of war is simple enough. Find out where the enemy is. Get 
at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can and as often as you 
can, and keep moving on.”68 
Lincoln put Grant in command of the western armies in October, then 
brought him back to Washington in March 1864, to give him supreme 
command of the Union armies, with the newly revived rank of Lieutenant 
General. Grant pushed on, heedless of heavy casualties, against Lee’s forces. 
General William T. Sherman moved from Tennessee across Georgia, taking 
his scorched earth campaign directly to southern civilians, and capturing 
Atlanta on September 2.
Relations among the civilian and military leaders were surprisingly good 
during 1864. General Halleck dismissed reports of high level quarrels as 
“all ‘bosh.’” One of Lincoln’s secretaries said that “the stories of Grant’s 
quarreling with the Secretary of War are gratuitous lies. Grant quarrels with 
no one.”69 And Grant himself wrote an extraordinary letter to Lincoln in 
May:
From my fi rst entrance into the volunteer service of the country to the 
present day I have never had cause of complaint, never have expressed 
or implied a complaint against the administration or the Secretary of 
War for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously 
prosecuting what appeared to be my duty. Indeed, since the promotion 
which placed me in command of all the armies … I have been astonished 
at the readiness with which everything asked for has been yielded, 
without even an explanation being asked.70 
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Despite this outward harmony, however, Lincoln was acutely conscious of 
the impending presidential elections. McClellan was preparing to run against 
the president for the Democrats and the infl uential New York Herald was 
promoting Grant as a candidate. Lincoln may have named Meade to replace 
Hooker because Meade had been born abroad and was considered ineligible 
to run for president. Only when Lincoln had received a letter from Grant 
pledging that nothing could persuade him to be a candidate did the president 
support the enactment of a law reestablishing the rank of Lieutenant General, 
a measure pushed in the Congress as a reward to Grant.71 
Congress at war 
In the nineteenth century, Congress was still a part-time legislature, typically 
meeting only three months per year, from early December until March 3. 
Every other year’s session was lame-duck, peopled by members elected two 
years before and meeting after the latest balloting. Lincoln accelerated the 
convening of the new thirty-seventh Congress by calling a special session 
in July of 1861 rather than waiting for the normal time in December. The 
Senate alone had met for three weeks following Lincoln’s inauguration in 
order to receive and act on nominations for the cabinet and lesser posts, 
including military offi cers. But the Senators had fi nished their work and 
adjourned two weeks before the attack on Fort Sumter.
Returning on July 4, the new thirty-seventh Congress spent a busy month 
responding to Lincoln’s call with a burst of legislative activity. Republicans 
had controlled the House of Representatives during the second half of 
Buchanan’s presidency, then gained majorities in both houses in the 1860 
elections. Lincoln’s party had a 33–15 lead over the Democrats in the Senate, 
with three from other parties, and a commanding 108–44 majority in the 
House, with 31 from other parties.72 
Legislators took seriously their constitutional powers to raise and support 
armies and to provide and maintain a navy, as well as to set the rules for 
the armed forces. Senator Benjamin Wade of Massachusetts expressed the 
Legislative Branch view of things when he said that the President might be 
Commander-in-Chief, “but Congress, the legislative power sitting superior 
to him or any the magistrate in the nation, may regulate, modify, and direct 
whatever principles they please [that] their chief commander shall act upon 
and execute.”73 
While the president enforced civilian control through his chain of 
command, Congress asserted its own civilian control through its powers 
of lawmaking and funding. Congress also had enormous infl uence over the 
selection of military personnel, starting with its authority to nominate men 
to attend the academies at West Point and Annapolis, the entry points for 
commissioned offi cers. While congressmen did not have explicit patronage 
power over military appointments, as they did over most civilian positions, 
they frequently recommended offi cers for key assignments in their states and 
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took personal interest in their careers. As two historians of the patronage 
system concluded, “Congressmen or Congressional delegations usually gave 
the President the names of those whom they wished appointed as brigadiers, 
major generals, and lesser offi cers.”74
Many in Congress were more radical than the president, more willing to 
make the war about slavery rather than simply preserving the Union. On July 
9, for example, the House passed a resolution declaring that soldiers had no 
duty to capture and return fugitive slaves. After wrangling over more extreme 
measures, Congress fi nally passed, on August 6, a compromise measure 
confi scating only that property used “in aid of the rebellion” – that is, only 
slaves actually employed in arms or labor against the Union could be freed. In 
the Senate, Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, chairman of the military affairs 
committee, met resistance to his measure retroactively approving Lincoln’s 
call for volunteers, increase of the regular army, blockade of southern ports, 
and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. After much debate, the Senate 
approved all but the language relating to the writ.75 To fund the war, it 
enacted America’s fi rst income tax.
With the Senate in session, the president submitted list after list of 
military nominations, most of which were routinely and promptly confi rmed 
– over 10,000 in the course of the war. The military affairs committee acted 
without partisan splits on appointments. But its chairman, Senator Wilson of 
Massachusetts, did refuse to confi rm any offi cers who had returned fugitive 
slaves to their masters.76 
While passing laws to organize and equip the rapidly expanding army, 
Congress also decided to increase its oversight of the process. In July the 
House established a special committee to investigate reports of fraud and 
mismanagement in government contracting. That committee later exposed 
scandals in Missouri under the regime of General Fremont. Senator Wilson 
welcomed visits by offi cers and enlisted men who wished to tell his committee 
of their views and problems.77 
Although Congress was out of session from early August until December, 
some members continued to push for offensive actions. After the Union 
defeat at Ball’s Bluff in October, for example, three Senators harangued 
General McClellan and then met with Lincoln to press their views.78
The union defeats at Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff prompted legislators in 
both houses to create an investigative committee when Congress reconvened 
in December. A New York congressman introduced a resolution calling for 
information to be provided regarding Ball’s Bluff. In the Senate, one member 
proposed a committee of inquiry into both recent defeats and then, when 
others wanted to add additional topics to the committee’s agenda, Senator 
Grimes of Iowa proposed a joint committee to examine all aspects of the 
war, with “the power to send for persons and papers.” Senator Sherman of 
Ohio noted that voting appropriations was easy, “but if we ignore the high 
duty imposed upon us as representatives of the people to investigate the 
conduct of the war and of all the offi cers of the Government, we neglect 
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the chief duty that is now imposed on us.” Both houses agreed, and the 
Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (JCCW) was established on 
December 20, with three Senators and four Representatives, including one 
Democrat from each chamber. Senator Benjamin Wade of Massachusetts 
was named chairman. None of the original members had any prior military 
experience, and all but one were lawyers. Radicals had a 4–3 majority over 
moderates.79 
The JCCW had the tools available to any congressional committee – 
oversight, subpoena, publicity, presumptive right of consultation – and it 
used them vigorously. Some historians see the committee as a hindrance to 
the war effort, treating several senior offi cers unfairly and trying to impose 
its strategic ideas on the administration.80 That was certainly the view of 
two men who later became president – Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman 
– and who fought to prevent creation of such an intrusive committee during 
the two world wars.
I believe that the JCCW should be seen as an ordinary and legitimate 
instrument of congressional prerogatives. It had an important oversight 
function, but its members had their own political motivations, and they 
used their committee positions to advance themselves and their views. 
The president and secretary of war conferred with committee members 
frequently, not only because of any threat of investigation but also because 
these men represented important segments of public opinion, whose support 
was ultimately vital for the war effort. Some senior commanders resented 
being called before the committee – an attitude not uncommon even today – 
but that is an important feature of the American system of civilian control. 
Two facts in particular defend the advantages of having such a committee: 
it worked hard and it worked in secret. Committee members met almost 
daily when Congress was in session, gathering information and conducting 
hearings. It held 272 offi cial sessions during three and a half years. Its 
members initiated meetings with the president at least eight times, and with 
Secretary Stanton even more often. And although the committee’s 11 reports 
were highly critical of many aspects of the war, these reports were released 
only after weeks and months of secret sessions. There was no parade of leaks 
to shape news coverage and public opinion.81 
Members traveled widely to gain fi rst hand impressions and to understand 
what they were investigating. Subcommittees went to Boston, New York, 
Annapolis, Illinois, and to the battlefi elds in Virginia, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee. Besides investigating military disasters, the committee looked 
into several operations on which it fi led no report. It also looked into many 
allegations of contracting and supply problems. A further proof of respect for 
the JCCW, lawmakers frequently referred press allegations to the committee 
and requested investigations.82 
On the other hand, it is true that the committee had its favorites, like 
General Fremont, whom it defended despite signifi cant incriminating inform-
ation. And it had its targets, like McClellan and General Charles P. Stone 
48 The challenge of warfi ghting
of Ball’s Bluff, whom it pursued unmercifully.83 It also had a perhaps naïve 
strategy – attack, attack, always attack – which was attractive to civilians 
sitting in Washington. But these views were no different from those of many 
in the cabinet, elsewhere in Congress, or in the press. 
On several occasions, the committee was the conscience pushing Lincoln 
toward emancipation or the “bad cop” he could cite when politely urging 
generals to take the offensive. Its very records provide key documentation 
for our understanding of the war and the many confusions attendant to its 
conduct. Commanders were probably more careful because they anticipated 
questions from the legislators. Speeches by its chairman, drawing on its 
reports, were widely circulated by the Republican party during the 1864 
presidential campaign.84
Navy Secretary Gideon Welles refl ected a critical view of the JCCW when 
he said, “There must be something in these terrible reports, but I distrust 
Congressional committees. They exaggerate.” The members defended them-
selves and explained their purpose in an 1863 report: “Your committee 
therefore concluded that they would best perform their duty by endeavoring 
to obtain such information in respect to the conduct of the war as would 
best enable them to advise what mistakes had been made in the past and the 
proper course to be pursued in the future.” Chairman Wade explained to 
McClellan: 
We are here armed with the whole power of both houses of Congress. 
They have made it our duty to inquire into the whole conduct of the 
war; into every department of it. We do not want to do anything that 
will result in harm or wrong. But we do want to know, and we must 
know if we can, what is to be done, for the country is in jeopardy.85 
Congressional oversight was not omnipresent, however, for even during 
some of the most important periods of the war the legislators were out of 
session for extended periods. Most members were away from Washington 
during August 6 to December 2, 1861; July 17 to December 1, 1862, March 
14 to December 7, 1863; and July 4 to December 5, 1864. In other words, 
Congress was absent during the Shenandoah Valley and Antietam campaigns 
in 1862, during the musical chairs of generals in 1863, and during Grant’s 
long, bloody campaign of 1864.
One of the most diffi cult issues faced by Congress was the question of 
conscription. In July 1862, the legislators approved amendments to the 
Militia Act reiterating the obligation of all able-bodied males 18–45 years 
of age and requiring up to nine months’ federal service. Using this new law, 
Lincoln on August 4 announced a draft of 300,000 men for nine months 
for all those states which had not met their quotas of volunteers for three-
year terms. Practical problems prevented this measure from ever having 
real effect, so the lame-duck Congress on its fi nal day, March 3, 1863, 
passed a comprehensive conscription bill. This measure required house-to-
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house canvasses for draftees, but allowed men to avoid service by fi nding a 
substitute or by paying a commutation fee of $300.86
This law came about through the normal legislative process of pulling, 
hauling, and compromise. Both bills, in 1862 and 1863, became vehicles 
for amendments dealing with emancipation and military service for blacks. 
Shifting majorities passed or defeated amendments trying to deal with these 
topics, along with the underlying conscription issue.87 Senator Wilson, 
chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, offered a fl oor amendment, 
previously rejected by his committee, for the $300 commutation fee. An 
important factor behind Wilson’s support of this fee, in addition to pressure 
from wealthy constituents, was to help highly industrialized Massachusetts 
maintain its labor supply. Later he persuaded Stanton to increase enlistment 
bonuses so as to minimize the need for draftees. The draft riots of 1863 and 
other public opposition drove Congress in 1864 to amend the law, repealing 
the commutation fee except for conscientious objectors. On another 
occasion, Wilson won enactment of a measure granting equal pay for black 
and white soldiers, and making it retroactive to the date of enlistment.88 
These actions display Congress in action on the details of major legislation. 
Members were following their individual policy and political judgments; the 
executive branch was not the key player.
As things turned out, the major impact of the draft law was to stimulate 
volunteer enlistments. In the fi rst draft call of 1863, 255,373 were called; 
117,986 hired substitutes; 86,724 paid the commutation fee; and 4,316 
failed to show; only 46,347 – 18 percent – actually entered the ranks.89 
Overall, only six percent of the 2.7 million men who served in the Union 
army during the Civil War were directly drafted.90 
The politics of war 
Elections strongly infl uenced the course of the war. Lincoln’s victory in 1860 
drove many southern states to secede. The prospect of congressional elections 
in 1862 led the president and congressional Republicans to push for a strong 
offensive to end the war or at least demonstrate Union resolve. The sense 
that Antietam was a Union victory, as Lee retreated into Virginia, reassured 
Lincoln enough to announce his planned emancipation proclamation. But 
the Republican losses in the 1862 elections made Lincoln more radical on 
war aims and tactics, and perhaps more desperate to fi nd a winning general. 
In 1864, Lincoln was unsure of winning re-nomination until the Baltimore 
convention in June and fearful of defeat at least until the confi dence-boosting 
fall of Atlanta in September.
In 1862, the Republicans held on to 33 of 52 Senate seats, but saw their lead 
in the House drop from 108–44 – plus 34 of other parties – to 85–72 – with 
27 from other parties. These results could deny them a working majority.91 
Stanton reacted to these setbacks by working to guarantee a strong 
Republican turnout in the 1863 state elections and in the 1864 presidential 
50 The challenge of warfi ghting
contest. He made sure that Ohio defeated a leading peace Democrat running 
for Governor, for example, by arranging for Ohio troops to vote in the fi eld 
and allowing war department clerks to travel home with free railroad passes. 
Lame-duck Democrats tried to pass a bill censuring Stanton and forbidding 
military offi cers from interfering in civil elections, but the measure failed.92 
In 1864, Stanton pressured military offi cials to help Republican state 
agents and to thwart the Democrats. Entire regiments were furloughed home 
to crucial states. As Charles Dana commented, “all the power and infl uence 
of the War Department … were employed to secure the re-election of Mr. 
Lincoln.” 
Stanton knew how strongly the men in uniform supported the president: 
Lincoln got 53 percent of the votes overall, but a rousing 78 percent of those 
of Union soldiers.93 
Political considerations also infl uenced military goals and strategy. They 
help explain why Lincoln moved to the radical position on freeing slaves 
and using them in the army. They help explain why northerners embraced 
Sherman’s attacks on the people of Georgia and why they accepted the heavy 
casualties under Grant, which led to victories over Lee. Congress refl ected the 
divisions within the country, and Lincoln steered a course through them.
At the end, however, there was still basic split – between Lincoln and the 
moderates who favored a benevolent reconstruction and the radicals who 
demanded southern capitulation and black empowerment. The president 
used a pocket veto to kill the Wade–Davis bill in 1864, which would 
have imposed a congressional plan antithetical to Lincoln’s approach. For 
example, it would have required a majority of each seceded state to take an 
oath of past as well as future loyalty in order to reestablish their own local 
governments. Lincoln favored a prospective loyalty oath and a 10 percent 
threshold of citizens taking the oath.94 
As the Confederate forces seemed on the verge of surrender, Lincoln took 
special measures to ensure that his more lenient approach was followed. 
On March 3, 1865, he specifi cally ordered Grant not to “decide, discuss, 
or confer upon any political questions” with General Lee. “Such questions 
the president holds in his own hand; and will submit them to no military 
conferences or conversations.” When Sherman, shortly after Lincoln’s 
assassination, offered generous terms to General Joseph Johnston – including 
provisions on the recognition of southern governments, referral of measures 
to the Supreme Court, and a general amnesty – Stanton ordered the deal 
revoked, an action which led the angry Sherman to refuse to shake the War 
Secretary’s hand during a grand review of Union troops a few weeks later.95
Assassination and aftermath 
The struggle over control of the military continued even after the end of 
the war and the assassination of the president. Indeed, Andrew Johnson was 
impeached and nearly removed from offi ce because he refused to obey the 
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law giving Congress the power over the appointment of the Secretary of War 
and other offi cials. The underlying dispute was that Johnson favored a more 
forgiving policy toward the former rebels, while the radical Republicans 
in Congress insisted on more punishment for southern whites and more 
empowerment for southern blacks. As the occupying force, the US Army 
was caught in the cross-pressures. 
At the apex of the power struggle was Secretary of War Stanton, who 
sided with the radicals. Asked to resign by President Johnson in August 
1867, Stanton refused, relying on the Tenure of Offi ce Act, passed over 
Johnson’s veto, which prohibited the removal of cabinet offi cers until their 
successors had been confi rmed by the Senate. He did, however, step aside 
and let General Grant act as interim secretary until December, when the 
reconvening Congress passed a resolution supporting him. Stanton then 
encamped in his offi ce and refused repeated presidential orders to surrender 
power. On the very days that Johnson tried to force the issue, impeachment 
resolutions were fi led in the House and reported by Committee in February 
1868. Stanton remained at his post until May, when the Senate fell one vote 
short of convicting and ousting the president.96 
Stanton resigned; Grant was chosen as Republican candidate for 
president in the fall elections; and Reconstruction proceeded as intended by 
the Congress. The era of congressional dominance of government, briefl y 
interrupted by the demands of Civil War, resumed. It was destined to last for 
over three decades, until Theodore Roosevelt came to power. In the interim, 
the army was punished for having been the implementer of Reconstruction. 
A key feature of the settlement of the disputed presidential election of 1876, 
which awarded Rutherford B. Hayes the electoral votes to become president, 
was the removal of US troops from the southern states and passage of the 
posse comitatus law, which still forbids the use of troops for domestic law 
enforcement. 
The legacy of congressional involvement in the war was also negative. 
When Congress declared war against Germany in 1917, President Woodrow 
Wilson vigorously opposed any effort to create the equivalent of the Joint 
Committee on the Conduct of the War. In time, however, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee became the focal point for skeptical oversight and 
ultimately the engine of defeat of the Versailles peace treaty. In the Second 
World War, then Senator Harry Truman, mindful of the precedents, actively 
worked to limit his committee, the Special Committee to Investigate the 
National Defense Program, to matters of military contracting. He did not try 
to oversee the strategy or conduct of the war.
The Civil War poisoned American civil–military relations so much that it 
took several generations for the warriors and politicians to recover from its 
effects.
4 Managing the Vietnam War
Now, I don’t need ten generals to come in here ten times and tell me to bomb. 
I want some solutions, I want some answers.
Lyndon Johnson to Army General Harold Johnson1
Maybe we military men were all weak. Maybe we should have stood up and 
pounded the table …. At times I wonder, ‘Why did I go along with this kind 
of stuff?’
CNO Admiral David McDonald2 
It is high time, we believe, to allow the military voice to be heard in connection 
with the tactical details of military operations.”
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, August 19673
I don’t want any more of this crap about the fact that we couldn’t hit this 
target or that one. This is your chance to use military power effectively to win 
this war, and if you don’t, I’ll consider you responsible.
Richard Nixon to Admiral Thomas Moorer, December 19724 
Lyndon Johnson inherited a war along with the presidency in November 
1963, a war he was never sure how to win but dared not to lose. He also 
inherited a group of advisors, civilian and military, who clashed over the most 
basic questions of the use of military force. On Capitol Hill, a sympathetic 
Congress supported administration policies until the costs mounted and the 
internal disagreements surfaced. The new president had been a loyal and 
enthusiastic supporter of John F. Kennedy’s policies. He had traveled to 
Vietnam and proclaimed President Ngo Dinh Diem the “Winston Churchill 
of Southeast Asia.”5 He endorsed the deployment of 16,000 US military 
advisors as a necessary measure to block the advance of Communism.  As 
a seasoned politician, Johnson was particularly concerned about avoiding 
the outcomes which befell Harry Truman, who tolerated the Communist 
takeover of China, sent American troops into ground combat in Korea, 
ignored warnings of provoking Chinese intervention, had to fi re his popular 
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but insubordinate military commander, and then lost the battle for public 
opinion regarding his military policies. In all of his subsequent decisions, one 
can see Johnson’s preoccupation with maintaining military, congressional, 
and public support for his conduct of the war in Vietnam. In his fi rst days 
as president, Johnson told his advisors, “I am not going to be the president 
who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.” But he also made clear that 
Vietnam was not his highest priority: reelection was. As he told the Joint 
Chiefs at a reception just before Christmas 1963, “Just get me elected, and 
then you can have your war.”6
The biggest threat to Johnson was Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz), the 
popular and outspoken conservative, an unabashed anti-communist who 
favored “a new winning strategy” in Vietnam and hinted that he would 
unleash the military to do what they thought best.7 He also had opposed 
Kennedy’s agreements with the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons testing 
and was willing to delegate use of nuclear weapons to military commanders. 
He easily won the Republican presidential nomination in July 1964, setting 
the stage for a titanic struggle with the new president. 
Despite the ongoing confl ict in Southeast Asia, Johnson was determined 
to be the peace candidate. “The United States intends no rashness and seeks 
no wider war”, he declared. He also warned, “We don’t want American boys 
to do the fi ghting for Asian boys. We don’t want … to get tied down in a land 
war in Asia.”8 In disavowing belligerent intentions, Johnson was following 
the practice that helped Woodrow Wilson in 1916 and Franklin Roosevelt 
in 1940
Declaration of war 
In the spring of 1964, Johnson discussed with his advisors the possibility 
of seeking congressional endorsement of his policies. Such action had the 
diplomatic advantage of demonstrating American unity and the political 
advantage of removing Vietnam as a partisan issue in the upcoming 
elections. “By God,”, Johnson declared, “I’m going to be damn sure those 
guys are with me when we begin this thing.”9 Consultations continued with 
key congressional fi gures during the summer. The measure was modeled on 
those previously passed by Congress in 1955 regarding Formosa (Taiwan) 
in 1957 regarding the Middle East, and in 1962 regarding Cuba. In those 
instances, the joint resolutions were seen as warnings to deter hostile actions 
more than as authorizations for major combat.
On August 2, probably in response to US covert actions against North 
Vietnam, torpedo boats fi red on the US destroyer Maddox. When a similar 
attack was reported two days later – though the evidence later seemed 
quite ambiguous – Johnson decided it was necessary to retaliate, and to 
ask for congressional support. He ordered air strikes – 64 sorties against 
North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and a fuel complex – and sent the draft 
resolution to Congress for immediate action.10
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Angered by the apparent attacks and determined to show toughness 
and unity in an election year, Congress quickly passed the administration’s 
resolution by nearly unanimous votes – 414–0 in the House, 88–2 in the 
Senate. The measure declared that “the Congress approves and supports the 
determination of the President, as commander in chief, to take all necessary 
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States 
and to prevent further aggression.” It also proclaimed that “the United States 
is therefore prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, 
including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol states of 
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense 
of its freedom.”11 In a face-saving measure of dubious legality, Congress 
included a provision saying that the resolution could be terminated by a 
non-vetoable concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress. 
Later on, offi cials pointed to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution as the “funct-
ional equivalent” of a declaration of war.12 State Department lawyers argued 
that the resolution was not necessary to carry out the war because of the 
inherent powers of the president and the ratifi cation of the 1954 SEATO 
treaty that committed the signatories to mutual defense against communism. 
Nevertheless, repeal of the resolution became a goal of antiwar congressmen, 
at least as a symbolic action against continued US participation in the war.
The military and legislative actions in August muted Vietnam as a political 
issue in the following weeks. In the fi nal balloting, Johnson trounced 
Goldwater, winning 61 percent of the vote and all but six states. He also 
gained huge, better than 2–1 Democratic majorities in the Congress, setting 
Figure 4.1 Lyndon Johnson meeting with Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1964 (LBJ Library) 
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the stage for what he called the Great Society.13 But while Congress busied 
itself with voting rights, anti-poverty and medicare legislation, national 
security offi cials turned their attention to the deteriorating situation in South 
Vietnam.
Maxwell Taylor, the former JCS Chairman, went to Saigon as Ambassador 
in July 1964 and soon began sending gloomy cables about the political 
and military capacities of the South Vietnamese government. He was also 
troubled by the disagreements among his country team. “We criticize the 
Vietnamese for their rivalries”, he said, “but we’re not exactly setting an 
example.”14 
After the US election, he returned to Washington for key meetings with 
Johnson and his advisors. On December 1, the president approved the fi rst 
part of a two-phase plan that recommended increased covert operations 
against North Vietnam followed a month later by a moderate level of air 
strikes on the North. Johnson even resisted reprisal raids after a Christmas 
Eve attack on an American troop billet that killed several soldiers. He held off 
until a second attack on US personnel came on February 7. After approving 
two days of reprisal raids, Johnson then weighed more sustained bombing 
campaign, fi nally launching Rolling Thunder on March 1, 1965. 
Two theories, two wars 
From the start, US military and civilian leaders had a fundamental disagree-
ment over the nature of the confl ict in Vietnam and how to deal with it. Most 
of the civilian offi cials believed that the chief problem was the weakness of 
the South Vietnamese government, political and military, and that North 
Vietnamese aid to its allies in the south was illegal but not decisive. As 
President Kennedy had said regarding the South Vietnamese in a September 
3, 1963 interview, “In the fi nal analysis, it is their war. They are the ones 
who have to win it or lose it.”15 Military leaders, by contrast, continually 
emphasized the role of external support and argued that major attacks on 
the north were the necessary and perhaps suffi cient condition to win the 
struggle in the south.
Civilian and military leaders also clashed on the use of force. McNamara 
and his whiz kids had already won the intellectual debate over nuclear 
deterrence and war-fi ghting with their notions of escalation ladders, second 
strike capability, and counterforce and countervalue targets. Each use of 
force was intended to signal something – resolve, restraint, willingness to 
escalate, etc. Since the human cost of any use of nuclear weapons was seen 
as so horrendous, civilian leaders were determined to try to minimize their 
actual use through withhold options and fi rebreaks. Faced with a limited 
war in Southeast Asia, they translated their game theory notions of signaling 
from the nuclear realm and applied them to conventional confl ict.
In a policy memo by McGeorge Bundy, sent in the heat of his visit to 
Vietnam at the time of the attack on US barracks in Pleiku in February 1965, 
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the national security advisor recommended “a policy of sustained reprisal 
against North Vietnam” as “the best way of increasing our chance of success in 
Vietnam.”16 He noted that the policy could fail but would “set a higher price 
for the future” that could deter others. He specifi cally followed the logic of the 
game theorists by recommending “that the level of reprisal be adjusted rapidly 
and visibly to both upward and downward shifts in the level of Viet Cong 
offenses. We want to keep before Hanoi the carrot of our desisting as well as 
the stick of continued pressure. We also need to conduct the application of 
force so that there is always a prospect of worse to come.”17 
Military leaders saw few reasons for restraint and believed, in theory and 
practice, that massive attacks on enemy forces and leadership were the best 
and only sure way to compel them to cease their aggressive acts. As early as 
January 22, 1964 – long before the Gulf of Tonkin attacks and reprisals in 
August – the Joint Chiefs sent a memo to McNamara urging fewer restraints 
on US military activities. 
In order to achieve that victory [over the “externally directed and 
supported insurgency in South Vietnam”], the Joint Chiefs of Staff are 
of the opinion that the United States must be prepared to put aside 
many of the self-imposed restrictions which now limit our efforts, and 
to undertake bolder actions which may embody greater risks.18 
The Chiefs recommended a US military takeover of conduct of the war and 
even US aid programs as well as aerial bombing of the north “using US 
resources under Vietnamese cover.”19  
They repeated their recommendations fi ve times more prior to the Gulf 
of Tonkin attacks. In May, for example, they urged air strikes on airfi elds, 
ammunition and petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) storage sites, major 
railway and highway bridges, and outlined ways to destroy entirely the 
north’s industrial base. After the reprisal raids in August, they called for 
“signifi cantly stronger military pressures” on the north and specifi cally 
rejected the idea “that we should be slow to get deeply involved.”20 
On November 14, 1964, the Chiefs spelled out their contrasting views on 
the use of force. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with a concept of “tit-for-tat” 
reprisals nor with Ambassador Taylor’s recommendation that the United 
States and the Government of Vietnam [GVN] jointly announce such a 
policy which ties our action to equivalency. “Tit for tat” is considered 
unduly restrictive, inhibits US initiative, and implies an undesirable lack 
of fl exibility both as to the nature and the level of response.21 
During 1964, the Chiefs’ support for air strikes on the north was a means of 
avoiding a ground force commitment in the south. Angered and frustrated 
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by the experience of the Korean War, they did not want to fi ght another 
land war in Asia. But even after the deployment of large numbers of ground 
combat forces, they continued to believe and argue that the war could be 
won only by major attacks on the north.
Intellectually and bureaucratically, the United States ended up fi ghting 
a very compartmentalized war. Strategic air operations, including strikes 
on the north and in Laos and Cambodia, were controlled by the Pacifi c 
Command in Hawaii. The war in the south directed by the commander of 
what was called MACV – Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – with 
separate sectors for army and marine operations. Some operations, air and 
ground, had narrow military goals, but many were for psychological or 
diplomatic reasons. The air war on the north, in particular, became caught 
up in the diplomatic maneuvering over peace talks. Target lists grew or 
shrank to “signal” American responses to North Vietnamese behaviors, and 
bombing pauses were touted as giving peace a chance to work. The ground 
war in the south followed its own logic, largely separate and distinct from 
the diplomatic dance that infl uenced the air war. 
Ground combat commitment 
Ironically, the deployment of the fi rst combat troops was made in order to 
support the air war on the north. Some 3,500 marines were sent to Danang on 
March 8, 1965, in order to protect the base which had been sending aircraft 
to strike in the north. But with the Saigon government in continued disarray 
and its military actions faltering, US offi cials saw the logic of sending more 
ground troops. McGeorge Bundy summarized the evolution of US thinking 
in a memo to Johnson on July 24, 1965. 
[I]nitially we all had grave objections to major US ground force 
deployment. Even those in favor, (like my brother Bill), wanted to try 
other things fi rst, and none of us was prepared to urge on Westmoreland 
things he was not urging on us. Then when we got major bases of 
our own, largely for air action, we moved quite promptly to protect 
them. These deployments did not give us bad reactions, and it became 
easier for Westmoreland to propose, and for us to accept, additional 
deployments.22 
Even Lyndon Johnson felt the need to do something different. He berated 
his Army Chief of Staff, General Harold Johnson, as he sent him to Vietnam 
in March, 1965. “Now, I don’t need ten generals to come in here ten times 
and tell me to bomb”, the president complained. “I want some solutions, I 
want some answers.”23 When, several days later, the Chiefs for the fi rst time 
recommended direct combat use of US troops, the president was ready and 
agreeable. 
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Maxwell Taylor, then ambassador to Saigon, later refl ected: “It was 
curious how hard it had been to get authority for the initiation of the air 
campaign against the North and how relatively easy to get the marines 
ashore. Yet I thought the latter a much more diffi cult decision and concurred 
in it reluctantly.”24 In practice, US civilian leaders – and the Congress – paid 
more attention to the air war throughout the region than to the ground war 
in the south. The commanders had a much freer rein to conduct military 
operations there, subject only to the troop ceilings which they periodically 
requested increasing. 
The buildup was massive and relentless. In October 1963, there had been 
16,732 US military personnel in Vietnam, mostly military advisors to South 
Vietnamese forces and support units. At the end of 1964, the fi gure had 
risen to 23,300. During 1965, the number surged to 184,300. It jumped to 
385,300 by the end of 1966 and to 485,600 by the end of 1967, peaking at 
543,482 in 1969. At its height, an additional 82,000 US military personnel 
were supporting the war from offshore and in Thailand. There were also 
72,000 troops from other nations involved in the war.25  
Under General William Westmoreland, they launched major operations to 
“search and destroy” enemy forces. Earlier emphasis on “pacifi cation” took 
a back seat to large unit operations throughout the country. These attacks 
were supported by huge numbers of air strikes, dropping more than four 
times the tonnage of munitions targeted against the north and the resupply 
lines – the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” – snaking through Laos and Cambodia. The 
south was also where the United States suffered its heaviest casualties. Fewer 
than 400 Americans had died in action prior to the Gulf of Tonkin attacks 
and reprisals. Another 1,369 died in 1965; 5,008 in 1966; 9,378 in 1967; 
and 14,592 in the peak year of 1968.26 
Dissension and debate
The human and material costs kept mounting, but the indicators of progress 
were inconclusive. Since Westmoreland’s search and destroy operations did 
not seize and hold territory, the best measure of success became the enemy 
body counts, but they grew unreliable and were disbelieved by the entire 
chain of command. The interdiction campaigns against enemy supply lines 
were massive in input but inadequate in results: the North Vietnamese and 
Viet Cong forces in the south needed only about 15 tons of supplies each 
day, an amount that could be carried by just a few trucks.27  
Throughout 1965 and 1966 and into the summer of 1967, the pattern 
was the same. The Chiefs pressed to strike additional targets in the north; a 
few were added; then they pressed to expand the list further. Westmoreland 
sought more troops; McNamara traveled to Saigon and got him to agree to 
a lower number; the president approved the reduced request.28 
Meanwhile, there were antiwar demonstrations in Vietnam and America; 
peace plans from all quarters; bombing pauses and escalated attacks – all 
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inconclusive. Most notable were: a 37-day bombing pause in December 
1965–January 1966; the fi rst US air attacks near Hanoi and the port city of 
Haiphong in June 1966; and major ground operations near Saigon, near the 
Cambodian border, in the Central Highlands and in the Mekong Delta.  
Many US civilian offi cials grew disillusioned with the war in the spring 
and summer of 1967. Robert McNamara vigorously defended past decisions 
and current operations, but opposed major additional escalation and gave 
hints of a change of heart. The Chiefs kept pushing for stronger action and 
resisting any cutbacks or ceilings on military activities. But a CIA analysis in 
May 1967, reached a very bleak conclusion: ‘Short of a major invasion or 
nuclear attack, there is probably no level of air or naval actions against North 
Vietnam which Hanoi has determined in advance would be so intolerable 
that the war had to be stopped.”29  
Westmoreland and the Chiefs were seeking 200,000 more men for 
Vietnam, a call-up of reserves, and fewer restrictions on attack on the north. 
On May 19, 1967, McNamara gave a long memo to the president opposing 
the military’s recommendations and urging only 30,000 more troops. Besides 
opposing most of the measures sought by the military leaders, McNamara 
also offered judgments on American public opinion.  
Most Americans do not know how we got where we are, and most, 
without knowing why, but taking advantage of hindsight, are convinced 
that somehow we should not have gotten this deeply in. All want the 
war ended and expect their President to end it. Successfully, or else. This 
state of mind in the US generates impatience in the political structure of 
the United States. It unfortunately also generates patience in Hanoi.30 
 Frustrated with the progress of the war and angry at the civilian leaders, 
the Chiefs vented their feelings on Capitol Hill. While McNamara and JCS 
Chairman General Earle Wheeler were traveling to Vietnam, they met with 
Mendel Rivers (D-SC) and some members of his House Armed Services 
Committee, where they reiterated their rational for expanding the war.31 
Military leaders also convinced Senator John Stennis (D-Miss) and other 
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to hold hearings on 
the air war. In the course of eight days of hearings in August 1967, the 
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee heard from all the senior military 
leaders and from McNamara. Although the hearings were held behind closed 
doors, declassifi ed transcripts were released in September, shortly after the 
Subcommittee’s devastating report.  
McNamara was confi dent and forceful in his testimony, ready to argue the 
futility of attacking every target not previously approved by the president. He 
claimed that all but 57 of the 359 targets recommended by the JCS had been 
approved, 85 percent, and that destruction of most of those remaining would 
have little impact on the war effort. In a few cases, he pointed out, the targets 
were justifi ably off limits because of the risk of provoking a confrontation 
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with the Soviet Union or China. He also said, quite disingenuously, “I don’t 
believe that there is this gulf between the military leaders and the civilian 
leaders in the executive branch.”32  
The hearings demonstrated otherwise, of course. And Lyndon Johnson 
was so concerned about their impact that he acted in advance to approve an 
expanded target list as well as more troops for Vietnam. At least 29 targets 
were added to the approved list in the month before the hearings, and only 
one target recommended by the JCS after July 20 was disapproved.33 In an 
August 16 meeting, Johnson told McNamara, “I would like to be able to say 
that we have hit six out of every seven targets requested.”34
Johnson also, for the fi rst time in the war, added General Wheeler to the 
short list of offi cials who participated in the “Tuesday Lunch” sessions where 
bombing targets were decided. While military critics contend that Johnson 
“picked” targets for attack, in fact the president de-selected some from the 
recommended lists, usually because of proximity to the Chinese border or 
Soviet supply venues or because heavy defenses made the costs of attack too 
high compared to the military benefi t. 
The Stennis panel concluded that the air campaign against the north had 
not achieved its objectives because of “the fragmentation of our air might by 
overly restrictive controls, limitations, and the doctrine of ‘gradualism’ placed 
on our aviation forces …” It complained that “civilian authority consistently 
overruled the unanimous recommendations of military commanders and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff for a systematic, timely, and hard-hitting integrated air 
campaign against the vital North Vietnam targets ….” The subcommittee 
concluded, “It is high time, we believe, to allow the military voice to be 
heard in connection with the tactical details of military operations.”35 
McNamara’s testimony was the last straw for the Chiefs. They thought 
that the defense secretary had misled the Congress about the effectiveness of 
the air war thus far and prospectively. Within hours of McNamara’s hearing, 
they met secretly in General Wheeler’s offi ce. The JCS chairman demanded 
total secrecy and then suggested that they should resign en masse at a press 
conference the next day. After several hours of discussions, the senior offi cers 
reached a consensus in favor of the unprecedented action. But early the next 
morning Wheeler called them together again and announced his change of 
heart. “We can’t do it”, he said. “It’s mutiny.”36 
General Harold K. Johnson and Admiral David McDonald also considered 
resignation in protest during the war. But the CNO lamented, “Maybe we 
military men were all weak. Maybe we should have stood up and pounded the 
table …. At times I wonder, ‘Why did I go along with this kind of stuff?’”37
Within three months, however, Lyndon Johnson had arranged the removal 
of Robert McNamara, although the longest-serving defense secretary did not 
actually leave the Pentagon until the end of February 1968. He had lost the 
confi dence of the president as well as of the Chiefs. 
While some writers wish that the Chiefs had carried out their resignation 
plans and think that that might have shocked the public into supporting 
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their wider war policies, a well-documented and well-received analysis by a 
highly regarded army offi cer blames the Chiefs for different reasons. H.R. 
McMaster, in Dereliction of Duty, laments the “fi ve silent men” who never 
rally developed a good alternative strategy. “The Chiefs’ failure to [render 
their best advice] and their willingness to present single-service remedies to a 
complex military problem, prevented them from developing a comprehensive 
estimate of the situation or from thinking effectively about strategy.”38  
Congress and the politics of the war 
Congress also never stood up to Lyndon Johnson, never dissented in an 
effective way against the war. One reason was party loyalty: Democrats 
controlled Capitol Hill and the White House, so they saw enormous 
political risks in challenging the president’s policies. They also knew Johnson 
personally, especially the Senators, and empathized with his dilemmas. 
Johnson also made a practice of including congressional leaders in frequent 
Vietnam policy meetings, making it harder for them to criticize outside what 
they had acquiesced to while inside. They also knew that American public 
opinion, in spite of the noisy antiwar protesters, continued to support the 
war.  
Republican supporters of the war were never as visible or outspoken as 
some Democratic critics, but they were an important factor keeping Congress 
in line. Johnson told the Senate’s Republican leader, Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) 
in February 1965, “I’m getting kicked around by my own party in the Senate, 
and getting my support from your side of the aisle.”39 A year later, however, 
Johnson expressed concern that Sen. Stennis was getting inside word about 
future troop increases and mused to his advisors, “Maybe we consult with 
’em too much.”40  
Nevertheless, there were some critics and several attempts to use legislative 
actions to shape military strategy. Probably most signifi cant were the dueling 
hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. 
J. William Fulbright’s Committee held nationally televised hearings on 
several occasions starting in February 1966 where it grilled administration 
witnesses and gave a megaphone to outside critics. The Stennis panel in 
1967, by contrast, gave voice to the Chiefs and their criticisms of the policy 
of restraint. But they met in secret and garnered only moderate attention 
when their report and transcripts were released.  
Lyndon Johnson’s mentor and close political ally, Richard Russell (D-
Ga.) was chairman of both the Armed Services Committee and the defense 
appropriations subcommittee. Russell opposed deeper involvement in 
Vietnam before the Gulf of Tonkin incident, then became a sturdy supporter 
of the war. In June 1965, he told a Georgia audience: 
It was a mistake to get involved there in the fi rst place; I have never 
been able to see any strategic, political, or economic advantage to be 
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gained by our involvement …. Whether or not the initial decision was 
a mistake is now moot. The United States does have a commitment in 
South Vietnam. The fl ag is there. US honor and prestige are there. And, 
most important of all, US soldiers are there.41 
Many members of Congress shared Russell’s view. They rallied round the 
fl ag in 1964 and were reluctant to undercut public or military morale 
thereafter. 
When Johnson announced the major deployment of troops to Vietnam in 
July 1965, there were, by one credible estimate, only about 10–12 Senators 
and 35–40 Representatives who were actively opposed to the use of large-
scale US forces in the confl ict. Another analyst concludes that “in the Senate 
a majority was either downright opposed to Americanization or ambivalent; 
perhaps more important, the number of committed hawks that spring [of 
1965] was astonishingly small.” By early 1966, almost half the Democratic 
Senators and one-fourth of the House Democrats were openly raising 
concerns about further escalation I the war.42  
Despite their doubts, members of Congress were willing to make 
speeches and provide appropriations supporting the war. They also defeated 
amendments intended to limit the conduct of military operations. Of the 94 
votes taken by Congress on measures directly related to the war between 
1966 and 1972, only nine came while Johnson was president.43 A 1966 
effort to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin resolution got only fi ve votes in the 
Senate. In 1967, Senators trying to pass a non-binding sense of Congress 
measure opposing attacks in North Vietnam and any increase in US troop 
levels beyond 500,000 lost out to supporters of an amendment declaring 
Congress’ “fi rm intentions to provide all necessary support for members 
of the armed forces of the United States fi ghting in Vietnam” as well as 
supporting a negotiated settlement “which will preserve the honor of the 
United States.”44  
Although two key Democratic leaders in the Senate were critical of the war, 
the Democratic leadership and key chairmen in the House were supporters. 
Its Armed Services Committee, headed by Rep. Mendel Rivers (D-SC), was 
also a reliable source of support. A group of members traveled to Vietnam 
in the spring of 1966 and reported confi dently that “we are moving steadily 
toward victory over the Vietcong.” A respected Vermont Republican, Senator 
George Aiken, offered a different assessment. In October, 1966 he argued 
that the United States had already won the war in the sense of avoiding 
defeat and that we should declare victory and pull out our forces.45 
Just before the 1966 elections, a magazine survey of members four 
58.5 percent favoring existing policy in the war, 26.4 percent for stronger 
military action, and 15.1 percent for de-escalation and negotiations. House 
Republicans, led by Gerald Ford (R-Mich.) and Melvin Laird (R-Wisc.), 
tried to make the war an issue in the elections by releasing a report calling 
the war a stalemate and by arguing that the administration was engaged 
Managing the Vietnam War 63
in “deception and confusion.”46 Although the war was only one of several 
issues cutting against Democrats, the elections gave them a three-seat loss in 
the Senate and a 47-seat loss in the House. They still retained majorities of 
64–36 and 248–187.  
Several key members of Congress pressed openly for more troops and an 
expanded target list during 1967, culminating with the Stennis subcommittee 
hearings and report. The administration was moving in the same direction, 
in part to preempt the criticism. As White House counsel Harry McPherson 
later recalled, “Like an acid, [the war] was eating into everything. It threatened 
to wipe out public awareness of Johnson’s great achievements; it had already 
corroded his relationships with members of Congress.” At a private dinner 
in May, Sen. Russell told the president, “We’ve just got to fi nish it soon 
because time is working against you both here and there.”47 
Instead of confronting the war directly, opponents launched the fi rst 
of several indirect attacks on presidential policies, which later culminated 
in the enactment, over Richard Nixon’s veto, of the War Powers Act of 
1973. The 1967 measure was the “National Commitments Resolution”, 
a non-binding declaration that any promise to use force abroad requires 
“affi rmative action by Congress.” The measure had been prompted by anger 
of the administration testimony that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was the 
“functional equivalent” of a declaration of war. Russell joined Fulbright in 
support of the new resolution, but it was not brought to a vote.48 
Johnson took several steps in the fall of 1967 to try to stop the erosion 
of support in Congress and the country. He approved a larger target list, 
summoned Westmoreland back to Washington to trumpet good news about 
the war effort, and had more meetings with congressional leaders. He also 
announced the replacement of McNamara.49 
The president also indicated to the Joint Chiefs that he was willing 
to increase pressure on the communists. In an October 17, 1967 report, 
the Chiefs complained that “progress has been and continues to be slow, 
largely because US military power has been retrained in a manner which has 
reduced signifi cantly its impact and effectiveness.” They recommended 10 
additional steps, many acceptable to McNamara, but also operations in Laos 
and Cambodia, which the president rejected. Johnson also complained that 
the Chiefs had offered only suggestions for action outside South Vietnam 
and for things already disapproved.50 
Turnaround after Tet
Three months later, Johnson’s carefully orchestrated pattern of carrots 
and sticks, peace feelers and air strikes, encouraging reports and optimistic 
forecasts, was blown away by the nationwide Viet Cong offensive begun on 
the January 30 Tet holiday. While analysts later concluded that the ultimate 
outcome was a severe defeat for the insurgents, the images in America of 
its embassy under attack and the long, block-by-block fi ght for the ancient 
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capital of Hue triggered a shift in US public opinion. Tet marked the crossover 
point, when public opposition to the war fi rst exceeded public support.51 
The trends were evident throughout 1967 and would continue inexorably 
until the end of the war. 
The loss of public support for the war effort coincided with a renewed 
push by the Chiefs for a more aggressive policy, including deployment of 
206,000 additional troops to Vietnam. With McNamara leaving, military 
leaders thought that Johnson would be more receptive to their proposals. 
Since they were not surprised by the 206,000 fi gure, they thought Johnson 
would not be either. But he was, and he asked his advisors to convene 
his outside group of “wise men” for a review. This group included many 
committed hawks like former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and General 
Omar Bradley, who had previously reassured the president that he was on 
the right course.  
This time, however, they had a different view. Meeting with Johnson on 
March 26, McGeorge Bundy told the president that “there has been a very 
signifi cant shift in most of our positions since we last met. … Dean Acheson 
summed up the majority feeling when he said we can no longer do the job 
we set out to do in the time we have left, and we must begin to take steps 
to disengage.” Johnson asked for individual comments and was shocked by 
what he heard. He called his top advisors aside and asked, “Who poisoned 
the well with these guys?”52
And they were joined by Johnson’s old friend and new secretary of 
defense, Clark Clifford, in raising doubts about the war. Clifford later wrote 
about his consultations with the Chiefs. “The military was utterly unable 
to provide an acceptable rationale for the troop increase. Moreover, when 
I asked for a presentation of their plan for attaining victory, I was told that 
there was no plan for victory in historic American sense.”53 
In response to these views, Johnson changed his plans in many ways. He 
approved only a limited troop increase of 13,500. He announced that he 
would not run for reelection. He launched a new peace offensive, including 
an end to the bombing of the north, and stayed with it until peace talks 
began in Paris in May. He replaced Westmoreland with General Creighton 
Abrams, who was more disposed to pacifi cation efforts than large-scale 
search and destroy missions.54 And despite some renewed attacks on the 
north in July, he halted all attacks on November 1, hoping to encourage 
the peace talks and help Hubert Humphrey defeat Richard Nixon for the 
presidency. Lyndon Johnson’s war was at an end. 
Nixon’s plan
Richard Nixon won the presidency with a narrow 500,000 popular vote 
margin over Humphrey. He had been vague about the Vietnam war during 
his campaign, pledging to “end the war and win the peace in the Pacifi c.”55 
While many observers inferred that he had a “secret plan” for Vietnam, 
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Nixon’s approach was modeled on Eisenhower’s approach to Korea in the 
1952 campaign – criticizing the lack of success thus far and suggesting a 
fresh approach without specifying details. Once in the White House, he 
received quite varied suggestions from his advisors. Senior military leaders in 
Washington recommended the removal of Johnson’s restraints with expanded 
attacks on North Vietnam and across the border in Cambodia. As General 
Wheeler told him, everything possible was being done in Vietnam “except the 
bombing of the North.”56 The US commander in Vietnam, General Creighton 
Abrams, had been changing the US military role and wanted to continue 
building up South Vietnamese military capabilities. The new Secretary of 
Defense, former congressman Mel Laird, agreed with Abrams largely for 
domestic political reasons: he wanted to “Vietnamize” the confl ict and bring 
US troops home as rapidly as possible. Henry Kissinger, the national security 
advisor, envisioned a multi-layered strategy that involved the Russians and 
Chinese as well as the Vietnamese.
Nixon believed that it helped his diplomacy to be perceived as willing 
to take extreme measures, what he himself called the “madman theory.” As 
he told his chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, “I want the North Vietnamese 
to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the 
war.”57 The new president centralized control over all aspects of the war 
inside the White House and under Kissinger, even to the extent of trying to 
maintain back channel links to Abrams and the Chiefs that excluded Laird. 
He distrusted Laird, viewing him as too willing to shape policy to conform 
to the restraints of public opinion.58 
In fact, Laird devised the strategy which best served Nixon’s political, 
diplomatic and military goals – Vietnamization in the south, allowing 
withdrawals of US troops, and more aggressive action against the north, 
which kept the Chiefs happy and supportive. In his fi rst meeting with the 
Chiefs, the new defense secretary announced his four primary goals: to end 
US involvement in Vietnam, to end the draft, to cut the defense budget, 
and to repair civil–military relations. He then – and repeatedly thereafter 
– forced the Chiefs to choose between money for Vietnam operations and 
money for US military modernization.59 After only a few weeks in offi ce, 
for example, Laird announced a $1.1 billion cut in the planned $79 billion 
defense budget for the coming year and told the military they would have 
to reduce the number of their favored B-52 bombing operations. He later 
told General Abrams that “the major constraint on US involvement was now 
economic.”60 
Laird maintained his own direct contact with Abrams and reinforced the 
US commander’s efforts to reduce the American combat role in the confl ict. 
Traveling with Wheeler to Vietnam in early March 1969, Laird told Abrams, 
“I think we’ve got some time, and we’ve got to make the best use of the time 
that we possibly can.” He also said that “we have a program to reduce the 
U.S. contribution, not only in the form of men, but in casualties and material 
and in dollars ….”61
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While Laird pressed the military to support US troop withdrawals and 
Vietnamization, Nixon adopted many of their recommendations for military 
escalation. In response to increase attacks in February 1969, he ordered air 
attacks on enemy positions in Cambodia – but ordered such tight secrecy 
that the US military chose to maintain two sets of books on the operations. 
When this “secret bombing” was investigated exposed and investigated by 
Congress in 1973, it led to an impeachment charge against the president.62
On April 10, 1969, Nixon approved the basic policy planning document 
for the confl ict, NSSM 36, which ordered “the preparation of a specifi c 
timetable for Vietnamizing the war.” It assumed that enemy force levels 
would remain about the same and that there would be “no de-escalation 
of allied military efforts, except that resulting from phased withdrawals” 
of troops. On May 14, Nixon proposed the simultaneous withdrawal of 
US and North Vietnamese forces from the south. Hearing no favorable 
reply, on June 8, during a meeting with South Vietnamese President Thieu, 
Nixon announced the fi rst unilateral US troop reduction – 25,000 men. 
That action was coupled with the president’s decision three days earlier 
to resume air attacks on the North for the fi rst time since just before the 
1968 US elections. Nixon told Thieu in July that the two leaders should 
have a plan for continued US troop cuts, “but let us keep it secret among 
ourselves.”63
In mid-summer, Laird engineered a change in the formal mission statement 
for Abrams and MACV. Under the Johnson administration, the purpose of 
US support was “to defeat the externally directed and supported communist 
subversion and aggression” and to attain “a stable and independent 
noncommunist government.” Despite objections from the Chiefs and other 
commanders, Laird insisted that US policy had changed and ordered a new 
mission statement on August 15. The revised document made no mention 
of defeating the enemy or of attaining an independent government. Instead, 
it declared the US objective to be “to allow the people of the Republic of 
Vietnam to determine their future without outside interference.” To that 
end, Abrams was ordered to assist the south’s armed forces “to take over an 
increasing share of combat operations.” In persuading Nixon that this was 
consistent with administration policy, the secretary also promised that no 
public announcement would be made of the change. Just before a planned, 
nationwide antiwar demonstration in October, however, Laird revealed that 
US military policy had changed to give highest priority to Vietnamization.64 
To Nixon and Kissinger, military operations were a means to reassure 
Saigon and to pressure Hanoi in order to make progress in the peace talks, 
which they had supplemented with secret exchanges starting in August 1969. 
To Laird, they were a tactic that had to be limited for budgetary and domestic 
political reasons yet maintained at some level to keep US military support 
of the administration. To military leaders, however, they were the key to 
what they still believed was a possible victory over the communists. General 
Wheeler complained to General Abrams during an October meeting, 
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It seems almost impossible to get the secretary of state, the secretary of 
defense, equally or more important the president, to realize that they 
are dealing from a position of military strength. And I mean military 
strength. Not just a marginal position of strength, but a very substantial 
position of strength.65 
In short, the military thought the US was winning while the civilians were 
concerned about not losing. At the same time, the intelligence community 
at the same time was concluding that “the Communists retain a substantial 
capability to sustain military operations” and that the Viet Cong infrastructure 
“continues to function effectively.”66  
The military unleashed
As the United States withdrew troops, it became more dependent on airpower 
to infl uence the war. The drawdowns also put pressure on the military to act 
before additional forces were sent home. From a peak of 543,000 in April, 
1969, US troop strength in Vietnam dropped to 484,000 in December, to 
335,000 at the end of 1970, to 158,000 at the end of 1971, and to only 
24,000 at the end of 1972.67
In September, 1969 Nixon announced a second American troop 
withdrawal of 35,000 men and secretly ordered planning for a wider air 
war in case negotiations were unsuccessful. The Chiefs’ plan, named Duck 
Hook, called for mining the north’s ports and harbors and a four-day series 
of strikes against military and economic targets in the north. The president 
ultimately decided against the attacks because of likely domestic turmoil 
and opposition from allies.68 Instead, on November 3, Nixon made a 
defi ant nationwide address, proclaiming his desire for an honorable peace, 
explaining his policy of Vietnamization, troop withdrawals, and negotiations, 
and calling for support from the “silent majority” of Americans to counter 
noisy antiwar demonstrators. He also tried to reduce domestic opposition to 
the war by suspending draft calls in November and December and by signing 
a bill establishing a draft lottery. On December 15, he announced a further 
troop withdrawal of 50,000. 
As US troop levels fell, military leaders pressed for action in border 
areas and along infi ltration routes in order to ease pressure on the South 
Vietnamese forces. In February 1970, Nixon approved orders for secret air 
strikes in Laos. In response to increased enemy activity in April, he accepted 
military advice to send US ground forces into Cambodia. Knowing of Laird’s 
opposition to such attacks because of concerns over the likely domestic US 
reaction, Nixon pointedly excluded his defense secretary from key planning 
sessions when he met with the acting JCS Chairman, Admiral Thomas 
Moorer. Later Nixon told Laird, “we must play a tough game” to buy time 
for troop withdrawals.69 Despite his misgivings, Laird displayed strong public 
support of the highly controversial operation, which triggered widespread 
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US protests and prolonged fi ghts in Congress over antiwar legislation. As 
the attacks in Cambodia continued during May, Nixon also approved an 
expanded target list and the heaviest air raids into the north since he had 
taken offi ce. 
Despite its outward show of unity, the Nixon administration was riven 
internally by distrust and suspicion. The president told some aides of his 
distrust of Kissinger and Laird and some top military offi cers. Nixon and 
Kissinger made deliberate attempts to bypass Laird and deal directly with 
Abrams and the Chiefs. Kissinger’s military deputy, Colonel and later General 
Alexander Haig, had his own secret communications and suspicions.70 In 
response to press leaks, Nixon ordered wiretaps on several NSC staffers and 
Laird’s military assistant.  
It was in this climate in September 1970 that a young navy yeoman 
assigned to clerical duties on the NSC staff became the key fi gure in a JCS 
spy ring. Charles Radford purloined and copied for his navy superiors, 
including Admiral Moorer, the most sensitive documents crossing the desks 
of Haig and Kissinger. On one occasion, traveling to China with Kissinger, 
Radford even took documents from Kissinger’s briefcase and passed them 
on to his uniformed bosses. He was discovered and reassigned in December 
1971, when he was suspected of leaking documents to columnist Jack 
Anderson, but the administration kept the scandal secret for over a year.71 
At fi rst, Nixon wanted to “use this as a device, of course, to clean out the 
Joint Chefs’ operation.” But he also saw the advantages of keeping Admiral 
Moorer indebted to him, so he relented. “We can’t touch him [Moorer]”, 
Nixon told his aides, “because it hurts the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs, the 
military, et cetera – not to be viewed as our enemy.”72  
Secrecy and suspicion led to another scandal. The commander of the 
7th Air Force, General John D. Lavelle, objected to restrictive rules of 
engagement that forbade his pilots fl ying over North Vietnam from striking 
certain air defense targets unless enemy radars had been activated. Knowing 
that the administration had labeled most of its attacks “protective reaction 
strikes”, he believed he should be able to react protectively whenever over 
enemy territory, and not just when the rules provided. He also thought 
he had winks and nods from his superiors to act as he did. It was later 
determined that Lavelle’s pilots had conducted at least 28 unauthorized 
strikes in North Vietnam in a four-month period – nearly one fourth of the 
offi cially acknowledged “protective reaction strikes” at that time. He was 
removed from command and retired – without the real reason being made 
public. In fact, the investigation leading to Lavelle’s dismissal had begun 
when a young air force sergeant complained to his Senator that he had been 
ordered to falsify records to conceal operations over the north.73 
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Congress emboldened
Antiwar members of Congress seized upon these reports of secret bombing 
and unauthorized air strikes and other scandals to publicize problems in 
the war and to try to drum up public support for legislation to restrict its 
conduct. Pro-war lawmakers defended administration policy and used their 
more senior legislative positions to smother objectionable amendments. 
Senior members of the defense committees were mostly strong supporters 
of the war, and they heard from their military contacts the largely optimistic 
reports from the fi eld. They were satisfi ed that the Nixon administration 
was listening to the senior military and adopting many of their proposals. 
They could defl ect antiwar pressures from constituents by endorsing the 
administration’s troop reductions and peace talks efforts, while accepting 
Nixon’s escalatory moves as unfortunate but necessary to end the war more 
quickly.  
Nixon made a point of briefi ng key congressional fi gures such as Senators 
Russell and Stennis, but they were known supporters of the war. Kissinger 
reports that only a handful of key leaders – none a critic of the war – were 
briefed about the spring 1969 bombing in Cambodia because “This was at 
that time the accepted practice” for classifi ed operations. He also notes that 
“Not one raised the issue that the full Congress should be consulted.”74  
With Russell weakened by a terminal illness, Stennis became the 
administration’s point man in the Senate in 1970. Nixon personally met 
with him in advance of the Cambodian invasion in April 1970 and again 
before the US supported South Vietnamese attacks into Laos in February 
1971.75 In return, Stennis was a stalwart opponent of restrictive legislation, 
often on the Senate fl oor throughout month-long debates in the early 
1970s, corralling votes and making procedural motions to protect the 
administration’s policies. 
Fulbright was marginalized because his committee had no real jurisdiction 
over legislation related to the war. That rested in Stennis’ Armed Services 
Committee, which also had more pro-war Senators than Foreign Relations. 
The Arkansas Senator was also upstaged by a bipartisan group of even more 
outspoken opponents of the war, who authored the key antiwar amendments 
that became the battlegrounds in 1970–3. 
One of the most important fi gures was the Senate Majority Leader, Mike 
Mansfi eld (D-Mont.), a longtime student and professor of Asian affairs. 
Mansfi eld sent private advisory letters to Nixon, as he had done to Johnson, 
and at fi rst was supportive of the Republican Administration’s peace efforts. 
He told Nixon in October 1969 that “we would do our best to protect 
his political fl anks as far as the Democrats are concerned” if the president 
took steps to reduce US troop levels and pressured the Saigon government 
in peace talks. He also offered “my personal assurances” that “I will not 
criticize in any way, shape or form but, on the contrary, will give articulate 
public support” to presidential decisions to end the war rapidly. Nixon 
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believed that Mansfi eld was offering him a politically useful “last chance to 
end ‘Johnson’s and Kennedy’s war’”, but that it would still be wrong to end 
the war “on any terms I believed to be less than honorable.”76  
Mansfi eld was torn in several ways by the Vietnam issue. He headed a 
sharply divided Democratic caucus in the Senate; he strongly supported 
Nixon’s opening to China and wanted administration support for his own 
visits to Beijing; yet he became disillusioned with the administration’s 
escalatory moves and fi nally shifted into the antiwar camp after the 
Cambodian invasion. He then took the lead an offered a series of 
amendments calling for US troop withdrawals promptly after an agreement 
on the return of POWs. Several passed the Senate and were modifi ed or 
dropped in conference with the House. All were toothless in the sense of 
merely declaring the “sense of Congress” but still were strongly opposed 
by the Administration.77  
The House of Representatives was more supportive of the war than the 
Senate throughout the confl ict. The Speakers, John McCormack (D-Mass.) 
and his successor, Carl Albert (D-Okla.), not only defended the war but used 
their positions to derail antiwar efforts. At no time while US combat troops 
were stationed in Vietnam did more than 40 percent of the members vote for 
antiwar legislation.78 The strong pro-war sentiment in the House, coupled 
with the Administration’s pressure, prevented enactment of any Senate-
passed measures that would have had a signifi cant impact on the conduct 
of the war. 
There were 85 rollcall votes on the war during the Nixon administration. 
Each victory, or even close call, gave hope to antiwar factions and heartburn 
to the administration. Perhaps the most signifi cant impacts came indirectly. 
The likelihood of congressional opposition may have tempered some military 
decisions and forced more diplomatic overtures. The increasing size and 
speed of US troop withdrawals was certainly viewed by Laird as politically 
necessary to counter antiwar forces in Congress. The defense secretary also 
feared that other defense programs would suffer as Congress cut defense 
spending as a surrogate for ending the war. General Wheeler shared this 
view. As he told General Abrams in October 1969, “In my more cynical 
moments I even suspect that some of these expenditure limitations are 
designed basically to force a reduction in our efforts here in Vietnam.”79  
In December 1969, the Senate passed and the House later agreed to an 
amendment which seemed innocuous but proved signifi cant – a prohibition 
on introducing US ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand.80 That 
prevented US infantry support for faltering South Vietnamese troops during 
their February, 1971 attacks into Laos. And the fact that the amendment 
failed to contain a restriction applying to Cambodia paved the way for the 
US invasion in April 1970. 
Legislation on the draft also was a surrogate for the debates on the war 
and a vehicle for indirectly impacting US force levels. Complaints about the 
unfairness of the draft system – especially the sense that rich, white college 
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boys were avoiding military service while others were doing the fi ghting and 
dying – led many Republicans take the lead in supporting a volunteer armed 
force. Nixon eliminated many of the remaining grounds for deferments and 
urged congressional approval of a lottery system, which was enacted late 
in 1969. He also appointed a commission which in 1970 recommended 
an end to the draft. In 1971, however, the Administration needed a two-
year extension of the draft. The measure eventually passed overwhelmingly, 
in part because it contained vague language urging an end to the war and 
absolute ceilings on the number of draftees.81  
Congress also began work on measures to prevent future Vietnams, 
particularly a bill to reassert Congress’ war power by specifying conditions 
under which troops could be sent into combat and procedures for 
congressional authorization or disapproval. These efforts had the active 
participation of Sen. Stennis as well as several antiwar Senators. The fi nal 
version was not enacted until 1973, after US involvement in the war was 
over. Overwhelming majorities of both houses overrode Nixon’s veto of the 
War Powers Resolution in November, 1973. Legislation also passed in the 
early 1970s to restrict overseas sales of US weapons and to give Congress 
more information and a greater role in such sales. 
Democrats were emboldened by the public support for their antiwar 
legislation, particularly after the Cambodian invasion in the spring of 
1970. They also gained nine members in the House in the 1970 elections, 
including several prominent antiwar activists. While some war critics like 
Sen. Albert Gore, Sr. (D-Tenn) also lost, the net effect was a slight increase in 
war opposition in the new Congress. 
Democrats had many political incentives to criticize the war, and antiwar 
Republicans had local support for their positions even though they opposed 
the Republican president. But they were also boxed in by Nixon’s ostensible 
support for peace talks and troop withdrawals, which they also favored. 
The administration’s trump card, which was highly important to the 
general public and acknowledged by antiwar factions, was the question of 
US prisoners of war. All lawmakers demanded a return of the captives and 
conditioned their own end-the-war legislation on the POW issue. Any such 
conditions, of course, required negotiations which only the executive branch 
could conduct. 
Air strikes and peace talks
In June 1971, just after the Senate passed the Mansfi eld amendment requiring 
a US troop withdrawal in nine months, provided that American POWs were 
released, Nixon told Kissinger that he felt compelled to withdraw troops, 
but that if the North Vietnamese failed to give him an agreement. “I’m 
gonna … bomb those bastards so that they lack the capability to take over 
South Vietnam.” He also said that “you’ve gotta remember that everything 
is domestic politics from now on.”82  
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To build support for his reelection, Nixon announced further US troop 
cuts in November 1971 and again in January, April, and August 1972. He 
also revealed that Kissinger had been holding secret peace talks with the 
North Vietnamese. But he broke off the talks when the North Vietnamese 
seemed intransigent at diplomacy and ready to renew their military offensive 
in the South.  
The Easter Offensive in 1972, the largest enemy action since the 1968 Tet 
offensive, led to the capture of the northernmost provincial capital and saw 
communist gains throughout the border provinces. The Chiefs pressed the 
president to remove the longstanding restrictions on key targets in the north. 
Admiral Moorer pleased with Nixon to “let us make these bastards pay for 
the American blood they’ve spilled.” He argued with Laird, who warned 
that the operation risked Soviet cancellation of the politically important 
summit in Moscow two weeks later. Moorer countered that “we’ve let them 
get away with this long enough.” Years later, Moorer told a reporter that 
the Chiefs were “ready to walk out the door” if Nixon didn’t approve the 
expanded operations. “We thought we had a real chance to break their backs 
– we weren’t going to throw it away like Johnson did.”83  
Despite the diplomatic risks, Nixon ordered the mining of Haiphong 
harbor and six other ports, as well as a major series of air strikes in the 
North, called Linebacker, targeting bridges, power plants, and petroleum 
storage facilities. He also nominated Moorer, who had been acting chairman 
for several months, to a regular term as JCS Chairman. The Soviet Union 
protested, but did not cancel the summit. In July, public and private peace 
talks resumed. 
Just before the elections, Kissinger held a dramatic news conference 
announcing that “peace is at hand.” In fact, the United States and North 
Vietnam were very close to an agreement, but it was unacceptable to the 
South Vietnamese. Nevertheless, the public sense of progress helped to 
propel Nixon to a landslide victory over George McGovern, as the president 
won 61 percent of the popular vote and every state but Massachusetts and 
the District of Columbia. 
Kissinger resumed talks with the North Vietnamese and Al Haig went to 
Saigon to try to get South Vietnamese concurrence in the agreement. “You 
should point out composition of our new Senate to Thieu”, Kissinger cabled. 
“No matter what happens, there will be a fund cutoff if we do not move 
in this direction.” Nixon feared the same outcome. But he sent the South 
Vietnamese leader a secret letter promising renewed US military support if 
necessary. “You have my absolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the 
terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory 
action.”84  
Renewed peace talks, and continued South Vietnamese unhappiness, 
led to a breakdown in negotiations in December. Once again, Laird argued 
against increased military action and for signing the agreement immediately. 
He warned Nixon, “We believe that you will no longer get the support of 
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Congress for continuation of the war if our POWs are not returned to the 
US promptly.” Further delay or escalatory action, he argued, “will destroy 
the remaining fl icker of support you now have from both the Senate and the 
House.”85 The president, however, gambled that massive force might break 
the deadlock. 
On December 18, Nixon ordered Linebacker II, the most intense air 
assault of the war, a 12-day series of B-52 and tactical aircraft strikes at 
the full range of North Vietnamese targets. An NSC memo said, “The plan 
includes new targets not previously attacked and is designed to accomplish 
the maximum psychological shock.” Nixon told Moorer, “I don’t want any 
more of this crap about the fact that we couldn’t hit this target or that one. 
This is your chance to use military power effectively to win this war, and if 
you don’t, I’ll consider you responsible.”86  
On December 30, with signals from Hanoi of renewed willingness to 
talk, the United States halted bombing north of the twentieth parallel. The 
Paris talks resumed, and on January 15, 1973, Nixon halted all US offensive 
military action. A week later, the two sides initialed a ceasefi re agreement, 
later signed on January 27. The agreement called for an internationally 
supervised ceasefi re throughout the north and south; release of all American 
POWs and removal of all US military personnel within 60 days; a declaration 
that the South Vietnamese people had a right to self-determination; and a ban 
on infi ltration of troops and war supplies into the south.87 Nixon proclaimed 
the agreement “peace with honor.” 
The dramatic return of American POWs started on February 12, 1973. 
When the last of the 587 prisoners was released on March 29, the remaining 
2,500 US combat troops were withdrawn from Vietnam as well. That marked 
the psychological end of the war. In fact, however, US air strikes continued 
in Laos and Cambodia – and Congress objected. In May the House voted 
for the fi rst time to cut off money for military operations in Southeast Asia, 
and the Senate followed suit in June. Congress had no stomach for more 
bombing – or more killed or captured pilots. Meanwhile, the president was 
turning all his energies to deal with the burgeoning Watergate scandal, which 
forced him to fi re his top two aides in April and to endure the start of months 
of televised hearings in May. On June 29, the president agreed to language 
requiring an end to all offensive military operations by August 15.88  
The direct American role in the war ended on that date, but the confl ict 
continued. The South Vietnamese forces received US military aid, though 
in amounts cut sharply by Congress, but many of their top offi cers turned 
out to be corrupt or incompetent. The North Vietnamese and their allies in 
the south mounted a major offensive in 1975 that led to the collapse of the 
south’s forces and government. Saigon fell on April 30 as the last American 
helicopters fl ed the scene.  
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Bitter lessons
The Vietnam war ruptured American politics not only while it raged but for 
many years thereafter, poisoning even the presidential elections in 2004. 
That confl ict remains for many a litmus test of patriotism and a reminder of 
the painful consequences of disagreement over a major war. 
Vietnam veterans have been prominent in Congress, in both liberal and 
conservative quarters. They were crucial in building support for restoration 
of diplomatic relations with Hanoi and the signing of trade agreements. 
Their views on use of force questions are given special weight.  
Perhaps the deepest wound from Vietnam came in civil–military relations. 
A generation of offi cers who fought in the jungles or risked their lives 
overhead resolved: “never again.” They believed that their civilian masters 
had rejected their advice and had misused or even abused their precious 
people with a fl awed strategy. They also believed that those who fought had 
been left abandoned by the politicians who sent them to fi ght, left to face 
hostility from home. They resented returning to a country that blamed them 
for the war they had loyally and bravely fought. While some offi cers dispute 
the wisdom of the large unit, search and destroy, ground operations, most 
believe that the United States forces never lost a battle. America lost the 
war, however, because of public opposition at home – opposition stimulated 
by the news media and reinforced by antiwar activists in the streets and in 
Congress. 
Given this critique, US offi cers took a series of steps to prevent another 
Vietnam. General Creighton Abrams, recalled from Saigon to be Army Chief 
of Staff, restructured his forces so that no major confl ict could be conducted 
without calling up the reserves. He knew that Lyndon Johnson had refused 
to call up reservists precisely because he feared it would increase domestic 
opposition to the war. He wanted that risk to be part of any future calculation 
about going to war. 
Army offi cers in particular drew upon Soviet military literature to fashion 
a new way of looking at war. Instead of the old distinction between strategy 
and tactics, they added a middle ground – the operational level of war – in 
which military offi cers and their well-considered doctrine should prevail, 
and into which the civilians should not venture. What Eliot Cohen calls the 
“normal theory” of civilian control, which has become dominant in the US 
military since Vietnam, calls for civilians to give clear and attainable political 
objectives and then to leave the military aspects to those in uniform.89  
Military leaders were joined in their critique of Vietnam by political 
offi cials who shared their anger. Caspar Weinberger, in particular, codifi ed 
what became known as the Vietnam syndrome with a 1984 speech laying 
out six “tests” which should be met before US troops were sent into combat. 
These included: a “vital’ national interest; “a clear intention of winning”; 
“clearly defi ned political and military objectives”; and “before the US 
commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we 
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will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives 
in Congress.”90  
These conditions were intended to prevent US involvement abroad in 
discretionary wars with limited objectives. They seemed to allow only Second 
World War-type, unconditional surrender confl icts. And, in fact, the US 
military largely resisted involvement in every major operation from Lebanon 
and Kuwait through Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. Only with the 
strong public support for action after 9/11 and the mission of regime change 
in Afghanistan and Iraq did the US military again enthusiastically embrace 
major war abroad. And when a skilled and deadly insurgency developed in 
Iraq, US offi cials went to great lengths to catalog the many ways in which 
Iraq was not another Vietnam. At the same time, the same offi cials began 
issuing body counts of insurgents killed and enunciated a strategy of training 
Iraqi forces to fi ght the insurgency and withdrawing US forces as soon as the 
political and military situations allowed. Whatever the lessons of Iraq, they 
will likely hang heavy over the US military for years to come. Perhaps there 
will even be an “Iraq Syndrome.”

Part II
The challenge of 
rearmament

5 John Adams and the politics 
of rearmament, 1798
if you must have an army I will give it to you, but remember it will make the 
government more unpopular than all their other acts.
John Adams, 17981
In what both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson later called an atmosphere 
of “terrorism,” the United States greatly expanded its army, created its navy, 
re-established the Marine Corps, and imposed tough laws on foreigners 
and policy critics. In the process, the president and Congress each tried to 
fashion policies consistent with their institutional and political needs. And 
the whole issue of military command and control got caught up in a vicious 
power struggle.
The crisis erupted in the spring and summer of 1798, but it had been 
brewing at least since 1793. When revolutionary France declared war on 
Great Britain and other European states, President George Washington 
proclaimed offi cial neutrality, hoping to avoid involvement in the confl ict. 
His action also postponed a domestic fi ght between supporters of France, 
led by Thomas Jefferson, and supporters of Great Britain, led by Alexander 
Hamilton.2 
By the start of Washington’s second term, two distinct political factions 
were jelling into political parties. On one side were farmers and southerners 
like Jefferson and James Madison who acknowledged the need for a central 
government but wanted to keep it limited. They were distrustful of bankers 
and businessmen, and especially of any standing army. True to their own 
revolutionary heritage, they admired the French upheaval as an extension 
and vindication of what they had achieved in North America. 
The other faction was led by men from northern cities who favored a 
central government active and powerful enough to encourage and secure the 
development of a continental nation, linked by commerce and trade. While 
they welcomed political independence from Great Britain, they wanted to 
continue close economic and cultural ties. They also welcomed a national 
military establishment as a means of protecting the nation and its economic 
interests.
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When the British began seizing US ships carrying goods to or from French 
ports in 1794, the two countries verged on war. Washington cooled the war 
fever by naming Chief Justice John Jay to try to negotiate a settlement of 
outstanding issues. Jay succeeded many months later, but his treaty was 
a compromise, obtaining some British concessions, such as a promise to 
evacuate western frontier forts by June 1796, but also granting US concessions 
limiting trade. The fi ght over the treaty lasted for many months in 1795, 
culminating in a Senate vote of 20–10 – just enough to meet the two-thirds 
requirement – for conditional approval, provided that a section were deleted 
that limited the size of US ships trading in the West Indies and banned re-
export of many tropical products. Washington was so torn over the public 
controversy that he waited seven weeks before deciding to proceed with 
ratifi cation of the amended treaty.3
As the leading historians of the Federalist period, Stanley Elkins and Eric 
McKitrick, have concluded, “The outpouring of popular feeling over the 
Jay Treaty, as has long been understood, was more directly responsible than 
anything else for the full emergence of political parties in America, and of 
clearly recognized Federalist and Republican points of view on all political 
questions.”4 The split was sharp in the presidential elections of 1796, when 
Adams bested Jefferson by only three electoral votes, 71–68, thus creating an 
awkward situation where the legal successor to the president was the head 
of the opposition.
John Adams began his presidency with the best of intentions, but with 
two actions that proved signifi cant political blunders. Concerned about 
deteriorating relations with France, he sought Jefferson’s help in recruiting 
Madison for a three-man delegation to Paris. Even before Madison declined, 
as expected, Adams’ own cabinet was in an uproar over both the idea of 
sending a mission and the fact that they had not been consulted in advance. 
The new president thought he was demonstrating smooth continuity by asking 
Washington’s cabinet to stay on, but what he got was internal opposition 
from men who were personally and politically much closer to Alexander 
Hamilton. Former Treasury Secretary Hamilton, by then practicing law in 
New York, had tried to engineer Adams’ defeat by his own Federalist running 
mate in 1796 and later came to rival the president in power and infl uence 
over the Executive Branch. Adams later said that his greatest mistake as 
president was to retain the Washington cabinet.5 
The French Government had been angered by the Jay Treaty and by the 
extent of American trade with Great Britain. It pointedly decreed in July 
1796 that it would seize US vessels attempting to trade with the British 
in the Caribbean. Several ships were seized in the subsequent months. 
Meanwhile, the French minister in Philadelphia openly sided with Jefferson 
in the presidential elections, and the outraged Federalists began calling the 
Republicans the French Party.6 
Adams used his inaugural address on March 4, 1797, to warn of foreign 
interference in American politics, of votes that “can be obtained by foreign 
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nations by fl attery or menaces, by fraud or violence, by terror, intrigue, or 
venality.” He also listed as the “natural enemies” of the Constitution: “the 
spirit of sophistry, the spirit of party, the spirit of intrigue, the profl igacy 
of corruption, and the pestilence of foreign infl uence, which is the angel 
of destruction to elective governments.” While speaking of his “personal 
esteem for the French nation, formed in a residence of seven years chiefl y 
among them, and a sincere desire to preserve the friendship which has been 
so much for the honor and interest of both nations,” he pledged to continue 
Washington’s policy of neutrality.7
Figure 5.1 John Adams (Library of Congress)
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Ten days later, the new president learned that the French had spurned 
Washington’s minister to Paris, Charles C. Pinckney. Offi cials refused 
to accept his credentials and ordered him to leave the country. Adams 
decided to summon Congress to a special session, starting May 15. At that 
time, Adams told the members of the “indignities” suffered by Pinckney 
and promised “a fresh attempt at negotiation.” He then asked for several 
additions to US defenses – a strengthened navy, coastal fortifi cations, more 
artillery and cavalry, but only a provisional army, not an expansion of the 
existing force.8 
These recommendations refl ected Adams’ considered approach to war 
and diplomacy. He doubted that a French invasion was likely. As he wrote 
to Elbridge Gerry, “Where is it possible for her to get ships to send thirty 
thousand men here? We are double the number we were in 1775. We have 
four times the military skill and we have eight times the Munitions of War. 
What would 30,000 men do here?” But he believed that a military buildup 
was necessary to convince France to negotiate.9 
He thought that the US coast and commerce could best be protected by a 
strong navy, a view not shared by his mostly pro-army advisers. A few years 
later, he noted, “Floating batteries and wooden walls have been my favorite 
system of warfare and defense for this country for three and twenty years.” 
But he admitted making few converts to this view.10 
Although Adams believed in a strong Executive, he openly deferred to 
Congress on particular details, asking the legislators to write laws so sailors 
could defend themselves and to “prevent the resources of the United States 
from being converted into the means of annoying our trade.” He did not 
offer specifi c legislative proposals of his own at that time.11
The politics of defense
The Fifth Congress was sharply divided along partisan lines. The Federalists 
had a 22–10 margin in the Senate, but only a narrow margin in the House, 
one that fl uctuated with member departures and absences. The Republicans 
were more sensitive to their minority status because they had had effective 
control of the House during all of Washington’s second term. They were now 
united in their disdain for Adams and their opposition to anti-French military 
preparations. They decried Adams’ message as tantamount to declaration of 
war. But they accepted the idea of a new three-man delegation to Paris and 
accepted Adams’ nominations once the independent-minded Elbridge Gerry 
was added.12 
When the Congress began debating defense matters, Adams lost control, 
for his own party thought he had not gone far enough and the opposition 
considered even modest measures the fi rst step on the road to war. In the 
ensuing fi ght, the Secretaries of State and Treasury, encouraged by Hamilton, 
pushed for such unprecedented steps – a provisional army of 25,000, new 
taxes, embargo on French trade, and laws allowing expulsion of aliens 
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– that the Republicans succeeded in blocking any augmentations. By the 
time Congress adjourned on July 8, the only defense measure approved was 
additional funds to complete the three frigates already under construction 
under legislation passed in 1794.13 
The members of Congress believed that they had the experience as well as 
the Constitutional duty to make independent judgments on defense matters. 
Half of the Representatives and 60 percent of the Senators were veterans 
of military service. The popularly elected House members were slower to 
approve provocative measures than the Senators, who were chosen by state 
legislatures  – until the furor over the XYZ affair in the spring of 1798. While 
Federalists tended to support Adams and Republicans to oppose, coastal 
Republicans joined with the Federalists to support shipbuilding. In the 1797 
debates, the House voted to limit presidential authority by forbidding the 
newly authorized frigates to be used in convoys, but the Federalist-dominated 
Senate opposed. When the House feared loss of all shipbuilding funds, they 
agreed to compromise by approving the ships without the restriction.14
The partisan differences on military matters are striking and perhaps 
surprising 200 years later. The Federalists favored a strong central government 
and a military force capable of defending US interests on the high seas and 
against Indians and Europeans in nearby colonies. Many who had served 
in the Revolutionary War, like Washington and Hamilton, doubted the 
effectiveness of the state-based militia. The Republicans, remembering 
Cromwell’s dictatorship in England, feared standing armies as threats to 
liberty and insisted on Constitutional provisions making it diffi cult to raise 
or maintain a national army and giving Congress alone the power to declare 
war. As Madison argued, “War is the parent of armies; from these proceed 
debts and taxes; and armies and debts and taxes are the known instruments 
for bringing the many under the domination of the few.” Republicans also 
resented the comparative high cost of military forces, which even in 1796 
accounted for over one fourth of total federal expenditures, and for over 
half the funds spent on items beyond interest on the national debt.15 
Given their differing views toward Great Britain and France, the American 
partisans did not see a common external threat against which to rally. They 
were happy with neutrality toward European affairs and in agreement with 
Washington’s advice against entangling alliances. And as political fi ssures 
widened, each side increasingly distrusted the motives of its opponents.
As a result, and as the Framers probably intended when they created a 
government of separated institutions sharing powers, there was gridlock 
rather than consensus and compromise. Only 718 men were in the US 
Army in 1789; there was no navy or marine corps, since they had been 
disestablished after the Revolutionary War. Congress agreed to increase the 
army to deal with Indian threats on the borders, but military operations were 
usually supplemented by militia units. Washington pushed for an expanded 
regular army of 5,000 men for a frontier legion. In 1796, a law was passed 
setting a regular force, constabulary in nature, of a little over 3,000 men.16 
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To deal with contingencies, the Federalists in 1794 proposed a provisional 
army primarily to deter a British attack. The Republicans countered with 
a plan for a select corps of militia. Neither was approved. What did gain 
congressional favor, however, was a small program of six frigates to deal 
with pirates along the Barbary Coast. When news arrived in 1796 of a treaty 
with Algiers, the Republicans in Congress quickly passed legislation cutting 
the procurement from six to three and reducing the army’s authorized 
strength while mandating regiments with small companies. Left in place, 
however, was basic law providing arsenals, stores, small units manning 
isolated frontier posts, with artillery and engineers in coastal forts, plus a 
tiny cavalry for patrol and communications.17
After four months home in Quincy, Adams returned to Philadelphia in 
November 1797, for the regular session of Congress.18 He used his fi rst 
annual message, now called the state of the union address, to reiterate his 
call for defensive measures, arguing that nothing had changed to render 
them unnecessary: “… the law of nations has lost so much of its force, 
while pride, ambition, avarice and violence have been so long unrestrained, 
there remains no reasonable ground on which to raise an expectation that 
a commerce without protection or defense will not be plundered.” He said 
he was awaiting word from the delegation sent to Paris, but he doubted that 
“permanent tranquility and order” would soon return to Europe.19
In the subsequent weeks, Congress remained deadlocked over military 
measures. In February 1798 the House on three occasions voted down 
Republican attempts to repeal the tax passed earlier to complete the three 
frigates. Meanwhile in France, the Directory issued a new decree against 
American shipping and the US delegation received demands for bribes before 
talks could begin. These developments, when news later reached America, 
sparked an intense new crisis and transformed political attitudes toward 
rearmament.20
XYZ affair
On March 4, Adams received the fi rst of several dispatches from the mission 
sent months before to France. The American envoys reported that the French 
had refused to receive them and had demanded bribes as a precondition for 
any negotiations. The French also insisted that Adams apologize for seeking 
an increase in US naval strength and that the Americans extend a large loan 
to France in addition to the bribe of about $250,000.21 Letters also reported 
the recent decree closing French ports to any ship that had visited an English 
port and allowing seizure of neutral ships carrying anything produced in 
Great Britain.22
Once the reports were decoded, Adams consulted his cabinet. Half the 
members favored a declaration of war. One suggested seizing Louisiana, 
another urged an alliance with Great Britain. After hearing from Hamilton, 
who urged an attitude of “calm defi ance” along with specifi c military 
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measures, Secretary of War McHenry passed along a full-scale rearmament 
proposal. Hamilton suggested arming merchant vessels, building 20 sloops 
of war and 10 ships of the line, plus an eight-fold increase in the regular 
army, to 30,000 men, and a provisional army of another 30,000. The former 
Treasury Secretary prudently insisted that revenues be raised to cover the 
costs.23 
At fi rst Adams agreed with the idea of formally declaring war and began 
drafting a message for Congress with that recommendation. But he became 
persuaded that such action might endanger the American envoys. What 
he sent to Congress on March 19 was a simple report that he had “no 
ground of expectation” that the commission would succeed. He renewed 
his plea for increased defensive measures “with promptitude, decision, and 
unanimity.”24
Congress reacted along party lines, the Federalists pressing ahead 
with military measures and the Republicans suspecting that Adams was 
exaggerating the threat. To calm any war fever, Jefferson suggested that 
Congress adjourn and go home to consult with their constituents, hoping to 
build support for peace He advised that to “do nothing, & to gain time, is 
every thing with us.”25 
On March 27, Representative Richard Sprigg of Maryland, a Republican, 
offered a series of resolutions questioning the need for war but supporting 
“adequate provision” for seacoast protection and internal defense. As debate 
proceeded, William Branch Giles of Virginia complained that the president 
was “pursuing hostile measures, and keeping back all information.” Federalist 
John Allen of Connecticut then proposed that the president be asked to 
provide the diplomatic papers to Congress. His colleagues agreed, for it 
was diffi cult to debate the possibility of war without knowing as much as 
the president regarding French actions.26 The Republicans were upholding 
the prerogatives of Congress; they did not expect that Adams would have 
withheld information so helpful to his argument.
On April 2, the House voted overwhelmingly – 65 to 27 – to demand 
the papers relating to the mission to France. Adams complied the very 
next day. After three days of closed-door debate, the Members voted to 
publish copies of the dispatches. The impact on public opinion was swift 
and overwhelming. As Elkins and McKitrick wrote, “The opposition in 
Congress to all intents and purposes collapsed.” Moreover, Federalists 
would see electoral gains, especially in the South, throughout the rest of 
1798 and into 1799.27 
America united to defend its honor, support the president, and prepare for 
possible war. On April 9, Congress began debating the administration program 
introduced by Samuel Sewall of Massachusetts. It was a comprehensive 
bill, providing for three new army regiments for a total strength of 3,000 
men; a Provisional Army of 20,000; and a direct tax on land, houses, and 
slaves to pay the costs. Republicans objected even to the fi rst reading of 
the administration’s bill and managed to prolong debate for a month. Their 
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main target was the idea of a standing army, which they labeled a “system 
of terror.”28 
Hamilton joined the public debate with a series of essays in early April 
challenging the patriotism of the opposition. He charged the Republicans 
with “unremitting efforts to justify or excuse the despots of France, to vilify 
and discredit our own government … to distract the opinions and to dampen 
the zeal of our citizens … [and] to divert their affections from their own to 
a foreign country.”29 
Adams surged in popularity. His public appearances were greeted with 
wild applause, and he began wearing a military uniform and sword. On one 
occasion a supporter cheered that he had stood up to the “cutthroat, frog-
eating, treaty-breaking, grace-fallen, God-defying devils, the French.”30 
Climate of fear and suspicion
In fact, there were many French sympathizers in America. Many refugees 
from the revolutionary turmoil lived in coastal cities and were politically 
active. Foreign Minister Talleyrand himself had lived in exile for two years. 
George Rogers Clark, renowned Indian fi ghter, still held a commission as a 
general in the French army and considered himself more loyal to Paris than to 
Philadelphia. The XYZ dispatches included a boast by M. Y that the “French 
party in America” would blame the Federalists for failed negotiations – and 
the Federalists believed that the Republicans were foreign agents. Prominent 
people talked of 100,000 Americans joining to support an invading French 
army. There were reports of a plot by the United Irishmen to aid France in 
overthrowing the US government as well as rumors of treasonous correspon-
dence between opposition Virginia congressmen and the Directory in Paris. 
It was only a short logical step to the conclusion that the elimination of 
Republicans was a necessary measure against France in a time of war.31 These 
fears spawned the Alien and Sedition Acts that same year.
There is no modern evidence to prove a conspiracy, but Federalists at 
the time fi rmly believed it. They argued that France won her battles in 
Europe by allying with parties in enemy nations. They witnessed pro-French 
demonstrators in the streets of Philadelphia and heard the revolutionary 
rhetoric. They were concerned that France might occupy Louisiana and 
other Spanish colonies and then dismember the United States. Southerners 
especially feared that France might invade with a black-led army, fresh from 
the Caribbean, which could incite a slave rebellion.32
The spring of 1798 was a turbulent time in America. Party divisions were 
deep; suspicion was rampant; fear of violence was widespread and credible. 
In an exchange of letters in 1813, Jefferson wrote that “the character of the 
times” that season was “terrorism”, but he claimed that it was “felt by one 
party only.” Adams cited numerous examples of what he called “Terrorism” 
against Federalists. In addition to the rebellions by Shay, Whiskey distillers, 
and Fries, he cited the situation during the XYZ crisis, “when I myself judged 
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it prudent and necessary to order Chests of Arms from the War Offi ce to be 
brought through bye Lanes and back Doors … to defend my House.”33 
In April, Adams learned of a letter found near his house telling of a plot 
by émigré Frenchmen and American accomplices to burn down Philadelphia 
and kill its inhabitants. A second warning letter arrived ten days later, and 
then a third. In fact, there were four serious fi res in Philadelphia between 
mid-April and June, 1798, with arson strongly suspected in two of them. 
There was also street rioting in May between pro-French and pro-British 
groups of young men. Public concern was so widespread that Jefferson wrote 
Madison that “many weak people packed their most valuable movables to be 
ready for transportation.”34 
The threat of terrorism and domestic subversion was palpable and powerful 
in 1798, though at this distance it seems grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, 
it proved a strong impetus to congressional action to counter the perceived 
threats, both internal and external. Jefferson noted that feelings ran so high 
that, “Men who have been intimate all their lives cross the street to avoid 
meeting and turn their heads another way, lest they should be obliged to 
touch hats.”35 
This climate of fear triggered support for military rearmament and 
political repression. By the time it adjourned on July 19, the Fifth Congress 
had approved legislation quadrupling the size of the army and increasing the 
navy’s fl eet more than tenfold. It also re-established the marine corps and 
created a separate navy department. It authorized a 10,000 man provisional 
army in case of emergency. While not formally declaring war, Congress voted 
an end to American treaties with France and a full trade embargo as well as 
authorizing the navy to attack and seize French ships.36 
Congress showed its seriousness of purpose by voting, for the fi rst time, 
for a direct tax on land, houses, and slaves to raise the needed $2 million 
to pay for the military buildup. The measure imposed a levy of 50 cents for 
each slave and a graduated tax on houses  – from 40 cents for one valued at 
$200 to 30 cents per hundred dollars’ valuation for a $500 house.37 This was 
widely felt among the population and the cause of later blowback. It was a 
change from previous practice, for the 1794 shipbuilding program had been 
fi nanced by tariffs, excises on whiskey, snuff and sugar, and a luxury tax on 
owners of carriages.38 
The fi nal bill passed with substantial Republican support, 60–11, thus 
demonstrating the political pressure for standing up to France. But in 
recognition of its Constitutional prerogatives, Congress kept tight rein on 
how the president might use his new authorities. It limited the Provisional 
Army to only eight months, until the next planned session of Congress, and 
only in case of war, invasion, or “imminent danger.” Southern Republicans 
thought it was better to have a fi xed number of regular troops rather 
than a larger standby force. The president was not given authority to take 
preliminary steps such as appointing offi cers for the provisional army. Nor 
was he allowed to begin licensing privateers.39 
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In creating the Navy Department, Congress demonstrated its oversight 
powers. Many members were angry that the War Department had taken 
three years to build the three frigates fi rst authorized in 1794. A House 
committee investigated the matter and issued a report charging “enormous 
expenses and unaccountable delays.” When the opportunity arose in 1798, 
Congress established a separate Navy Department so that shipbuilding would 
get a higher priority. And it did. When Benjamin Stoddert became the fi rst 
secretary at the end of June, there were only three ships in service and none 
at sea at the time. Within a month, the fi rst US ship, the Ganges, went on 
patrol against the French. By the end of 1798, the navy had 20 ships, and 33 
by the end of 1799.40 
In addition to military and diplomatic measures against the French, 
the Federalists enacted political sanctions against French sympathizers at 
home. Adams signed the Alien and Sedition Acts into law and tarnished 
his reputation forever thereby, but the impetus for the laws themselves 
came from Congress. Adams fueled the fi restorm by repeatedly branding 
his opponents as in league with France, but his legislative allies made it an 
urgent cause. As Senator Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts said when he 
fi rst learned of the XYZ dispatches, “It will afford a glorious opportunity to 
destroy faction.”41
The large number of immigrants coming to the new republic prompted 
consideration of legislation providing for naturalization. Federalists sought 
to stop or reduce the fl ow of new people because they seemed predisposed 
to support the Republicans. They tried to prevent foreign born people from 
voting or holding offi ce, but lost that provision by a 2–1 vote. In mid-June, 
1798, Congress narrowly passed – by a single vote in each house – a new 
Naturalization Act extending the residency period for naturalization from 
fi ve to 14 years.42
This set the stage for other legislation dealing with foreigners. On June 25, 
Congress passed a measure extreme in intent but never invoked in practice. 
The Alien Act allowed the president “at any time during the continuance of 
this act”  – that is, whether there was peace or war – to deport any aliens 
“he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or 
shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable 
or secret machinations against the government.” No court hearing or even a 
specifi ed reason was required for the deportation. The law expired in 1800 
without ever having been invoked.43
On July 6, the Alien Enemies Act became law. The original version had 
called for a vast system of registration, surveillance, and individual permits. 
The target was the “wild Irish” who had pro-French sympathies and 
were drawn into Republican politics. Even Federalists recognized that the 
provisions were excessive, however, so they modifi ed the legislation to limit 
the expulsions to cases of war or invasion and to permit judicial review. Thus 
changed, the bill attracted Republican support.44 
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Even the Sedition Act was modifi ed to little more than the existing common 
law on sedition, but it was used for politically motivated prosecution. The 
original House bill made mere threats to defame punishable. The original 
Senate measure said there could be treason in peacetime, named France as 
the enemy, and made giving aid and comfort to an enemy punishable by 
death. Eventually the Senate struck references to treason and France. And 
the fi nal Senate bill refl ected common law practice regarding sedition. The 
House added provisions requiring proof of malicious intent and allowing 
truth as a defense. It also permitted juries to determine both facts and law.45
The fi nal version made it unlawful 
to combine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or 
measures of the government … [or to] write, print, utter or publish … 
any false, scandalous and malicious writing … against the government of 
the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, 
or the President of the United States, with intent to defame … or bring 
them into contempt or disrepute …46
It is arguably signifi cant that the fi nal text prohibited criticism of the President 
and Congress, but not of the Vice President.47
Hamilton’s views refl ected the shifting mood on this bill. At fi rst he said 
the “spirit of patriotism” could be used to crush the opposition so that “there 
will shortly be national unanimity.” Later he urged caution: “Let us not be 
cruel or violent.” And eventually he pleaded, “let us not establish a tyranny”, 
warning that the sedition act might “endanger civil War.”48
Struggle for control of the army
Although Adams had not pressed for expansion of the army, he moved 
quickly to implement the new law. On June 2, without even consulting 
his cabinet or the former president, he nominated George Washington as 
commander, hoping thereby to unify the country and intimidate the French. 
Enjoying retirement at Mount Vernon and doubting the likelihood of 
a French invasion, Washington was at fi rst reluctant to accept. When he 
fi nally relented on July 8, he insisted that he be allowed to name his chief 
subordinates.49
This posed a problem for Adams because, even more than a war with 
France, he feared that Alexander Hamilton would become de facto head 
of the army and a threat to his administration. His animosity went deep, 
at one point calling Hamilton an “instrument of hell.”50 While both men 
were committed Federalists, sharing a common view of executive power and 
the national interest, they were political rivals. And with three of Adams’ 
cabinet members routinely seeking and accepting Hamilton’s advice on 
policy questions, the former Treasury Secretary was the guiding force behind 
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many of the administration’s actions. He remained close to Washington and 
expected to be named second in command.51 
In fact, Hamilton had been Washington’s young adjutant in the 
Revolutionary War and was a longtime proponent of a national army. He 
had chaired the Continental Congress’ military committee in 1783 when it 
reported a plan for peacetime army of 3,000, supplemented by elite reserve 
in case of war or invasion, much like the later provisional army. While the 
plan was killed by Gerry and other New Englanders who fi ercely opposed 
the idea of any standing army, Hamilton continued to press similar ideas in 
subsequent years.52
When Washington accepted Adams’ nomination, he sent a list of proposed 
general offi cers with Hamilton’s name fi rst. “Oh no”, Adams declared, “it 
is not his turn by a great deal.”53 He then engaged in a series of maneuvers 
to try to avoid making Hamilton Washington’s chief deputy. He argued for 
restoring all revolutionary war generals to their prior rank, which would 
have made them senior to Hamilton. Eventually he was pressured into 
including Hamilton, but then left Philadelphia for Quincy without signing 
any of the commissions.54 
Adams saw these maneuverings by Hamilton and his supporters as a threat 
to civilian control as well as to his own authority. He called the cabinet 
intrigue a “combined plot” to “appoint him [Hamilton] general over the 
president.” And when it was over and Hamilton had prevailed, Adams called 
his rival “the most restless, impatient, artful, indefatigable and unprincipled 
Intriguer” in the United States.55 
Hamilton and Secretary of War McHenry set to work organizing the new 
army.56 As Adams had believed, “I have always cried Ships! Ships. Hamilton’s 
hobby horse was Troops! Troops!” The newly named major general got 
involved in the minutia of military organization and training. He designed 
uniforms for Washington and other offi cers, designed huts for different ranks 
and even conducted experiments to determine the ideal length and speed of 
marching steps.57 
Since the new army had political as well as military purposes, Hamilton 
insisted on the ideological purity of senior offi cers and blocked Adams’ efforts 
to name some Republicans as generals. The plan for 12 regiments meant that 
he could pick nearly 400 offi cers, a potent force of future supporters.58 
Adams concluded that he had lost control of the government. “With all 
my ministers against me, a great majority of the Senate and other House of 
Representatives, I was no more at liberty than a man in prison, chained to 
the fl oor and bound hand and foot.”59
As a result, he decided to change course – and spent the rest of his term 
trying to avoid a full-scale war with France. He became more willing to 
see hopeful signs in the peace overtures emanating from Paris. There were 
various reports of French willingness to end the crisis. And the French defeat 
at the Battle of the Nile made it even less likely that France would take on 
America.60 
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Despite his proclamation in June that “I will never send another minister 
to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored 
as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation”, 
he suggested to his cabinet in October that he might announce his intent 
to nominate a minister to France “in order to keep open the channels of 
negotiation.” Meeting resistance, he created only a small loophole – that 
he would not send a new minister “without more determined assurances he 
would be received.”61 
 When Congress convened on December 8, Adams appeared with Generals 
Washington, Hamilton, and Pinckney arrayed behind him. He spoke of “the 
ultimate failure of the measures which have been taken by the Government 
of the United States toward an amicable adjustment of differences with” 
France. But he pointed to evidence that “it is averse to a rupture with this 
country, and that it has in a qualifi ed manner declared itself willing to 
receive a minister from the United States for the purpose of restoring a good 
understanding.” He declared, “It must therefore be left with France (if she is 
indeed desirous of accommodation) to take the requisite steps.”62
With regard to the military measures previously adopted, Adams saw 
nothing “which ought to change or relax our measures of defense.” He 
repeated his view that “An effi cient preparation for war can alone insure 
peace.” And he renewed his call for an increased navy “to guard our coast 
and protect our trade.”63 
Congress eventually approved an increase in the navy, but it also agreed 
to Hamilton’s proposal for restoring and tripling what was called the 
Eventual Army, since the authority for a Provisional Army had lapsed. The 
legislature approved a force of 30,000 men in 25 regiments that could 
be used in case of war or invasion. Meanwhile, Hamilton and McHenry 
continued recruiting men and appointing offi cers for the New Army of 
regulars. Adams tried to slow things down, often sitting on matters 
requiring his clearance.64 
The last straw for Adams was a report from Senator Sedgwick in early 
February 1799, that the Senate was considering giving Washington the new, 
never previously used rank of “General.” Adams exploded. “What, are you 
going to appoint him general over the President?”65 He was concerned about 
the former president dominating his successor, but even more concerned that 
Hamilton might succeed to the title and the power. He warned Sedgwick, 
“… if you must have an army I will give it to you, but remember it will make 
the government more unpopular than all their other acts.”66 
Two weeks later, without prior notifi cation to his cabinet or Congress, 
Adams nominated William Vans Murray to be minister to France. Federalists 
and Republicans alike were “thunderstruck.” He agreed to add two Federalists 
to the delegation as a concession to Congress, and all three were promptly 
confi rmed. With the old Congress gone, and the sixth not scheduled to meet 
until December, Adams delayed sending the new envoys to France for eight 
months, perhaps waiting for the completion of additional navy ships.67 The 
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delegation concluded a treaty with France in September 1800, just before 
elections ousted Adams and the Federalists in Congress from power.
Support for the military buildup collapsed even before the treaty was 
signed, a casualty of domestic opposition to the direct tax, the idea of a 
standing army, and the Alien and Seditions Acts. Congress voted in February 
1800 to suspend enlistments for the new army and cancelled the law for 
a provisional force. In fact, less than half the authorized number ever 
enlisted in the new army. They spent the summer of 1799 scattered, and 
the fall constructing winter encampments. They did little serious training. 
Washington lamented the failure to create the larger standing force several 
months before his death. “The golden moment is passed”, he said, “and 
probably will never occur again.”68 
This rearmament controversy was repeated several times in later American 
history. Although the circumstances varied – different enemies, different 
domestic political dynamics, different degrees of harmony and discord  – 
the underlying institutional forces operated in similar ways. The president 
always had the initiative, but Congress imposed its own conditions and 
viewpoints.
6 Franklin Roosevelt and the 
politics of rearmament 
After all, if Italy and Japan have developed a technique of fi ghting without 
declaring war, why can’t we develop a similar one?
Franklin Roosevelt, December, 19371 
You might say that the Army played politics in this period [spring of 1940]. 
That is a crude expression. Actually, we had regard for politics. We had regard 
for the fact that the President did not feel assured he would get the backing 
of the people generally and in the Middle West particularly and had to move 
with great caution.
General George C. Marshall2 
Anyone who reads the hearings will note that the principal discussion is not 
what is in the bill, but what ought to be in the bill in order properly to meet 
the situation which confronts us.
Senator Carl Hayden (D-Ariz), May, 19403 
By forceful leadership, persuasive rhetoric, crafty diplomacy, and stealthy 
military actions, Franklin D. Roosevelt turned a withdrawn, isolationist 
United States into an arsenal for democracy and a fi ghter against fascism. In 
a later age, with a less sympathetic press and a less deferential Congress, he 
might well have been impeached for his conduct, which in several instances 
was of questionable legality and Constitutionality. Instead, he succeeded in 
rearming a reluctant nation and sending its soldiers and sailors, step by step, 
into combat. The verdict of history is in his favor, but the trials he endured 
were diffi cult, and the outcome never certain.
America in the 1930s was far from a world power, but was instead a 
sideline observer of the battles developing in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The 
US military was a pitiful force, labeled by General George C. Marshall “a 
third-rate power.” The US Army in 1939 ranked nineteenth in size, between 
Portugal and Bulgaria, and was forty-fi fth in terms of the percentage of the 
population under arms. Its units were mostly under strength, and it did 
not even have enough ammunition for target practice. About a third of the 
army’s budget went for engineering projects in US rivers and harbors and 
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maintenance of the Panama Canal. The navy had fallen below the ceilings set 
by the naval disarmament treaties of the 1920s and was building only about 
one fourth as many new ships as the other naval powers until Roosevelt 
directed some job creation money to the navy in 1933. As late as 1939, 
total military spending – including those funds for domestic water projects 
– accounted for only 12 percent of total federal spending.4 
Isolationism was the only “ism” most Americans embraced. They didn’t 
want to be infected by the Communism of Soviet Russia or the Fascism 
of Mussolini’s Italy and then Hitler’s Germany. They wanted to stay safe, 
protected by two large oceans. They were sympathetic to underdogs – Haile 
Selassie vainly resisting Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia and Chiang Kai-shek 
struggling against Japan’s invasion of China – but not to the point of getting 
involved in another foreign war. 
Congress mirrored public opinion. Convinced by revisionist historians 
that merchants of death had driven America into the deadly trenches of 
the First World War, Congress built a fortress of neutrality laws making it 
next to impossible to be lured into another distant confl ict. The legislative 
branch also nearly surrendered its war-making authority to the outcome of 
a national referendum. 
Shielded from foreign wars and preoccupied with the continuing effects 
of the depression, the American people were largely indifferent to the 
collapse of the Versailles Treaty in Europe and the ineffectiveness of the 
League of Nations. Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, was concerned though 
he waited until he was safely reelected in 1936 before beginning to warn his 
countrymen of the gathering dangers abroad. 
On October 5, 1937, with Japan fi ghting in China, a civil war raging in 
Spain, Ethiopia having been conquered by Italy, and Hitler and Mussolini 
proudly proclaiming a Rome–Berlin axis, Roosevelt spoke in Chicago 
about “the epidemic of world lawlessness.” He noted that epidemics of 
diseases usually led to a community effort to “quarantine” the patients. All 
he proposed was a “search for peace”, but the public reaction to his meta-
phor of containment was overwhelmingly negative. The very next day he 
backtracked, telling a press conference that he planned nothing more than 
the speech itself – no change in the neutrality laws, no economic sanctions. 
He later told his speechwriter, “It’s a terrible thing to look over your shoulder 
when you are trying to lead – and to fi nd no one there.”5
Despite this initial setback, Roosevelt set about to mobilize public opinion 
and US resources to defend America – and its beleaguered friends – against 
the new aggressors. As he told William Allen White two years later, “My 
problem is to get the American people to think of conceivable consequences 
without scaring the American people into thinking that they are going to 
be dragged into this war.” In fact, he managed masterfully to keep public 
opinion in step with his rearmament program and his progressively less 
neutral foreign policy. In 1937, for example, a near majority – 46 percent 
– of Americans said they favored an increase in funding for the army and 
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navy, compared to 33 percent for no change and 21 percent for a decrease. 
But another poll that year found overwhelming opposition – 95 percent to 5 
percent – to taking part in “another European war” and a 1936 survey found 
Americans by a 4–1 margin unwilling to fi ght even if a foreign power tried to 
seize land in Central or South America. Nor were they willing – 37 percent 
for, 56 percent against – to require military service for young men.6
While the president was the champion of rearmament and the leader of 
the effort to untie the isolationist restraints on US foreign policy, he found 
willing allies in Congress and among opinion leaders, and eager subordinates 
in the armed forces. Together, they outmaneuvered and defeated the 
opposition and persuaded a reluctant populace that the costly rearmament 
and military aid to beleaguered Britain would make it easier for America to 
remain at peace. 
Congress and the politics of isolationism
At the very time when Roosevelt hinted at collective action to quarantine 
aggressors, the Congress was moving in a different direction – debating a 
proposed Constitutional amendment requiring a national referendum before 
Congress could declare war. The vote in the House of Representatives in 
January 1938, fell just nine votes short of the number needed to bring it 
out of committee for fl oor debate.7 The 209–188 vote suggests there was a 
majority in support of the measure, but far short of the two-thirds necessary 
to approve a Constitutional amendment.
Congress wanted to make it diffi cult to get involved in a war. During 
the mid-1930s there was a strong public reaction against the First World 
War, fueled by a congressional investigation designed to show that American 
involvement in that confl ict had been driven by munitions manufacturers, 
the “merchants of death.” When newly inaugurated Franklin Roosevelt 
proposed legislation granting the president discretion in imposing arms 
embargoes, Congress instead enacted a mandatory embargo. The fi rst of fi ve 
neutrality acts prohibited the export of “arms, ammunition, or implements 
of war”; barred US ships from carrying arms to belligerents; and restricted 
travel by American citizens on ships of belligerent countries.8 
When that law was set to expire in 1936, Congress extended it for 
another year and added language prohibiting Americans from making loans 
or extending credit to belligerents. In 1937, the legislators passed an act 
specifi cally forbidding the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of 
war to Spain, which did not fall under the existing law since it was torn by a 
civil war. In May 1937, Congress voted for a third neutrality act, imposing 
a rigid embargo on both countries at war and those experiencing civil 
strife. The revised law added a prohibition on the arming of US merchant 
vessels.9
Isolationist sentiment was strong in the Midwest and Mountain states and 
included large numbers of both Republicans and Democrats. The disparate 
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coalition included liberal pacifi sts, pro-Soviet Communists, pro-German and 
Italian fascists, anti-British Irish, anti-Catholic and anti-black bigots, and 
virulent Roosevelt haters.10 All agreed with the slogan adopted by one of the 
leading isolationist groups, “America First.”
Support for military programs was consistent but restrained. Budget 
requests were modest, compared with other government expenditures. In 
fact, benefi ts to veterans exceeded expenditures for the current armed forces 
from 1923 until 1938. During the 1930s the House of Representatives 
usually voted for some cuts in presidential requests for the army and navy, 
and the Senate then partially restored the funds.11
The strongest early support for rearmament came from the naval affairs 
committees, especially Congressman Carl Vinson (D-Ga.), who ultimately 
served as chairman – or ranking minority member – of the defense committee 
for 42 years. Although his committee could only authorize shipbuilding, 
subject to appropriations, he steered several bills through Congress during 
the 1930s. The Vinson–Trammel Act of 1934 called for adding ships up to 
the existing treaty limits. Another act early in 1938 provided for additional 
substantial increases in the US Navy.12
Roosevelt and Vinson teamed up to push money into shipbuilding. In 
1933 the president directed the Public Works Administration to spend $238 
million – 7 percent – of the emergency relief funds passed by Congress on 
construction of two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, 20 destroyers and four 
submarines – ships which proved vital in the war effort after the destruction 
of battleships at Pearl Harbor. In contrast, when Roosevelt assigned a mere 
$2.5 million from the same bill to manufacture munitions for the army, the 
pacifi st outcry was so strong that the next Congress specifi cally prohibited 
the use of relief funds for munitions.13
The former Assistant Secretary of the Navy himself showed a clear 
preference for maritime power until after the outbreak of war in Europe. 
At one meeting, General Marshall pleaded, “At least, Mr. President, stop 
speaking of the Army as ‘they’ and the Navy as ‘us’.”14 Roosevelt articulated, 
and probably shared, the view that ships guaranteed commerce and thus 
were more peaceful than ground troops. Building navies was not warlike 
compared to building armies, in his view. By the late 1930s, he developed an 
enthusiasm for air power, both land-based and sea-based. And he argued that 
building airplanes was another good way to avoid getting into war. Many 
in the Congress shared these views and were more willing to fund ships and 
aircraft than ground forces and their equipment. American public opinion 
also showed a strong preference for air and naval power. 
As early as 1935, with majority opinion in favor of a larger military, the 
fi gures supporting a larger air force – which did not become a separate service 
until 1947 – were regularly much higher than for the army and navy. In one 
instance, the results were 48 percent favoring higher appropriations for the 
army, 54 percent for the navy, and 74 percent for the air force. Air power 
retained its favored status throughout the years before Pearl Harbor.15 
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Military leaders 
Senior offi cers accepted the support they got from their civilian leaders, 
even though funding fell short of their perceived requirements. Time and 
again they reminded congressional committees that they were not allowed 
to ask for more than the president and his Budget Bureau had approved. 
But Congress sometimes restored a portion of the Budget Bureau cuts from 
the service proposals during the mid to late 1930s.16 After war broke out in 
Europe, Roosevelt was more willing to let his service chiefs go directly to 
Congress with their requests. When they took the lead, he risked less of his 
political capital, and the Congress viewed the issues less politically.
The hero of the rearmament effort, and of the later war as well, was 
George C. Marshall. Strong-willed but self-effacing, Marshall had spent 
the interwar years studying the army’s junior offi cers and marking some of 
them for the senior commands they eventually received when war came. 
He cultivated key members of Congress as well, offering them credible 
testimony and appropriate deference. He also gained invaluable experience 
outside the army when he was dispatched to set up and supervise some 19 
camps for young men in the Civilian Conservation Corps. His CCC work 
helped him better plan the mobilization of millions of men when the army 
expanded under the draft.17 
Marshall understood the strength of isolationist sentiment in the nation 
and the constraints it imposed on the military. “We had to move cautiously”, 
he later told his biographer. “If I had ignored public opinion, if I had ignored 
the reaction of Congress, we would literally have gotten nowhere. I had 
to be very careful, I felt and I still think, not to create the feeling that I, 
as the leader of the military portion of affairs at that time, was trying to 
force the country into a lot of actions which it opposed.” He was deferential 
toward the legislative branch, but was such an honest and straightforward 
witness that he built a “fruitful collaboration” with “a friendly and trusting 
Congress.”18 
His stature on Capitol Hill not only enabled him to succeed in gaining 
support for conscription and extra funds for the army, but also allowed him 
to overcome patronage pressures to retain superannuated offi cers. When 
he became Chief of Staff in 1939, he spoke of his plan to revitalize the 
army. “I’ve made a little list”, he said. “I’m going to put these men to the 
severest tests which I can devise in time of peace. … Those who stand up 
under the punishment will be pushed ahead. Those who fail are out at the 
fi rst sign of faltering.” When Marshall sought legislative authority to remove 
older offi cers, some of them persuaded the Chairman of the House Military 
Affairs Committee to pigeonhole the bill. Marshall then found an ally in 
Senator James Byrnes (D-So.Car.), who added language to an appropriations 
bill giving Marshall what he needed. When he subsequently removed a 
high ranking National Guard offi cer, the state’s congressional delegation 
demanded a meeting. Marshall told them, “it seems to me that you are only 
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considering one constituent and ignoring all [your] other constituents who 
are members of the division.” He told the group, “if he stays, I go, and if I 
stay, he goes.” The congressmen backed down.19 
Marshall was admired on Capitol Hill and in the White House for his 
willingness to speak truth to power. In November 1938, at a White House 
meeting where Roosevelt told senior offi cers that he favored more money 
for airplanes, the bulk of which would be sent to European allies, the 
president asked Marshall whether he agreed. “I am sorry, Mr. President”, 
the general replied, “but I don’t agree with that at all.”20 His reply shocked 
his colleagues, but it made a favorable impression on Roosevelt. 
Five months later he was summoned to the White House and told he 
would be named Chief of Staff of the Army. Once again, Marshall told the 
commander-in-chief that he wanted to be able to speak his mind freely. “Is 
that all right?” he asked. When Roosevelt gave the predictable affi rmative 
reply, Marshall continued, “You said yes pleasantly, but it may be unpleasant.” 
Later on, Marshall picked his battles carefully. “I never haggled with the 
President. I swallowed the little things so that I could go to bat on the big 
ones. I never handled a matter apologetically and I was never contentious.” 
Nevertheless, the general felt that the president “rather hesitated about 
taking me into his confi dence.” And Roosevelt’s untidy management style 
led Marshall to doubt the president’s abilities until his decisiveness after 
Pearl Harbor.21 
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold “Betty” Stark, was 
also well regarded by the president and congressional leaders. Logical and 
methodical, he and Roosevelt had been friends since the First World War, 
and he had developed close ties with Capitol Hill during his navy career. It 
helped, of course, that the president had a special fondness for the navy.22 In 
addition to these service chiefs, Roosevelt developed close ties with the head 
of the army’s rapidly expanding air corps, General Henry “Hap” Arnold, and 
Admiral Ernest King, whom he made commander of the Atlantic Fleet and 
eventually successor to Stark as CNO. He also brought back from retirement 
Admiral William Leahy, fi rst making him ambassador to Vichy France and 
then, in 1942, Chief of Staff and head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The major tension in the military establishment was not between senior 
offi cers and their civilian superiors, or between them and the Congress, but 
rather it was the long and bitter clash between the top two civilians in the 
War Department. In 1936, Roosevelt had named Harry Woodring, a former 
Democratic governor of Kansas as Secretary of War. The following year, 
he appointed Louis Johnson as Assistant Secretary, the number two slot. A 
lawyer who helped found the American Legion and later served as its national 
commander, Johnson was bright, energetic, and the polar opposite of the 
isolationist Woodring. They clashed, profoundly and often, in personality and 
over policy. By 1939, Time magazine could report: “Only when absolutely 
necessary do they speak to each other. When offi cial business requires them 
to communicate, they do so in writing or through harried subordinates. Mr. 
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Johnson despises Mr. Woodring. Mr. Woodring distrusts and despises Mr. 
Johnson, who for 27 months has gunned for Mr. Woodring’s job.”23 
Roosevelt tolerated the open hostility because his management style 
was to assign tasks without regard to formal authorities or offi cial lines of 
command. He also found it diffi cult to fi re once-favored subordinates, even 
when they were disloyal or incompetent. If need be, the president would 
just work around them by going directly to others. In this case, Roosevelt 
bypassed Woodring and put Johnson in charge of airplane production and 
assigned foreign sales of aircraft to Britain and France to the Secretary of the 
Treasury, Henry Morgenthau.24
Marshall was caught in the middle, agreeing with Johnson on policy issues 
but still feeling primary loyalty to Woodring. One reason he became Chief of 
Staff, he thought, was that both Woodring and Johnson mistakenly thought 
that the other opposed Marshall’s promotion.25 Roosevelt waited until June 
1940 to resolve the confl ict by replacing both the Secretary of War and the 
Secretary of the Navy with prominent, pro-interventionist Republicans. 
The gathering storm
Roosevelt recalled Congress to a special session on November 15, 1937, 
but only to deal with his domestic legislative proposals – wages and hours 
standards, agriculture and conservation. He was under fi re from conservative 
Democrats who opposed these measures, as they had his plan to expand 
the Supreme Court so he could appoint more justices friendly to the New 
Deal. Facing domestic defeats, Roosevelt turned his attention to foreign 
affairs. When Japanese aircraft attacked the US gunboat Panay and three 
US merchant vessels in the Yangtze River near Nanking, the president asked 
Congress for funds to expand the US Navy, citing his “growing concern” 
about the world situation. “I do not refer to any specifi c nation or to any 
specifi c threat against the United States. The fact is that in the world as a 
whole many nations are not only continuing but are enlarging their armament 
programs”, he wrote.26
Early in January 1938, he convened White House meetings with congress-
ional leaders to discuss a defense buildup. In his subsequent January 28 
message to Congress, Roosevelt called American defenses “inadequate” and 
asked for $28 million more for the navy and $17 million for the army. He 
argued that “we must keep any potential enemy many hundred miles away 
from our continental limits.” At the same time Roosevelt launched secret 
discussions with the British, sending a navy captain for staff talks with the 
Royal Navy. In May, Congress passed a 10-year, $1 billion authorization for 
naval expansion for a “two ocean navy.”27
Public opinion supported the start of rearmament. Roosevelt’s inter-
national policy was endorsed, with 50 percent approving and only 15 
percent disapproving in July 1938. And as the Munich crisis developed in 
September, surveys found majorities expressing a willingness even to pay 
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more in taxes for a larger army – 53 percent, navy – 54 percent, and air force 
– 74 percent.28
Immediately after the agreement dismembering Czechoslovakia and 
putting the Sudetenland under German control, Roosevelt gave a radio 
address warning that Americans must continue to arm. “There can be no 
peace if national policy adopts as a deliberate instrument the threat of war”, 
he declared. While publicly reiterating his desires for peace, he began secret 
talks with the British regarding ways to circumvent the neutrality act so that 
he could funnel US weapons to Britain even in the event of war. He also 
moved toward an Atlantic-fi rst naval strategy by shifting the annual fl eet 
exercise from the Pacifi c to the Caribbean and ordering the Pacifi c fl eet to 
sail to the 1939 New York World’s Fair.29 
But his new obsession was air power. He suggested increasing American 
aircraft production from 2,600 to 15,000 per year. On November 14, 1938, 
he held a major meeting with his army advisors – the one where Marshall 
openly disagreed with his priorities. The president argued, “A well-rounded 
ground army of even 400,000 could not be considered a deterrent for any 
foreign power whereas a heavy striking force of aircraft would.” He wanted 
an American air force of 10,000 planes and production capacity for 20,000 a 
year. He saw little need to spend money on pilots, crews, ground service and 
maintenance facilities, since the bulk of the planes would be sold abroad. He 
said he could not “infl uence Hitler with barracks, runways, and schools for 
mechanics.” Eventually, he modifi ed his plans so as to have a more balanced 
force of ground and air units, and a scaling back of production goals to 
6,000 per year.30
This was the fi rst of more than 20 cases between 1938 and 1945 when 
Roosevelt overruled the recommendations of his military advisers. That was, 
of course, his Constitutional prerogative, but it underscores the fact, as the 
offi cial US Army history of the Second World War puts it, that “Roosevelt 
was the real and not merely a nominal Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces. Every President has possessed the constitutional authority which that 
title indicates, but few Presidents have shared Mr. Roosevelt’s readiness to 
exercise it in fact and in detail and with such determination.”31
Even before the new 76th Congress convened in January 1939, Roosevelt 
approached the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
seeking support for changes in the neutrality act. This proved politically 
impossible until after the German invasion of Poland, but it was a key 
legislative priority for the president throughout the year. Meanwhile, he 
tried to move American opinion to see the world as he saw it – with Nazi 
aggression as the principal threat, one which endangered America as well as 
Europe. 
Sometimes he went too far. In a January 31 meeting with members 
of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, he warned that war in Europe 
was imminent and that, even if our oceans protected us, the economic 
consequences could hurt us. If Hitler dominated Europe, it would imperil 
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the peace and safety of the United States. “That is why the safety of the 
Rhine frontier interests us”, he said. “Do you mean our frontier is on 
the Rhine?” a senator asked. “No, not that”, he replied. “But practically 
speaking, if the Rhine frontiers are threatened the rest of the world is, too.” 
Roosevelt was angry at the leaks regarding his comments, denouncing them 
as a “deliberate lie”, but the damage had been done. The incident boosted 
isolationist sentiment.32
Roosevelt also launched a peace offensive, asking Hitler and Mussolini 
in April to disavow specifi cally any intention to attack 31 listed nations. 
Hitler mocked the proposal, but it helped Roosevelt persuade the nation of 
his own sincerity in seeking peace, even as he obtained funds for increased 
armaments.33 
Public opinion moved slowly as Roosevelt pushed. In a January 1939 
survey, American respondents gave support to the idea that the United States 
must stand fi rm to prevent Hitler or Mussolini from taking any more territory 
by a 56 percent to 31 percent majority. But the only nation a majority said 
they were willing to defend with US forces was Canada – 73.1 percent – 
compared to only 27.8 percent for defending England and only 22.1 percent 
for defending France. Opposition to a draft was still strong – 37 percent for, 
63 percent against.34 
In one of the most signifi cant developments in US civil–military relations, 
Roosevelt on July 5, 1939 transferred the Joint Board of the Army and 
Navy to the Executive Offi ce of the President, where he could oversee 
and direct war planning and conduct. Later on, he created a chiefs of staff 
committee of the four most senior offi cers, so that they could interact with 
their British counterparts. Although Admiral Leahy continued to press for 
a formal document authorizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roosevelt said it 
“would provide no benefi ts and might in some way impair fl exibility of 
operations.”35 In other words, it might cause problems for Roosevelt’s very 
fl uid management style. 
War in Europe
The same day Germany invaded Poland, General Marshall and Admiral 
Stark assumed their new positions as service chiefs, eager to continue the 
rearmament plans already authorized by the president and Congress. As 
required by the neutrality act, Roosevelt ordered an arms embargo. But in a 
nationwide radio address, he said, “This Nation will remain a neutral nation, 
but I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well.” He 
also said America would continue searching for peace.36 
On September 8, Roosevelt declared what he called a “limited national 
emergency” and ordered small increases in military personnel – 17,000 for 
the army and 5,000 for the navy. He recalled the Congress for a special 
session on September 21 and pleaded with the legislators to change the 
neutrality act. “I regret that Congress passed that [original 1935] Act”, he 
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said. “I regret equally that I signed that Act.” He said he favored keeping US 
ships and citizens out of the war zones, but that victims of aggression should 
be able to buy armaments on a cash and carry basis.37 
American opinion still opposed a draft and direct US participation in 
the European war. But 58 percent favored repeal of the neutrality act if it 
would help England and France but not Germany. And support continued 
strong for increased military spending. At the end of October the Senate 
voted 63–30 to revise the act, and the House followed a few days later 
with a 243–141 vote. The fourth neutrality act dropped the mandatory 
embargo and allowed arms sales on a cash and carry basis. But it still made 
it unlawful for US vessels to carry passengers or any articles to belligerent 
states, unlawful for US citizens or ships to go to or through combat zones, 
and unlawful to travel on ships of belligerents. It also banned the arming 
of US merchant vessels.38
The start of war in Europe stimulated additional measures to increase US 
military capabilities. Chairman Vinson, with Roosevelt’s backing, introduced 
another naval expansion bill, authorizing $1.3 billions for ships over the next 
four years. The army’s head of congressional liaison found strong support 
on the Hill for more funds and recommended: “I fi rmly believe that now 
is the time to ask for everything the War Department needs. We will get it. 
Let us strike while the iron is hot.” Despite those favorable prospects, the 
president decided to ask for only another $120 million for the army.39
When Congress reconvened on January 3, 1940, Roosevelt devoted his 
state of the union address to foreign affairs. He reiterated America’s search 
for peace but warned against ignoring the current realities of war. During 
the winter of what was called the “phony war”, some members of Congress 
began pushing for cuts in defense spending. The House Appropriations 
Committee, for example, cut the president’s request for the army by 9.5 
percent in early April.40 
Then Germany invaded Denmark and Norway on April 9, demonstrating 
Hitler’s appetite for all of Europe. The next day, Marshall met with a group 
of Senators in a session arranged by Senator Byrnes and industrialist Bernard 
Baruch. As they talked long past midnight, Marshall pleaded his case for 
rearmament in what Baruch termed “a turning point in convincing … critics 
of preparedness.” Events in Europe also led to a sea change in congressional 
opinion after the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands on May 10. 
Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass.) told General Arnold “it is the general feeling 
of Congress, and as far as I can gather, among public opinion throughout the 
country, to provide all of the money necessary for the National Defense, and 
so all you have to do is ask for it.”41 
May 1940 marked the tipping point in American public opinion. That 
month found a 50–50 division on the question of the draft. Thereafter, 
support shifted to 2–1 in favor. That month found 86 percent to 14 percent 
for a doubling of defense spending, including if necessary a special tax to pay 
for the buildup –76 percent for, 24 percent against. Nevertheless, Americans 
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were still opposed – 18 percent for, 74 percent against – to allowing American 
ships to carry war supplies to Britain.42 
Working with Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, Marshall arranged for a 
meeting with Roosevelt on May 13. The general urgently sought an extra 
$657 million for the army, but his own civilian superiors disagreed among 
themselves. When Morgenthau defended Marshall’s proposals, Roosevelt 
turned them down, telling his advisors, “I am not asking you, I am telling 
you.” When Morgenthau told the president, “I still think you are wrong”, he 
replied, ‘Well, you fi led your protest.” He also rejected the suggestion that 
Marshall be allowed to go to the Hill on his own.43
The Treasury Secretary then asked Roosevelt, “Will you hear General 
Marshall?” At fi rst Roosevelt, in a bantering mood, said, “I know exactly 
what he would say. There is no necessity for me to hear him at all.” Then 
Marshall walked over the Roosevelt and asked directly,” Mr. President, may 
I have three minutes?” “Of course, General Marshall”, came the reply.44 
The Army Chief of Staff then poured forth his concerns and frustrations, 
detailing the army’s critical requirements for more money and better 
organization. He concluded, “If you don’t do something … and do it right 
away, I don’t know what is going to happen to this country.” The surprised 
president gave the general part of what he sought and asked him to return 
a few days later with a more detailed list of requirements. This was the 
moment that “broke the log jam”, in Marshall’s view.45
On May 16, Roosevelt went before Congress with a huge military spending 
request – $1.2 billion in addition to his January request of $1.8 billion. He 
warned of the short fl ight times from Atlantic islands to US shores and asked 
for capacity to produce 50,000 planes a year. He sought to increase the army 
from 227,000 to 255,000 men and to provide weaponry for a mobilization 
force of 750,000. But he didn’t call for conscription.46 
When General Marshall and Admiral Stark went before Congress in the 
following days, they found a changed atmosphere. The Senate Appropriations 
Committee held three hours of hearings and reported a comprehensive 
spending bill. The naval affairs committees rushed to passage a bill increasing 
the number of the navy’s planes from 3,000 to 10,000 and providing for 
16,000 pilots. Congress also lifted army manpower levels by another 25,000 
– to 280,000.47
The atmosphere was one of fear and urgency as German troops surged 
toward the English Channel and toward Paris. To restore American confi dence, 
Roosevelt gave one of his biennial fi reside chats on May 26. He detailed 
the improvements already achieved in military capabilities, the increased 
numbers of soldiers and sailors, of planes and tanks and anti-aircraft guns. 
He pledged, “it is my resolve and yours to build up our armed defenses. We 
shall build them to whatever heights the future may require.”48 
Five days later he asked Congress for an additional $1.3 billion for defense 
and for authority to call up the National Guard. Marshall asked an increase 
in the army to 325,000 and Congress boosted the fi gure to 375,000. Stark 
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asked for a 70 percent increase in the size of the fl eet, and Vinson spearheaded 
another naval expansion bill that authorized 13 battleships, six carriers, 32 
cruisers, 101 destroyers, and 39 submarines.49 On July 10, Roosevelt sent 
Congress another supplemental spending request for defense, seeking an 
additional $4.8 billion. These additional sums were fi nally enacted in early 
September.
Congress’s new-found enthusiasm for military spending refl ected a sea 
change in American public opinion as Nazi troops marched into Paris. 
Support for the $2 billion increase in defense was overwhelming – 86 percent 
for, 14 percent against – even when the pollsters mentioned a special tax to 
pay for it. Opinion was still evenly divided, however, on the idea of a draft 
and still strongly opposed to changing the neutrality laws so that US ships 
could carry war supplies to England.50
Meanwhile, the army staff was developing plan for a fully equipped force of 
500,000 men by July 1941 and one million by January 1942. Marshall knew 
he needed a draft to reach those numbers, but the president was reluctant to 
endorse such a proposal. In fact, Roosevelt was preoccupied politically by 
the issue of running for a third term. He wanted the Democratic convention 
to draft him, without having formally to seek the nomination. So Marshall 
consulted with outside advocates of conscription, led by New York lawyer 
Grenville Clark. Although Marshall indicated that the army could not yet 
give public support to the proposal, he sent three offi cers to help prepare a 
bill. The bipartisan Burke-Wadsworth bill was introduced on June 20, two 
days before the French surrender to the Nazis.51
As Marshall later explained, “You might say that the Army played politics 
in this period. That is a crude expression. Actually, we had regard for politics. 
We had regard for the fact that the President did not feel assured he would 
get the backing of the people generally and in the Middle West particularly 
and had to move with great caution.”52 Once the bill was before Congress, 
Marshall felt free to testify, stressing that the War Department supported the 
measure.
Although until August 2 Roosevelt himself did not openly endorse the 
draft – which he always insisted on calling a “muster” to connote the rallying 
of Minute Men53 – he took other steps to shape opinion in its favor. On June 
22 he fi nally replaced his discredited secretaries of war and navy with two 
prominent Republicans – Frank Knox, the GOP candidate for Vice President 
in 1936 and Henry Stimson, who had been Secretary of War under Taft and 
Secretary of State under Hoover. Both favored conscription. It also helped 
that the 1940 Republican nominee for President, Wendell Willkie, endorsed 
the draft in his acceptance speech. Public support for the draft rose from 50 
percent in May to 64 percent in June to 71 percent in July.54 The fi nal bill did 
not pass until September, and only with amendments limiting service to 12 
months and forbidding use of troops outside the Western Hemisphere.
While the military leaders were pleased to get the ever-rising appropriations, 
they disagreed with several of the president’s other decisions in the summer 
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of 1940. Roosevelt ordered all-out military aid to Britain after the fall of 
France. The services protested, arguing that Britain was probably doomed 
and that the transfers would leave the United States stripped of necessary 
arms. They also protested Roosevelt’s order transferring B-17 bombers to 
Britain and ordering that the fl eet be kept at Pearl Harbor, supposedly to 
deter the Japanese.55 
Congress also, though for different reasons, worked to restrict Roosevelt’s 
ability to help Britain. The Senate Naval Affairs Committee Chairman, David 
Walsh (D-Mass.), was angry at learning of a plan to send 20 newly built 
torpedo boats to Britain. He called a hearing, at which the navy admitted there 
were also discussions under way with Britain regarding the sale of destroyers. 
Walsh went to the fl oor of the Senate, angrily denounced the plans to send 
American equipment abroad, and offered an amendment, readily adopted, 
banning the disposal of any equipment unless the service chief certifi ed that 
such material “is not essential to and cannot be used for the defense of the 
United States.” Chairman Vinson pushed a similar amendment through the 
House, though his motivation was anger at Roosevelt’s veto of a bill designed 
to force the removal of some of the navy’s senior offi cers and the protection 
of some naval aviators. Vinson’s amendment prohibited the selling, disposal 
or scrapping of ships “without the consent of Congress.”56 
Arsenal of democracy
During August 1940, Churchill repeatedly pressed Roosevelt for the sale 
of 50 aging destroyers, but the president resisted. Churchill offered to 
lease some British bases in the Atlantic and Caribbean but insisted that the 
actions not be linked. At fi rst, Roosevelt felt that he lacked legal authority 
for the deal without congressional approval, but Attorney General Robert 
Jackson wrote a memorandum arguing that the president had authority to 
transfer the destroyers. Once the acquisition of bases was added into the 
deal, the civilian leaders were confi dent that the gains to US defenses made 
certifi cation by Admiral Stark easy. Jackson met with Marshall and Stark on 
August 22. After extensive discussion, the offi cers were ready to certify the 
transfers of the destroyers and some army equipment. Stimson also worked to 
obtain informal word that Willkie would support the deal. When Roosevelt 
announced the arrangements, he met with widespread support. Only a few 
diehard isolationists like Senator Walsh still denounced the plan.57 
Late in the presidential campaign, two weeks after the fi rst draft lottery 
and with Willkie surging to 4 percent below Roosevelt in opinion polls, the 
president used a major speech in Boston to reiterate his hatred for war and 
his promise, “Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.” 
Every time before, and thereafter, Roosevelt had added the words “except 
in case of attack.” When his speechwriter raised the point, the stubborn 
president countered, “If we’re attacked it’s no longer a foreign war.”58 The 
Boston statement was the one thrown back at him time and again later.
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Roosevelt won reelection and then had to deal with the plans being 
developed by US military leaders and the worsening situation in Europe. 
Coordinating with Marshall, Admiral Stark recommended on November 12 
what was called Plan Dog – the “D” option – calling for a defensive posture 
in the Pacifi c while building up offensive strength in the Atlantic. Stark also 
argued that US naval assistance alone would probably not defeat Hitler 
and that the United States would “need to send large air and land forces to 
Europe or Africa, or both.”59 Roosevelt was not ready to sign on to such a 
strategy, but he did authorize secret military staff talks with the British.
American involvement in the war seemed increasingly inevitable. Stimson 
noted “a basic agreement” on that point among himself, Knox, Marshall and 
Stark after a December 16 meeting. In a long cabinet meeting on December 
19, the secretary of war told Roosevelt that the United States needed to 
begin stopping German submarines that threatened British ships. “Well, he 
said he hadn’t reached that yet.”60 
What he had decided to do, however, was to seek congressional author-
ization to send massive amounts of military equipment to Britain, called 
Lend-Lease on the dubious proposition that the items would be returned 
after the war. One of the leading isolationists, Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio), 
quipped, “Lending arms is like lending chewing gum. You don’t want it 
back.”61 
Nevertheless, Roosevelt performed a series of public relations master 
strokes. In a news conference on December 17, he compared the assistance 
to lending a neighbor a garden hose to fi ght a fi re. In a December 29 fi reside 
chat, he said that the United States must be “the great arsenal of democracy” 
and that “there is far less chance of the United States getting into war if we 
do all we can now to support the nations defending themselves against attack 
by the Axis.” The phrase, “arsenal of democracy”, had been suggested by 
Frenchman Jean Monnet.62 On January 3, 1941, Roosevelt’s budget message 
called for a near tripling of defense expenditures in the coming year. Three 
days later, in his state of the union address to Congress, he linked arming the 
allies to the achievement of a world founded on “four freedoms” – of speech 
and religion and from want and fear.63 These various steps helped to build 
strong public support for lend-lease, better than 2–1 in most polls.64 
House Speaker Sam Rayburn arranged for the Lend-Lease bill to be 
numbered H.R. 1776 and then worked tirelessly to orchestrate prompt and 
favorable House action. He got numerous opposition amendments ruled out 
of order and corralled the votes to defeat 19 other restrictive amendments. 
In the Senate, the Democratic leadership, which felt compelled to refer the 
measure to the isolationist Foreign Relations Committee, arranged to add 
two lend-lease supporters to the panel. Senate passage by a 60–31 vote 
was helped by Willkie’s endorsement of the bill and by acceptance of an 
amendment making it clear that only weapons built with lend-lease funds 
could be shipped abroad, not those funded by regular defense appropriations. 
Seven billion dollars were approved for the aid program at the end of March, 
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and within two months over 60 percent of the funds had been allocated to 
specifi c programs.65 
Congress then faced the military manpower question. While the initial 
draft lottery had gone smoothly, the draftees then began to barrage their 
congressmen with complaints about primitive encampments and inadequate 
equipment, such as broomsticks for rifl es. Many looked forward eagerly to 
the end of their one year obligation in the coming October. 
Army planners had opposed the one-year limitation and built the new 
divisions on the implicit assumption that the draftees would be in their 
units beyond 12 months. Otherwise, the forces would disintegrate. Marshall 
and Stimson recognized the problem and began urging the president to ask 
Congress for an extension of the draft. When Roosevelt’s reluctance was 
evident, Marshall decided on a different approach – to use his own prestige 
to make the case. He turned his previously routine annual report into a hard-
hitting brief for draft extension. He detailed the eight-fold growth of the 
army over two years, and the problems that necessarily created. He noted 
that in all but two regular army divisions, the number of draftees ranged 
from 25 percent to 50 percent. The loss of these men after 12 months would 
be devastating.66 
Marshall failed to brief congressional leaders in advance, however, so the 
release of his report provoked an angry response even from such friends 
as Speaker Sam Rayburn, who had earlier gone on record opposing a draft 
extension as a violation of the moral contract with the draftees.67 
Despite his reelection victory and the deceptively large Democratic 
majorities in Congress, Roosevelt was still a divisive politician. Antipathy 
toward him was still deep. When one Democratic Senator had complained 
that, by his court-packing scheme and efforts to purge conservatives from the 
party, Roosevelt was “his own worst enemy”, his colleague bitterly replied, 
“Not while I’m alive, he isn’t.” The president was quite willing to let his 
subordinates do the heavy lifting on Capitol Hill. Thus, he allowed Marshall 
to take the lead on draft extension, waiting until July 21 to endorse the idea 
– and then putting the onus on Congress. Without extension, he said, the 
army would disintegrate. “The responsibility rests solely with Congress.” 
Roosevelt also backed off pushing for repeal of the amendment restricting 
use of the draftees to the Western Hemisphere, giving “the laboring oar” 
instead to Marshall.68 
Public opinion opposed the draft extension as well as the repeal of 
the Western Hemisphere restriction. Only 27 percent favored a two-year 
requirement; 65 percent wanted only one year. Over half the people favored 
the restriction throughout 1941 polling. A congressional aide with four 
decades’ experience reported that the fear of the bill was the worst he had 
ever seen, that a vote for it was viewed as political suicide. The army’s 
legislative liaison staff forecast a 5–1 vote against the bill.69 
Marshall had an uphill fi ght, but he reached out to members of both 
parties, talking them through the accomplishments thus far and the problems 
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remaining. He sensed that members viewed him as a nonpolitical expert on 
military matters. He made personal appeals to Republicans, at one point 
meeting with a group until past midnight. One congressman explained his 
continued opposition: “You put the case very well, but I will be damned if I 
am going along with Mr. Roosevelt.” Marshall shot back, “You are going to 
let plain hatred of the personality dictate to you to do something that you 
realize is very harmful to the interest of the country.”70
A crisis arose when some soldiers received and sent mail-in postcards 
printed by the America First Committee opposing the draft extension. When 
Stimson learned of the campaign he said, “this comes very near the line of 
subversive activities against the United States – if not treason.” Marshall 
called the actions “sabotage” and said, “We cannot have a political club 
and call it an army.”71 Stimson later became convinced that soldiers got the 
postcards inadvertently and apologized to the isolationists, but the incident 
demonstrated the politicization of the issue.
The Senate approved the draft extension bill by 45–30 on August 7 after 
including some restrictive amendments. In the House, Rayburn predicted 
a close vote, at most for a one-year extension. He then lobbied members 
personally and relentlessly. “I need your vote. I wish you’d stand by me 
because it means a lot to me”, he pleaded. When the fi nal roll call came on 
August 12, Rayburn quickly announced the results – 203 in favor, 202 against 
– and gaveled down efforts by several arm-waving members to change their 
votes. On this vote, 21 Republicans joined with 181 Democrats in favor, 
while 65 Democrats and 133 Republicans – plus four from other parties 
– were opposed. To assure a strong Senate vote on the House-passed version 
of the bill, supporters stalled the debate until the army could fl y absentees 
back to Washington.72 The fi nal version still barred the use of draftees beyond 
the Western Hemisphere. The only other major legislative fi ght before Pearl 
Harbor was in November, when Congress voted to repeal key remaining 
sections of the neutrality act. 
Back door to war
Although Roosevelt never admitted sharing the view of his senior advisers 
that war was inevitable, he acted throughout 1941 as if he agreed. Yet he 
was cautious, telling Marshall in mid-January that “the Army should not be 
committed to any aggressive action until it was fully prepared to undertake 
it; that our military course must be very conservative until our strength 
had developed.”73 Nevertheless, Roosevelt was also quite willing to order 
naval actions that put US forces in direct confl ict with Germany. Openly he 
expanded America’s defense zones and secretly he collaborated with Britain 
against Germany.
He also put in place military offi cers more willing to follow his strategy. 
Although he respected General Marshall’s honest disagreement on occasion, 
he could not tolerate the brash behavior of his Pacifi c Fleet commander, 
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Admiral James Richardson. When Richardson visited Washington and 
lunched with Roosevelt on October 8, 1940, he warned that the fl eet was 
unprepared for war. But he went further and brazenly told the commander-
in-chief, “Mr. President, I feel I must tell you that the senior offi cers of the 
navy do not have the trust and confi dence in the civilian leadership of this 
country that is essential for a successful prosecution of the war in the Pacifi c.” 
Less than three months later, Richardson was abruptly relieved of command 
and replaced by Admiral Husband Kimmel. Roosevelt also installed Admiral 
Ernest King – considered by his daughter to be “the most even-tempered 
man in the navy: he is always in a rage” – as commander of the upgraded 
Atlantic Fleet – and later as successor CNO. Roosevelt took his personal 
interest in commanding the navy to the point that he had a direct phone line 
to the director of the Ship Movements Division and plotted fl eet movements 
with a wall chart in his offi ce.74 
In February, Roosevelt extended his designation of the Western Hemisphere 
neutrality zone to the twenty-sixth west longitude, just west of Iceland and 
east of the Azores. He said that belligerent ships or aircraft in that area 
should be viewed as “possibly actuated by unfriendly interests.” Positions 
of hostile ships were then to be passed on to the British. In April he sent 
US troops to occupy Greenland pursuant to an agreement with the Danish 
ambassador in Washington, whose home country was now controlled by 
the Nazis. In late May he ordered about a quarter of the Pacifi c Fleet to be 
moved to the Atlantic.75 In July, troops were sent to Iceland, Trinidad, and 
British Guiana.
US military leaders opposed these new garrisons and the convoy 
operations – as well as the July decision to impose an oil embargo on Japan. 
But Roosevelt overruled them, determined to press ahead in accordance 
with his own vision. That strategy, as described by his chief speechwriter, 
was “to keep one step ahead of public opinion, not to be stampeded into 
one direction or the other, and to encourage full debate before taking too 
drastic action.”76 
In fact, as early as January, 1941, the American people agreed – 48 
percent to 42 percent – that we were already in the war. By June the fi gures 
on that question were 79.1 percent to 10.9 percent. By July, they supported 
convoying ships as far as Iceland, 75 percent to 15 percent. By September 
they were ready to have US ships shoot on sight – 62 percent – rather than 
waiting until they were fi rst attacked – 28 percent. By early October, they 
favored 72 percent to 21 percent arming US merchant ships – a change in 
the law approved by Congress a few weeks later. Perhaps most signifi cantly, 
by mid-September, the American people overwhelmingly – 71 percent to 22 
percent – agreed that if the United States is to be free, the Nazi government 
must be destroyed.77
What the American public did not realize, however, is how provocative 
the United States forces became. They were outraged at the German attacks 
on American ships but ignorant of the secret orders to the navy to follow 
110 The challenge of rearmament
German submarines and report their locations to the British. When a US 
fl ag ship Robin Moor was sunk by a German submarine in the South Atlantic 
on May 21 and its passengers left adrift in lifeboats for over two weeks, 
Roosevelt sent a strident message to Congress, calling the attack “outrageous 
and indefensible” and a violation of freedom of navigation. He declared that 
the United States would not yield “to world domination at the hands of the 
present leaders of the German Reich.”78 
Roosevelt took these steps because the Germans were winning the battle 
of the Atlantic. By May 1941, the Nazis were sinking three times as many 
merchant ships as the British capacity to replace them, and more than double 
the combined US and British ship production. Roosevelt decided to make a 
radio address from the White House on May 27 pointing out those sober 
facts and declaring an “unlimited national emergency.” He said, “We are 
placing our armed forces in strategic military position. We will not hesitate 
to use our armed forces to repel attack.” And he said cryptically, “Our patrols 
are helping now to insure the delivery of the needed supplies to Britain. All 
additional measures necessary to deliver the goods will be taken.” Roosevelt 
also declared a preemptive policy. “Our Bunker Hill of tomorrow may 
be several thousand miles from Boston, Massachusetts …. Old-fashioned 
common sense calls for the use of a strategy that will prevent such an enemy 
from gaining a foothold in the fi rst place.”79
The very next day, however, Roosevelt tried to calm public opinion by 
telling his press conference that he had no plans to ask Congress to repeal 
the neutrality act and no plans to introduce convoys. He also wasn’t sure 
what orders he might issue pursuant to the unlimited national emergency 
declaration. Stimson felt that the press conference was “one of the worst and 
almost undid the effect of the speech.” Harry Hopkins saw it as a reversal 
“from a position of strength tone of apparently insouciant weakness.” Yet that 
was Roosevelt’s puzzling but irritating style, as explained in his comment, “I 
am a juggler. I never let my right hand know what my left hand does.”80
Even General Marshall was sometimes uncertain of the president’s 
policies. In late September he inferred from a newspaper article that Roose-
velt favored a reduction in the size of the army in order to free more 
production and shipping for aid to Britain. His staff labored for several days 
on point papers opposing any reductions, but the army eventually proposed 
placing the best National Guard divisions in inactive status and organizing 
new divisions in their place. The plan, slated to start in February 1942, was 
overtaken by the events of December 7.81 
On September 4, the US destroyer Greer, while trailing a German submarine 
for three and a half hours and dropping depth charges along with a British 
bomber, had at least two torpedoes fi red at it, without suffering damage. 
Roosevelt responded to this fi rst direct German–American exchange of fi re 
by issuing a shoot on sight order and giving a radio address on September 
11 with a carefully edited version of events. After fi rst briefi ng congressional 
leaders of his planned text, he said the Greer was in “waters of self-defense” 
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and that the German submarine had fi red fi rst. He did not mention the 
trailing of the sub or the collaboration with the British bomber. He listed 
earlier incidents – including the Robin Moor, the August 17 sinking of an 
American-owned, Panamanian-fl agged ship, the Sessa, and the sinking of a 
US merchant vessel, Steel Seafarer, in the Red Sea on September 6 – which 
he said demonstrated a Nazi design to abolish freedom of the seas. He then 
accused the Germans of “unrestricted submarine warfare” – the code words 
for what triggered US entry into the First World War – and declared “our 
patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships.” Comparing the 
German ships to rattlesnakes, he said, “when you see a rattlesnake poised to 
strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.”82 
That same day, General Marshall and Admiral Stark submitted their Joint 
Board military estimate of the overall situation, a comprehensive strategic 
document. While listing preserving the security of the United States and the 
Western Hemisphere as primary, they also said major US objectives were to 
prevent the disruption of the British Empire, prevent the further extension 
of the Japanese empire, and to establish regional balances of power in 
Europe and Asia to ensure US security. Signifi cantly, they noted that “These 
national policies can be effectuated in their entirety only through military 
victories outside this hemisphere.” The strategy paper declared, “if our 
European enemies are to be defeated, it will be necessary for the United 
States to enter the war and to employ a part of its armed forces offensively in 
the Eastern Atlantic and in Europe or Africa.” Finally, the military document 
recommended fi ghting Germany fi rst, “while holding Japan in check.”83 This 
became the template for the ensuing war.
On October 9, Roosevelt formally asked Congress to repeal most of 
the remaining restrictions of the neutrality act and allow the arming of US 
merchant vessels. He argued that keeping US ships out of combat zones “was 
inviting [Nazi] control of the seas …. It is time for this country to stop playing 
into Hitler’s hands and to unshackle our own.” Support for the legislation 
was further stimulated by the October 17 attack on the US destroyer Kearny 
with 11 killed, and the October 31 sinking of the US destroyer Reuben 
James, with the loss of 115 men. On November 7 the Senate passed the bill 
repealing key sections of the Neutrality Act and allowing the arming of US 
merchant ships by a 50–37 vote. A week later, the House passed the measure 
by another close margin, 212–194.84 
Despite the public acceptance of naval clashes, Roosevelt escalated his 
rhetoric but still refused to call for a declaration of war. Even a former leader 
of the America First Committee, General Robert E. Wood, endorsed such 
action. The president did tell a Navy Day audience on October 27, “America 
has been attacked.” And he said, “we do not propose to take this lying down.” 
The orders to shoot on sight still stood. Yet he asked only for repeal of the 
neutrality act, nothing more decisive. Admiral Stark confi ded to a friend, “The 
Navy is already in the war in the Atlantic, but the country doesn’t seem to 
realize it. … whether the country knows it or not, we are at war.”85 
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Figure 6.1 Franklin Roosevelt signing the declaration of war against Japan in the 
presence of congressional leaders, 1941 (Library of Congress) 
Meanwhile, the crisis with Japan was worsening. In response to an 
unacceptable Japanese note on November 20, Marshall and Stark urged 
diplomatic maneuvering to allow more time to deploy forces to the Pacifi c. 
Roosevelt overruled them, as he had the previous summer when he imposed 
the oil embargo, and instead sent an ultimatum on November 26 that the 
Japanese were sure to reject. As Stimson recorded in his diary, “The question 
was how we should maneuver them into the position of fi ring the fi rst shot 
without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”86 With diplomacy failing 
and with the Japanese task force secretly headed toward Hawaii, the die was 
cast for war with Japan. 
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Interplay of civil–military relations
The rearmament fi ght revealed the extensive powers of the president – to 
act on his own at times as well as to persuade the public and the Congress. 
Roosevelt skirted the boundaries of his legal authority by his actions to aid 
Britain and police the North Atlantic. He also used his communication skills 
to inform, educate, and lead a reluctant citizenry along the path of military 
expansion and probable war. But he was always acutely sensitive to public 
opinion and on numerous occasions retreated from his declared positions 
when they met hostile responses. 
For its part, Congress followed Roosevelt’s lead, while asserting its own 
special prerogatives, such as controlling the direction and expenditure of 
funds. On occasion it added money for favored projects, as has always been 
usual. When Roosevelt declined to push for a draft or a draft extension, 
Congress assumed the responsibility for acting on the politically charged 
issues. After trying to tie the president’s hands with the neutrality legislation, 
the legislators slowly, but with public support at each stage, undid their 
restraints. While some members fought the drift toward war loudly and 
vigorously until December 7, the Senate and House as institutions deferred 
substantially to the president throughout the buildup. They did not even 
conduct embarrassing or revelatory hearings, which might have undercut 
support for US policies.
US military leaders accepted civilian control without question or open 
dissent. They accepted presidential decisions, even when Roosevelt overruled 
them. They followed the weak leadership of some service secretaries while 
welcoming their more skilled replacements. Marshall and Stark spoke truth 
to power in the White House and on Capitol Hill and gained respect and 
support in return. Marshall also discovered that he could get out in front of 
the president, as on the draft issue, without damaging his relationship.
Together, the civilian and military leaders fashioned an amazingly large 
and successful rearmament program. More by luck than by design, they began 
building the armed forces and weaponry to fi ght a global war and adjusted 
foreign policies to make use of America’s strengths. They developed the 
outlines of a grand strategy which, despite surprises and setbacks, they were 
able to pursue after Pearl Harbor. This is a story of prudence and success.
7 Harry Truman and the 
politics of rearmament
I will not buy a pig in a poke.
Harry Truman on the NSC 68 rearmament policy paper1 
A military establishment is not a political democracy. Integrity of command 
is indispensable at all times. There can be no twilight zone in the measure of 
loyalty to superiors and respect for authority existing between various offi cial 
ranks.
Navy Secretary Matthews on the fi ring of CNO Admiral Denfeld2 
The removal of Admiral Denfeld was a reprisal against him for giving 
testimony to the House Armed Services Committee. This act is a blow against 
effective representative government in that it tends to intimidate witnesses 
and hence discourages the rendering of free and honest testimony to the 
Congress ….
House Armed Services Committee report, March 1, 19503 
 Harry Truman didn’t want to rearm America in 1949. He wanted to fi ght 
communism, but with other weapons – abroad with foreign aid and at home 
with tough new laws and a vigorous FBI. He preferred to focus on domestic 
issues, including national health insurance and civil rights.
His feisty 1948 campaign returned him to the White House with a 
surprising victory and helped replace the “do nothing” Republican-controlled 
eightieth Congress with strong Democratic majorities in the eighty-fi rst. He 
sent the new Congress his proposed budget for fi scal year 1950, starting July 
1, 1949, with a level $14.3 billion requested for defense – less than half what 
the military services had originally sought.
He fi red his fi rst secretary of defense, James Forrestal, in March and 
replaced him with a politically ambitious lawyer, Louis Johnson, who proved 
eager to limit military spending. Truman strengthened Johnson’s hand by 
forcing Congress to pass a new law giving the secretary of defense much 
greater control over the Pentagon and its budgets. The president also quelled 
the “revolt of the admirals” by replacing the Navy Secretary and the Chief 
of Naval Operations.
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Abroad, Truman strengthened Europe against Stalin’s probes with the 
creation of NATO and continued aid through the Marshall Plan. The Soviet 
leader ended his eleven-month blockade of West Berlin and acquiesced in 
the establishment of a West German government. In Asia, however, the 
United States washed its hands of the failing Kuomintang government in 
China as its leaders retreated offshore to Formosa (Taiwan). American forces 
also withdrew from South Korea, since that peninsula was deemed outside 
the redrawn US “defense perimeter” in Asia.
And then, in September 1949, things fell apart. The comfortable 
assumptions driving US policy proved faulty and the political challenges 
became signifi cant. Even so, it would take another 14 months – and shocking, 
border-crossing aggression in Korea – before Truman fully embraced and 
fought for the full-scale rearmament that allowed America to reach a standoff 
in Asia and more broadly in the Cold War with the Soviet Union.
New team, new priorities
Harry Truman believed that presidents should be decisive, truly in charge 
of their administrations, and willing to accept responsibility. The sign on 
his desk echoed his view: “the buck stops here.” He was respectful of 
senior military offi cers, but not intimidated by them. Even during his tough 
reelection fi ght in 1948, he did not hesitate to impose racial integration on 
the armed forces or tough budget limits. In a May 13, 1948 meeting with 
Defense Secretary James Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he insisted 
that the fi scal year 1950 defense budget be kept within $15 billion, despite 
their pleas for more. The president also handed his military leaders a formal 
memo, concluding: 
As Commander in Chief I expect these orders to be carried out whole-
heartedly, in good spirit and without mental reservation. If anyone 
present has any questions or misgivings concerning the program I have 
outlined, make your views known now – for once this program goes 
forward offi cially, it will be the administration program, and I expect 
every member of the administration to support it fully, both in public 
and in private.4 
After his surprising election victory, he was even more determined to maintain 
fi scal discipline on the armed forces. Despite the ongoing Berlin blockade 
and the communist military successes in China, Truman insisted on further 
cuts. He met with the JCS and their civilian bosses on December 9, 1948 and 
listened politely, but refused to relent. After an hour’s discussion, he changed 
the subject. “Thanks, boys”, he said. “I used to be a judge in Kansas City and 
found a couple of bottles of bourbon. Let’s have a drink.”5
Harry Truman was direct and unpretentious, self-confi dent while recog-
nizing his limitations. He had military experience as an artillery captain in 
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the First World War and remained active in the army reserve. He retained a 
soldier’s prejudice against the other services, however, noting in 1948 that 
“The air boys are for glamour and the navy as always is the greatest of 
propaganda machines.” In 1950 he had to apologize publicly for saying, in 
a letter to a Republican congressman, that the Marine Corps was only “the 
Navy’s police force” and that he intended to keep it that way, despite the fact 
that it had “a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin’s.”6
It’s important to remember that there was no Defense Department in 
early 1949. There was a Pentagon and a Secretary of Defense with a small 
staff of about 150 professionals.7 The Secretary presided over – but didn’t 
really control – the strangely named National Military Establishment – NME 
– and the real powers in the Pentagon were the Service Secretaries, who had 
large staffs, established traditions, cabinet rank, and statutory membership 
on the National Security Council. In one of the ironies of history, the fi rst 
Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, had fought efforts to create a strong 
position and then suffered the consequences of its weakness. By 1949 he was 
ready to support much greater power for the post.
Truman’s 1950 fi scal year budget, sent to Congress on January 10, allowed 
only $14.3 billion for defense. And he said that fi gure would stay level for 
“the foreseeable future.” He held several meetings with the military leaders 
in subsequent months in order to remind them of the need for a united front 
in support of his program. To help enforce discipline on the unhappy Chiefs, 
the president brought in General Dwight D. Eisenhower to be the “presiding 
offi cer” over the JCS, and he replaced Forrestal with the more compliant 
Louis Johnson. Eisenhower shared Truman’s concerns about the budget. He 
confi ded to his diary that the president should be tough on the Chiefs. The 
general began his new duties on January 24 by giving the Chiefs a pep talk, 
urging them to be tough on themselves as well as on the other services. He 
got them to agree to work within the proposed budget.8 
Louis Johnson had been a vigorous advocate of rearmament when he 
was Assistant Secretary of War during 1937–40. By 1948, he was politically 
active and ambitious, raising $2 million for Truman’s reelection campaign. 
Rewarded with the Pentagon post, he joined in preaching fi scal discipline. 
In a speech to the National War College, he said that the armed forces had 
“to provide honest value for the dollars” they received, since those funds 
competed with “revenues for measures dedicated to the health, progress 
and social welfare of the American people.” The challenge, he said, was to 
fi nd a balance that deterred aggression “without militarizing the nation or 
bankrupting it in the ordeal.”9 
The new defense secretary practiced what he preached by canceling the 
Navy’s new aircraft carrier and insisting on further cuts in military spending. 
This provoked what was dubbed “the revolt of the admirals”, but what in 
fact was a deeper debate over US military strategy. 
America’s armed forces were demobilized and cut back following the 
Second World War. The 1945 force of 12 million men and women had shrunk 
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to 1.4 million in 1948, an 88 percent cut. Defense spending had fallen 89 
percent, from $83.3 billion in 1945 to $9.1 billion in 1948.10 The army and 
the navy were locked into what they viewed as a life or death struggle with 
the newly established air force, the service which offered the glamour of new 
technology and the promise of military victory through strategic bombing.
The navy pinned its hopes on carrier-based aircraft and had already 
laid the keel on its 65,000-ton super carrier, United States, just fi ve days 
before Secretary Johnson cancelled the program on April 23, 1949. The 
Navy Secretary resigned in protest, while the admirals stayed and started 
a counterattack. They complained openly of inadequate budgets and low 
morale. They orchestrated an attack on the air force and its B-36 program, 
which led to the dramatic congressional hearings described below. And they 
challenged the emerging US strategy of nuclear deterrence.
Lacking a capability to launch atom-bomb-carrying aircraft, navy leaders 
began arguing that such weapons were immoral as well as indecisive. Admiral 
Arthur Radford, later to become JCS Chairman under President Eisenhower 
and a defender of Ike’s “massive retaliation” strategy, in 1949 argued, “I 
do not believe that the threat of atomic blitz will be an effective deterrent 
to a war, or that it will win a war.” He went on to say that “the threat of 
instant atomic retaliation will not prevent [war], and it may even invite it.” 
Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie went further, calling the bombing of urban 
areas “contrary to our fundamental ideals”, and declaring strategic bombing 
“contradictory … to fundamental ideals, policies, and commitments of the 
United States.”11 
The air force defended its programs and its strategy to enthusiastic 
audiences. A month before the super carrier was cancelled, the air force 
dramatically revealed its new in-fl ight refueling technique by fl ying a B-
50 bomber around the world non-stop. The medium range B-50 was a 
modernized version of the B-29 of the Second World War. The air force also 
announced that one of its new, top priority long-range bombers, the B-36, 
had made a successful 9,600 mile nonstop fl ight, carrying a load equivalent 
to an atomic bomb for 5,000 miles, thus demonstrating an ability to strike 
distant targets and return to base. A few days later the press carried leaked 
reports of an air force presentation pinpointing seventy strategic targets in 
the Soviet Union that could be hit by B-36s on non-stop return fl ights from 
North America.12 These events helped to solidify US public and congressional 
opinion in support of the air force and its capabilities. 
Truman and Johnson tried to restrain the inter-service rivalry and to 
maintain a balanced military force. The president impounded funds added 
to his budget by Congress to build more planes for the air force. He also 
acted to preserve his options regarding nuclear strategy by keeping both 
the physical custody as well as the operational control of atomic weapons 
in civilian hands until after the start of the Korean War. The new defense 
secretary tried to muzzle the military with his Consolidation Directive No. 
1, centralizing security review procedures in his offi ce. He also slashed 
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service public information staffs by 90 percent, transferring many of the 
people to his own departmental staff. He even maintained leverage over the 
civilian service secretaries by keeping their pro forma letters of resignation, 
submitted when he assumed offi ce, on fi le for possible later use.13 
In the spring of 1949, with the super carrier cancelled and the Berlin 
blockade lifted, Johnson demanded additional cuts in budget plans for fi scal 
year 1951. He bragged publicly that he was cutting another billion dollars 
in waste and duplication from the Pentagon budget and insisted internally 
that the Chiefs cut another $1.4 billion from their programs to bring the 
new budget to $13 billion. The Chiefs reluctantly complied.14 A few months 
later, when the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, was 
insuffi ciently supportive of the administration in congressional testimony, 
Johnson relieved him of his command. The Navy Secretary admonished 
the CNO with sharp words: “A military establishment is not a political 
democracy. Integrity of command is indispensable at all times. There can 
be no twilight zone in the measure of loyalty to superiors and respect for 
authority existing between various offi cial ranks.”15
The impact of these actions, Mark Perry has written, was that “the JCS 
was stunned into paralysis.”16 For good or ill, civilian control was complete. 
In fact, Harry Truman had a strategy which was far more comprehensive 
than the Chiefs, or the public, seemed to realize. His goal was to contain 
communism, “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation 
by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” He fi rst announced this 
Truman Doctrine in his message to Congress proposing aid to Greece and 
Turkey in March 1947. But the means he chose were military and economic 
aid to threatened nations rather than an increase in US military capabilities. 
He followed this narrowly focused military assistance program with the 
comprehensive economic aid program named after the enormously popular 
former general and then secretary of state, George C. Marshall.  
Under these programs, the State Department budget surged to levels never 
achieved before or since. In 1949 the United States spent 53 cents on foreign 
aid for every dollar spent on defense, and together defense and foreign aid 
accounted for one half of the federal budget. In 1950, before the Korean 
War, nonmilitary programs were equal to one-third of the Pentagon budget. 
In 2006, by contrast, even before counting the costs of war in Iraq, the 
Pentagon gets 12 times as much as the United States spends on international 
programs for security and development.17
Geographically, Truman’s strategy put Europe fi rst. That was where 
US leaders feared Soviet probes, where local communist parties still had 
large followings. China was seen as lost to the communists despite the best 
American efforts to shore up the crumbling Kuomintang government under 
Chiang Kai-shek. America’s defense perimeter in Asia ran through Japan 
and the Philippines, and excluded Korea until it was actually attacked. The 
keystone in the strategy was the treaty establishing the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, NATO, pledging each member to defend all the others, signed 
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on April 4, 1949 and ratifi ed by the US Senate on July 21. This strategy 
refl ected and sustained an unusual level of bipartisan support.
 Congress and national security strategy
Although the legislative branch shared Truman’s antipathy to communism 
and his desire for fi scal discipline, it asserted independent views on many 
aspects of policy. Congress was slow to enact the Marshall Plan, delaying 
fi nal action until just after the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 
1948. Legislators remained uneasy about supporting what could be labeled 
foreign aid, since such programs ranked low in public opinion. Even today, 
Americans seem to believe that US aid programs amount to 10 percent to 15 
percent of the federal budget, instead of the one percent actual fi gure. And 
public opinion remains hostile to “foreign aid.”18 
Congress was unifi ed over the defense of Europe but divided over Asia 
policy. There was a large “China lobby” that supported Chiang Kai-shek and 
demanded substantial US diplomatic and material assistance to his crumb-
ling anticommunist government. The House of Representatives defeated, 
however, a modest aid program for Korea, requested as US troops were with-
drawing from the peninsula. 
Like the public it represented, Congress was enthusiastic about air power, 
seeing atomic weapons as the ultimate defense. Air power advocates favored 
a minimum of 70 groups for nuclear deterrence and war-fi ghting, compared 
to the 45 groups then in existence. In 1948, Truman had approved 55 
“limited strength” groups and another 15 “skeleton” units. Later that year 
the then-Republican Congress overwhelmingly approved a 66-group force 
and added $1 billion for additional aircraft. Truman refused to spend the 
extra money.19 
Democrats regained control of Congress after the 1948 elections. They 
went from a 45–51 vote minority status in the Senate to a 54–42 majority. 
In the House, they surged from a 188–246 minority to a 263–171 majority. 
The eighty-fi rst Congress got along well with the president, who held weekly 
meetings with the leaders and engaged in frequent phone calls.20 Although 
Truman had strong views on presidential prerogatives, he was otherwise 
solicitous of and deferential to legislative sensitivities. Both parties had 
conservative and liberal wings, facilitating bipartisan majorities on defense 
and foreign policy as well as domestic programs.
Some members championed particular services and took sides in the rival-
ries raging in the Pentagon, but the most vocal were usually the ones trying 
to protect the most beleaguered, especially the navy and Marine Corps. 
Despite press reports that Truman had slashed the Chiefs’ budget requests 
in half and had even cut his defense secretary’s program by 15 percent, 
Secretary Forrestal was asked no questions during his 1949 budget testimony 
about what the higher fi gures would provide in added capabilities. Congress 
seemed content with the notion and the level of restraint. Even longtime 
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shipbuilding advocate Carl Vinson (D-Ga) supported cancellation of the 
super carrier because of the budget limitations.21
During consideration of the 1950 fi scal year budget, the House cut the 
navy request by three percent and army by fi ve percent while adding 17 
percent for the air force. The Senate restored a small portion of the cuts and 
rejected the air force add-ons. In conference, the two sides agreed to most of 
the air force increases within a modest three percent boost overall. Truman’s 
advisors said that the president could not refuse to spend the extra money, 
but he overruled them and impounded the funds.22 
Where the Congress was most infl uential, however, was in investigating 
military programs and in enacting signifi cant new legislation strengthening 
the secretary of defense. Rep. James Van Zandt (R-Pa), a naval reservist who 
had served in both world wars, made good use of his minority status to 
defend the navy and criticize the air force. Senior naval offi cers fed him 
materials which he used to expert advantage, gaining press coverage and 
forcing action by the Democrats. Claiming that the B-36 was vulnerable to 
enemy fi ghters, Van Zandt won House approval of a nonbinding resolution 
asking the Pentagon to conduct mock battles between the new bomber and 
navy fi ghters. He then introduced a resolution calling for a select committee 
to investigate charges of deception and mismanagement in the B-36 program. 
To deal with the fi restorm sparked by Van Zandt, House Armed Services 
Committee Chairman Carl Vinson announced detailed hearings into the 
matter.23 
Those hearings in August, 1949 exposed the navy’s propaganda campaign 
and solidifi ed support for the B-36. The navy civilian who had authored a 
widely reported document alleging scandalous charges about the bomber 
program and its management, concluding it was a “billion dollar blunder”, 
was summoned to testify and recanted his allegations. So complete was the 
air force victory in the hearings that the House committee unanimously 
approved a statement that there was no “one iota, not one scintilla of 
evidence … that would support charges or insinuations [of] collusion, fraud, 
corruption, infl uence or favoritism” in the B36 program.24 
On the question of reorganizing the Pentagon, Congress also asserted its 
powers over the military and against the wishes of the president. It recognized 
the problems caused by inter-service rivalries and the weak secretary of 
defense. In the National Security Act of 1947, the eightieth Congress had 
rejected Truman’s proposal for a strong secretary, siding instead with the 
navy’s idea of loose coordination and service autonomy. In 1949, however, 
Truman had new reorganization authority as a result of recommendations 
from the Hoover Commission, which had been established to fi nd ways to 
make government more effi cient. The president pressured Congress to enact 
new legislation by confronting them with an executive order unifying the 
services which would otherwise take effect. 
In May 1949, the Senate passed a measure, supported by the administration, 
establishing a formal Department of Defense and giving its secretary specifi c 
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power over the services. The bill empowered the secretary to reorganize the 
new department without further action by Congress. The bill also created 
the new post of Chairman of the JCS and named him the principal military 
advisor to the president and NSC. The measure also dropped the service 
secretaries from membership on the NSC.
Chairman Vinson opposed the new legislation but responded by offering 
amendments strengthening the legislature’s role in defense policymaking. He 
proposed language forbidding the creation of a general staff or of an overall 
chief of staff of the armed forces. His bill required the secretary to consult 
with the Senate and House Armed Services Committees before exercising 
transfer or consolidation authority and repealed the Hoover Commission 
reorganization authority for the new Department of Defense. Finally, Vinson 
insisted on language authorizing the service secretaries and chiefs of staff 
to present to Congress “after fi rst so informing the Secretary of Defense, 
any recommendation relating to the Department of Defense that he may 
deem proper.”25 Dwight Eisenhower later complained that this amounted 
to “legalized insubordination.” But the lawmakers wanted to avoid any 
muzzling of military offi cers.
Vinson won most of his provisions, but the secretary of defense won direct 
control over a consolidated department. Congress had asserted itself and 
preserved its ultimate authority over DOD structure and organization, and 
its shared control over military offi cers. Truman signed the new bill into law 
on August 10, 1949. That month was the high water mark in Truman’s effort 
to shrink the military establishment and avoid the costs of rearmament.
Bleak September
Events during the next month shattered many of the assumptions on which 
Truman’s national security policy had been based. In Asia, the Chiang 
Kai-shek forces retreated offshore to the island of Formosa, now known 
as Taiwan. The Chinese communists, led by Mao Tse-tung, proclaimed 
their new government on October 1. The US government had foreseen the 
collapse of anti-communist forces, despite strong US support over many 
years. Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a report to the NSC on February 
28, 1949, declaring, 
 it is now beyond question of doubt that any further military program 
for the Chinese mainland will in the foreseeable future (a) be ineffectual, 
(b) eventually contribute to the military strength of the Communists and 
(c) perhaps most important of all, solidify the Chinese people in support 
of the Communists ….26 
On June 16, the CIA predicted that “before the year is out, the Communists 
will have formed a central government which will seek international 
recognition.” The intelligence estimate argued that “The US cannot 
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reverse or signifi cantly check this course of events ….”27 Nevertheless, the 
establishment of a communist government under Stalin’s tutelage was an 
enormous defeat for US policy. It also sparked a “Who lost China?” debate 
in which the Republicans charged US offi cials with sympathy for and actions 
supporting the victorious communists. 
Even within the Truman administration there were differing approaches 
to the new circumstances, Defense Secretary Johnson called for an NSC 
effort to develop a “carefully considered and comprehensive plan” to 
contain communism in that region, thus creating a paper trail of internal 
doubt over Truman’s policy.28 This was only one of several disputes between 
the secretary of defense and the secretary of state. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
according to JCS Chairman, General Omar N. Bradley, sided with the China 
lobby in terms of providing limited military assistance to buy time.29 But in 
a formal memorandum of August 17, the Chiefs declared that “the strategic 
importance of Formosa does not justify overt military action … to prevent 
Communist domination ….”30 
All offi cials concurred in the decision to withdraw US troops from Korea 
by June 30, 1949, thereby leaving only diplomatic and military assistance 
missions and exemplifying the decision to exclude Korea from America’s 
defense perimeter in Asia. Meanwhile, the United States continued to 
occupy Japan pending the conclusion of a formal peace treaty, not achieved 
until 1951, and to maintain major bases in the Philippines, a former colony 
granted independence in 1946.
The most surprising and alarming event in September was the discovery 
that the Soviet Union had tested a nuclear weapon. On September 3, an air 
force weather reconnaissance plane on routine patrol picked up signs of 
abnormal radioactivity.31 Subsequent fl ights led to a determination that the 
Russians had exploded a bomb. 
In March 1948, the Joint Intelligence Committee had concluded that 
“The earliest date by which the Soviets may have exploded their fi rst test 
bomb is mid-1950” and that “The probable date … is mid-1953.” By 1955, 
the estimate concluded, the Soviets might have a stockpile of 50 atomic 
weapons.32 An intelligence assessment the previous May had concluded that 
a “deliberate Soviet resort to direct military action against the West during 
1949 is improbable.”33 There was no mention of the prospect of a Soviet 
A-bomb. Press reports in the fall of 1948 said that the JCS did not expect a 
Soviet test before 1952. 34
The Soviet bomb shattered the belief in American invulnerability. It meant 
that the United States had lost its nuclear monopoly, thus denying it leverage 
over others and giving Stalin a check on US action against him. It also meant 
that the time of genuine US vulnerability, when the Russians might have the 
capability for a devastating surprise attack on America, was only a few years 
away, in 1955. The Soviet Union was on the verge of becoming the world’s 
premier military force, combining massive ground forces with enough 
nuclear weapons to defend itself and to threaten others.
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The Cold War had many traumatic moments, when the dangers of direct 
confl ict were palpable or when the reassuring assumptions of the past 
were shattered by new realities. One such moment came in March 1947, 
when the United States realized that it had to act vigorously to prevent the 
further spread of communism in western Europe. Another came in February 
1948, when the communist coup in Czechoslovakia convinced American 
policymakers that the Kremlin was on the march and had to be stopped. Still 
another came when the Berlin blockade demonstrated the collapse of the 
Soviet–American agreement on the control of Germany and when the Berlin 
airlift proved that American air power could sustain a people struggling to 
remain free. Those were moments of anxiety rescued by years of hope. What 
happened in September, 1949, however, were changes in the geopolitical 
landscape – tectonic shifts in fact – that forced Americans to reassess basic 
policies.
The events that month also changed the domestic political environment, 
forcing Truman and his fellow Democrats onto the defensive. Critics charged 
that they had “lost” China – by trusting the communists and by failing to 
give enough support to the nationalists. They failed to prevent the Russians 
from getting the bomb and failed to know that the Soviet program was so far 
along. And they had failed to recognize the threat posed by communist agents 
and sympathizers inside America. The public’s surprise and sense of loss 
and fears of approaching dangers were seized upon by the administration’s 
political opponents. The bipartisanship which had bolstered policy toward 
Europe collapsed into recriminations over policy toward Asia. Conservative 
Democrats joined their Republican colleagues in demanding tougher 
measures against communists and fellow travelers. The political atmosphere 
had turned poisonous and would stay that way at least until Senator Joseph 
McCarthy’s fall from grace in 1954.
In the immediate aftermath of the September developments, however, 
Harry Truman held fast. The NSC repeated its commitment to a defense 
budget within the previously established $13 billion ceiling on September 
29.35 Truman repeated his action in 1948 by refusing to spend congressional 
add-ons for airplanes. The administration continued to distance itself from 
the Chinese nationalists on Formosa. 
The only military reaction to the Soviet detonation was a review of plans 
to develop a new more powerful bomb, “the super”, the hydrogen bomb, a 
weapon perhaps a thousand times more powerful than those that destroyed 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And despite the events of September, there was 
substantial opposition. The Atomic Energy Commission voted against the 
program. The nuclear scientists at Los Alamos, who built the fi rst atomic 
weapons, recommended against it on surprising moral grounds: they argued 
that true city-busters, killing orders of magnitude more civilians than the 
original A-bombs, would be immoral.
Sentiment in Congress was in favor of the new weapon. Truman also 
recognized the military and psychological benefi ts of the program. But what 
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made a go-ahead decision unavoidable was the concern that the Russians 
were likely to build their own super weapon as soon as they could. That 
concern was coupled with growing domestic fear of communist spies. On 
January 13, 1950 Klaus Fuchs, a German-born naturalized Briton who had 
worked on the weapons program at Los Alamos during and after the war, 
confessed to having provided the Russians with information on how to 
build an atomic bomb.36 On January 30, 1950, Harry Truman approved 
the program to develop the H-bomb. He also ordered a fundamental policy 
review, launching the process that would produce the seminal US strategy 
document, NSC 68.
NSC 68 Cabal 
Most of the literature on NSC 68, the policy paper which laid out America’s 
Cold War strategy of rearmament and containment, treats it as a far-sighted, 
consensus document which laid the foundation for decades to come. I think 
that the evidence points, instead, to an effort by a small group of rearmament 
zealots who were repeatedly rebuffed by the president and even the Congress 
until the Korean War made a military buildup unavoidable – and then their 
plan was the least worst of the alternatives.
Truman’s top secret directive to his secretaries of state and defense 
ordered them “to undertake a re-examination of our objectives in peace 
and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the 
light of the probable fi ssion bomb capacity and possible thermonuclear 
bomb capacity of the Soviet Union.”37 In fact, the new director of the 
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, had been pushing 
for such a review since the previous summer. He was concerned that the 
United States was not doing enough to build up its defenses, either for 
large-scale war or more limited war. He was especially troubled by a Joint 
Staff briefi ng that suggested US air forces were not expected to control the 
air in a third world war.38 
The Pentagon had resisted any reexamination of policy because it 
threatened its budget plans. Louis Johnson feared that the lid would come off 
his economy program. The defense secretary had also gone to great lengths to 
limit contacts with the state department by directing that all communications 
to that department be channeled through one of his deputies, Major General 
James H. Burns. For their own reasons, the JCS also ruled against having a 
JCS representative on the study group. They did allow three offi cers on the 
Joint Strategic Survey Committee to participate, but the men had no real 
authority to speak for the Chiefs.39 
The group worked hard over the next several weeks, developing the 
rationale for comprehensive rearmament to deal with the growing Soviet 
threat. Its initial report was a 66-page declaration of alarm, arguing that the 
USSR sought world domination, that it was developing the military capacity 
to achieve that goal, that even in 1950 it could attack and overrun Western 
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Europe and strike selected US targets with atomic weapons. The study group 
endorsed containment but questioned whether the United States was doing 
enough to be successful. Its report noted “a sharp disparity between our 
actual military strength and our commitments” and said that “our military 
strength is becoming dangerously inadequate.” It warned that the USSR 
could achieve the ability for a “decisive initial attack” by 1954 unless the 
United States greatly increased its military strength. The study group said 
that a continuation of current policies would force the United States “to 
shift to the defensive, or to follow a dangerous policy of bluff.” It ruled out 
isolation as ineffective and preventive war as immoral, then settled on the 
preferred course of action: “a rapid build-up of political, economic, and 
military strength in the free world.” To do this, the report acknowledged, 
would probably require substantial increases in military spending, reduction 
of domestic spending programs, and increased taxes.40 
The study group included no price tag in its report because the members 
could not agree on one and feared rejection of its views if the costs seemed 
unacceptable. The military participants thought in terms of a $5 billion 
increase in current levels, to $17 or $18 billion per year. But Nitze and his 
colleagues envisioned budgets at $35 billion or perhaps even $50 billion per 
year, compared to the current $13 billion ceiling.41 Also, no one from the 
Budget Bureau had been included in the deliberations.
On March 22, 1950, Acheson convened a meeting with Johnson and 
the study group at the State Department. Nitze outlined the paper and its 
conclusions while Johnson listened, tilting back in his chair. “Suddenly he 
lunged forward”, Acheson later wrote, “with a crash of chair legs on the 
fl oor and fi st on the table, scaring me out of my shoes. No one, he shouted, 
was going to make arrangements for him to meet with another Cabinet 
offi ce and a roomful of people and be told what he was going to report 
to the President.” He gathered his people and stalked out of the room. An 
NSC representative told the President, who immediately called Acheson to 
express his outrage and tell him to carry on with the project.42 
Johnson was angry that such extensive interagency meetings had been 
conducted contrary to his instructions. He was also upset that the paper 
confl icted with established policies. He believed that the State Department 
was out to undermine his programs at Defense. But while Johnson was away 
for nearly a week at a NATO meeting, the report was circulated widely in 
the Pentagon and given unanimous approval by the JCS and the three service 
secretaries. When Johnson returned, confronted by the widespread support 
for the report, he joined in signing it to send to the President on April 7. 
Since the paper was only rhetoric, he could fi ght the budget fi ghts another 
day.43 
Nitze briefed the president’s staff with mixed results. The special counsel 
was alarmed by the Soviet threat while the budget director held fast to his 
conviction that the economy could not tolerate huge defense increases. 
He also briefed Senator Walter George (D-Ga), chairman of the Finance 
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Committee and a senior Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, but 
the senator remained unconvinced of the need for radical change.44 
The president temporized. He was not ready to endorse full-scale 
rearmament, saying “I will not buy a pig in a poke.” Instead, on April 12 
he sent the report to his economic advisors in the Budget Bureau, Council 
of Economic Advisors, and Secretary of the Treasury for cost estimates.45 
Further evidence of Truman’s thinking came in a May 4 news conference, 
when he was asked about the need for increasing military spending. “The 
defense budget next year will be smaller than it is this year”, he responded, 
“and we are continually cutting it by economies. And we are not alarmed in 
any sense of the word. We are simply maintaining a defense program that is 
adequate for the defense of this country.”46 
Four days later the president’s Council of Economic Advisors reported to 
the NSC that “substantial new programs could be undertaken without serious 
threat to our standards of living, and without risking a transformation of the 
free character of our economy. Yet the adoption of such programs would 
create major problems of economic and social policy.”47 Meanwhile, Johnson 
permitted his military planners to develop cost fi gures without regard to 
any particular ceiling. They were given a July 1 deadline for their fi rst fl ash 
estimates. To meet that deadline, the JCS packaged each service’s programs 
into a $50 billion fi rst-year estimate.48 By then, however, the United States 
faced a hot war in Korea.
Korea shock 
As late as June 1, 1950, Truman discounted fears of a growing Soviet threat 
and the danger of war. When asked at a news conference about public 
opinion polls saying that a majority of Americans expected a war within 
fi ve years, the president replied, “I don’t agree with that at all. I am doing 
everything I possibly can to prevent any war of any kind and to make the 
United Nations operate for a permanent peace in the world. I think we are 
closer to that now than we have been in the last 5 years.”49  
Three weeks later, North Korean forces charged across the thirty-
eighth parallel, challenging Truman’s assumptions and confronting the US 
government with diffi cult decisions about its regional and global policies. 
American offi cials had not expected war in Korea. The US ambassador had 
warned that the North Koreans had “undeniable materiel superiority” that 
would provide the “margin of victory” in the case of an invasion. But the 
head of the US military assistance mission reported that the South Korean 
troops were better trained and equipped than those in the North – and 
Washington policymakers preferred to believe the optimistic assessments.50 
US offi cials also shared a general consensus that Korea was not important 
to the United States. The decision to withdraw US troops had been made 
two years earlier, and the JCS had reaffi rmed that policy, concluding that 
Korea was of “little strategic value to the United States” and that any military 
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commitment there would be “ill advised.”51 But once troops crossed the line 
dividing communist from noncommunist regions, American leaders believed 
they had to respond to the new aggression as they had failed to do in the 
1930s. The attack was a challenge to the international order established in 
1945 and based on the United Nations and its Charter. 
Acheson’s fi rst action after consulting with Truman was to call for a UN 
Security Council meeting on the crisis. And within 27 hours of the start of 
the invasion, the Security Council passed a resolution urging a cessation 
of hostilities and North Korean withdrawal to the thirty-eighth parallel. 
Most signifi cantly, the resolution determined that a breach of the peace had 
occurred and called upon UN members “to render every assistance to the 
United Nations in the execution of this resolution.” This was the legal trigger 
for international use of force. The council avoided a Soviet veto because the 
Soviet delegate was boycotting the UN in protest of its refusal to seat the 
new Chinese communist government in place of the Chinese nationalists.52 
Despite American concern about aggression, its policy toward the Korean 
confl ict was tempered by other considerations. Many US offi cials doubted 
the reliability of the South Korean government under Syngman Rhee and 
had limited US military aid so as not to give Rhee a capability to attack the 
North. And most US policymakers still believed that the greatest and most 
likely threat to US interests would come from the Soviet Union and into 
Western Europe. Some feared that the Korean attacks were a diversionary 
effort, intended by Moscow to get so committed to a land war in Asia that it 
could not respond to Soviet probes in Europe.53 
As JCS Chairman General Bradley said in Truman’s fi rst meeting with his 
advisors on June 25, “We must draw the line somewhere.” He believed Korea 
“offered as good [an] occasion for action in drawing the line as anywhere 
else.”54 The president asked for a review of where the Soviet Union might 
next strike – for the Soviets were believed to be behind the North Korean 
attack.
Truman made clear his own assessment in his fi rst meeting with congres s-
ional leaders on June 27. “This act was very obviously inspired by the Soviet 
Union”, he said. “If we let Korea down, the Soviets will keep right on going 
and swallow up one piece of Asia after another. We had to make a stand some 
time, or else let all of Asia go by the board. If we were to let Asia go, the Near 
East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe.”55 
At fi rst, despite the president’s initial reaction that aggression had to be 
resisted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff resisted the idea of ground force support 
to the South Koreans. Air and naval support yes, but not ground troops. 
General Bradley and his colleagues argued that such action would require 
a large-scale mobilization. As late as June 28, the Chiefs still opposed the 
commitment of ground troops. On June 29 they agreed to a limited use of 
ground troops, but only to secure a defense perimeter around the southern 
port of Pusan, either to funnel aid to the South Koreans or, as they more 
likely felt, to ensure the safe evacuation of Americans. They did not envision 
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using soldiers along the front in the north. But when MacArthur, in a 3am 
teleconference with Army Chief Collins on June 30, demanded permission to 
move one regimental combat team into Korea as a prelude to a two division 
force, Collins called the Army Secretary, who called the President at 5am and 
secured a favorable decision.56 The military situation had deteriorated too 
quickly, and there was no other alternative to prevent a communist victory.
Later that day, Truman met with his advisors and later with congressional 
leaders to tell them of his decision to send US forces to repel the invaders and 
restore peace on the peninsula. He also ordered a blockade of the Korean 
coast. The president linked his actions to the UN Security Council’s request 
for support to Korea in a resolution passed on June 27, the second measure 
on the confl ict approved in the absence of the Soviet delegate.
Meeting with congressional leaders, the president found broad support for 
his actions. In his fi rst session on the crisis, on June 27, Truman indicated that 
he did not expect to commit ground troops. He also explained his decisions 
to send the seventh fl eet to defend Formosa and to increase military aid to 
the Philippines and the French in Indochina. In answer to a question about 
the possible need to expand the navy, Secretary Johnson said the Chiefs were 
already at work on a balanced expansion plan for the armed services if that 
became necessary.57 
On June 30, when he told the legislators of his decision on combat troops, 
he received questions and suggestions about getting other nations involved 
under the UN umbrella. Sen. Kenneth Wherry (R-Neb), the minority fl oor 
leader, complained that Congress ought to be consulted before moves like 
this. “I just had to act as Commander-in-chief ”, Truman said, “and I did.” 
Wherry repeated his concern that Congress ought to be consulted before any 
large scale actions. Truman said, “If there is any necessity for congressional 
action, I will come to you. But I hope we can get those bandits in Korea 
suppressed without that.”58
Those exchanges triggered a series of administration meetings on the que-
stion of asking for congressional action. Pentagon offi cials drew up drafts 
declaring support for the US actions taken but not containing words like 
“authorize” or “declare war.” In a July 3 meeting, joined by the Senate 
majority leader, Scott McLucas of Illinois, Acheson urged Truman to make 
an address to Congress and accept, but not propose, a resolution of support. 
McLucas saw no need to call the Congress back from its short July 4 recess 
and noted that things were going well on the Hill regarding Korea. He was 
also concerned that a presidential appearance would seem to be asking for 
a declaration of war, and that other issues – like Formosa and Indochina 
– might lead to a prolonged debate.59 
Truman decided to send a written message to Congress on July 19, 
followed by an evening speech to the nation. The president labeled the attack 
in Korea as “naked, deliberate, unprovoked aggression.” He noted that his 
actions to defend Korea were based “on the unanimous advice of our civil 
and military authorities.” He acknowledged, “Under all the circumstances, it 
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is apparent that the United States is required to increase its military strength 
and preparedness” both in Korea and elsewhere. He also said “it will be 
necessary for a number of years to support continuing defense expenditures, 
including assistance to other nations, at a higher level than we had previously 
planned.” He called for increased taxes and authority to prioritize domestic 
production.60 
Despite these words, Truman delayed until December actually endorsing 
the full-scale, long-term rearmament plans envisioned by NSC 68. In July and 
August, he sent Congress supplemental appropriations requests for $11.6 
billion for defense and $4 billion in foreign military assistance, 87 percent of 
which was earmarked for NATO. But Truman told his new budget director in 
July that he didn’t want to be “putting any more money than necessary at this 
time in the hands of the Military.” And even George Marshall, recalled to be 
Secretary of Defense after Truman fi red Louis Johnson in September, wanted 
to keep pressure on Pentagon expenditures because he was concerned that 
“these great expenditures will not be supported over the fi ve-year program 
by the American people.”61 
On September 30, at a meeting with the NSC, Truman approved the 
conclusions of the NSC 68 paper “as a statement of policy to be followed 
over the next four or fi ve years” but deferred action on the rest of the report, 
including a table of expenditures suggesting $44 billion to $54 billion defense 
budgets for the next four years. The president wanted cost estimates to be 
more fi rmly developed.62 As late as November 22, Marshall argued for a 
slower buildup than Acheson proposed, saying that a steady pace was better 
“than building up a mountain and then sliding off.”63 
Congress approved the July and August supplemental requests speedily 
and without cuts. Just after the start of the war it had completed action on 
a two year extension of the draft, dropping a previously approved provision 
permitting callups only if Congress had declared a national emergency. On 
September 1, the legislators approved the Defense Production Act, giving the 
president authority to allocate materials and facilities for defense production 
and to impose wage and price controls if necessary.64 
From the start of the confl ict, there was strong bipartisan support for 
aiding South Korea. Republicans tried to score points, however, by suggesting 
that failure to oppose communists in China had invited this latest attack. 
Senate Republicans caucused on June 26 and announced their support for 
maximum aid to South Korea in terms of equipment but said the United 
States had no obligation to go to war itself. They were highly supportive 
of Truman’s statement about defending Formosa. When Truman decided to 
commit ground troops, he received additional support, with Sen. Wherry 
applauding that “at long last” the president had taken a “strong stand” 
against the “Red tide.”65
Congress was also eager to fi ght the Red tide at home. Hearings had 
exposed communist party members and Soviet spies. High level offi cials 
were accused of helping the communists in China and the Soviet Union. 
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Alger Hiss had been convicted of perjury in an espionage case in January 
1950, the same month that Klaus Fuchs confessed giving the Russians atomic 
bomb secrets and that ten offi cials of the US Communist Party went on trial 
for advocating the overthrow of the government. On February 9, Sen. Joseph 
McCarthy (R-Wisc.) claimed to have a list of 205 communists still working 
in the State Department, thereby sparking a four-year campaign of smears 
and accusations.
The biggest domestic policy debate in the summer of 1950 was over the 
proposed Internal Security Act, which Truman felt compelled to veto on 
September 22 because of vague yet far-reaching language. The president 
called the law “unnecessary, ineffective and dangerous.” The legislation 
authorized the emergency detention of people thought to be likely to 
conspire with others for espionage or sabotage and barred members of 
communist-front organizations from jobs in defense facilities or with the 
Federal Government.66 
Republican leader Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) had declared even before 
the Korean War that the 1950 congressional elections would be fought on 
the three issues of “socialism, spending, and softness toward communism.”67 
By the time of the November balloting, communism topped the list and led 
to the defeat of several prominent Democrats, including Senate majority 
leader McLucas. The Democrats lost fi ve seats in the Senate, leaving them 
with a nominal 2-seat majority. They lost 28 seats in the House, cutting 
their majority from 95 to 35. And this was before the war turned from near 
victory into a stunning setback.
Command, control, and MacArthur 
There were surprisingly few disputes between the president and his military 
leaders in the fi rst six months of the war. The Chiefs had been disappointed 
in the earlier budget cutbacks by Secretary Johnson, but they worked 
cooperatively with him in responding to the military situation and in 
developing the budget supplementals. The Chiefs also felt that they could 
approach the president directly and did so several times, end-running the 
secretary of defense. Once Marshall succeeded Johnson, the senior civilian 
leaders had a very close and cooperative relationship, and this made it easier 
on the Chiefs.68 The Chiefs also had few if any split papers or disagreements 
among themselves as the confl ict proceeded.69
“President Truman never interfered with military operations”, Army 
Chief of Staff General Collins said, “but in the Korean war … he was deeply 
committed personally and wished to be kept constantly informed.”70 The 
president had approved a directive giving the Chiefs “general direction of 
all combat operations.”71 They were the point of contact with MacArthur, 
the source of precise orders to the theater commander and the channel for 
requests for decision by the president. Only after the massive intervention by 
Chinese troops in November did the President insist on personal and prior 
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clearance, by himself and the secretary of defense, of all messages from the 
JCS to MacArthur.72
Truman asked and depended on the Chiefs for military advice. That advice 
became somewhat easier to provide after General Bradley became the fi rst 
formal Chairman of the JCS and during the war met with Truman almost 
every morning. The Chiefs consulted regularly with State Department offi cials 
once Johnson was gone and the fi rewall between departments removed, but 
they provided the key military advice in Washington. As Paul Hammond 
concluded, “Although the difference between a civil and a military viewpoint 
was thus sometime drawn, it did not divide the Defense Department; and it 
was a difference without contentious disputes, at least among the civil and 
the military in the executive branch in Washington. The disagreements … 
involved Washington-fi eld relations rather than inter-service confl ict.”73 
In the fi eld was the imposing presence of General Douglas MacArthur, 
hero of the war in the Pacifi c, pacifi er of Japan, and former Army Chief of 
Staff in the 1930s. MacArthur, as a fi ve-star General of the Army, outranked 
all of his nominal superiors in Washington until Truman and Congress 
rewarded Bradley with a fi fth star on September 18, 1950. MacArthur knew 
how to orchestrate favorable press coverage, and he ignored presidential 
orders intended to muzzle him. He maintained close contacts with Repub-
lican political fi gures, who became a conduit for many of his criticisms of 
administration policy. And he knew how to force favorable decisions from 
his chain of command by sending urgent cables predicting dire consequences 
if his requests were not immediately granted. His June 30 request for the 
introduction of ground combat troops, for example, claimed that that was 
“the only assurance of holding the present line, and the ability to regain 
later lost ground.” When General Collins said he would have to ask the 
president, MacArthur responded, “Time is of the essence. And a clear-cut 
decision without delay is imperative.”74 That led to the 5am call to Truman.
In November, when the president cancelled an unauthorized air strike 
planned against Yalu River bridges, MacArthur fi red back that enemy forces 
were “pouring” across those bridges. “This movement not only jeopardizes 
but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command.” 
MacArthur went on to tell the Chiefs that “your instructions may well 
result in a calamity of major proportions for which I cannot accept the 
responsibility.”75 Truman backed down.
That incident and several others where MacArthur disregarded orders or 
spoke out publicly in contravention of offi cial policy ultimately led Truman to 
relieve the popular general of command in April 1951. But in the fi nal months 
of 1950, MacArthur was untouchable. He planned and carried out the risky 
Inchon landing, the surprisingly successful amphibious attack in September 
behind North Korean lines, despite strong doubts on the part of the Chiefs. 
He objected to constraints on his operations near or over the Chinese border 
and dismissed the likelihood of massive Chinese intervention. The Chiefs 
deferred to MacArthur both because of his seniority and experience and 
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because they believed that commanders in the fi eld usually knew best. As 
General Bradley said, “General MacArthur is a man of long distinguished 
service, and experience, and I think it would be quite improper to try to tell 
him from here how exactly to dispose his divisions, and so we did not do 
so.”76 
The politicians in Washington were more suspicious of the famous 
general. In the very fi rst cabinet-level meeting of the war, Secretary Johnson 
recommended that any instructions to MacArthur “should be detailed so 
as not to give him much discretion.”77 Truman was always suspicious of 
MacArthur’s political ambitions and disdainful of the general’s pomposity. 
On his fl ight to his one and only meeting with MacArthur, on Wake Island 
on October 15, he wrote to his cousin, “I’ve a whale of a job before me. 
Have to talk to God’s right-hand man tomorrow ….”78 That was the meeting 
where the general reassured the president that “formal resistance will end 
throughout North and South Korea by Thanksgiving.” And he hoped “to be 
able to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas.” Truman asked, 
“What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?” MacArthur 
replied, “Very little …. We are no longer fearful of their intervention.”79 
Figure 7.1 Harry Truman meeting General Douglas MacArthur, 1950 (Truman 
Library)
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“An entirely new war” 
In late November, just after MacArthur launched what he called his fi nal 
offensive, the Americans discovered that tens of thousands of Chinese troops 
had infi ltrated Korea and were launching powerful attacks against allied 
forces. The general seemed to panic, cabling Washington that this was “an 
entirely new war.” He said that his command had “done everything humanly 
possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond 
its control and strength.” He said he would have to switch to defensive 
operations.80 
The Chinese intervention shocked policymakers in Washington as well. 
On November 28, Truman told his staff, “We’ve got a terrifi c situation on 
our hands.” While they sat in stunned silence, he told them of MacArthur’s 
message. “The Chinese have come in with both feet.” He decided to meet 
with the cabinet and ordered planning for another budget supplemental 
and a message declaring a national emergency.81 That afternoon, Marshall 
warned against getting “sewed up” in Korea or into a war with China. “To 
do this would be to fall into a carefully laid Russian trap. We should use 
all available political, economic, and psychological action to limit the war.” 
Acheson agreed. “We can’t defeat the Chinese in Korea. They can put in more 
than we can.”82 General Bradley believed that at this meeting the consensus 
fi nally developed that the long-pending recommendations of NSC 68 would 
have to be implemented, that rearmament would have to proceed even if 
Americans “had to give up such things as refrigerators and television”, in the 
words of NSC member Stuart Symington.83 
Troubled by the turn of events in Korea but decisive as always, Truman 
held a news conference on November 30 and spoke grimly of the prospects 
in Korea. “The battlefi eld situation is uncertain at this time”, he said. “We 
may suffer reverses as we have suffered them before.” He announced 
a three-fold plan of UN action in Korea, strengthening allies around the 
world, and rapidly increasing America’s military strength. At the end of the 
session with the press, Truman made a general statement that “We will take 
whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always 
have.” A reporter asked if that included the atomic bomb. “That includes 
every weapons that we have”, Truman responded, thereby setting off a trans-
Atlantic fi restorm that prompted an emergency visit by the British Prime 
Minister.84 
In fact, Truman had always maintained tight presidential control over 
nuclear weapons. They were in civilian custody until after the start of 
the Korean War. Even then, on July 30, Truman allowed the dispersal of 
non-nuclear components for the bombs for storage in Guam. But General 
Bradley’s message to MacArthur noted that it would take a presidential 
decision, and 72 hours for shipment of nuclear components, before such 
weapons could be employed.85 
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On December 1, Truman sent Congress a special message requesting 
$16.8 billion in additional military funds, bringing the total for the year to 
$41.8 billion. He listed the improvements in US defense capabilities already 
achieved and said the new funds were for military improvements world-
wide. This “is not a war budget”, he said. “That would obviously require far 
more money.” It merely provided the basis for possible mobilization if that 
became necessary.86 Congress approved the extra funds before adjourning on 
January 2, 1951, following a delay over funds for 50 cargo ships favored by 
the Senate and opposed by the House.87  
Two weeks later, the president declared a national emergency and spoke 
gravely to the nation. “Our homes, our Nation, all the things we believe in, 
are in great danger”, he said. “This danger has been created by the rulers 
of the Soviet Union.” He went on to note that “The danger we face exists 
not only in Korea … but Europe and the rest of the world are also in very 
great danger.” Truman detailed the increased fi gures of military personnel 
and weapons production, then warned of higher taxes, credit controls, and 
reduced nonmilitary expenditures.88  
On December 14, the day before his nationwide address, the president 
formally approved the top secret policy paper, NSC 68/4, setting forth 
“an effort to achieve, under the shield of a military build-up, an integrated 
political, economic, and psychological offensive designed to counter the 
current threat to the national security posed by the Soviet Union.”89 This 
was the fi nal blueprint for the policy of containment and the programs of 
military rearmament to fi ght the Cold War. 
Although the Korean War provided the occasion for rearmament, the 
policy had been advocated long before that confl ict because of the belief that 
the Soviet Union had aggressive intentions. An August 25, 1950 NSC report 
warned that the attack in Korea “could be interpreted as the fi rst phase of a 
general Soviet plan for global war.” The document noted that the Kremlin 
would likely wait “until such time as the United States had reached the point 
of maximum diversion and attrition of its forces-in-being ….” The report 
suggested that the USSR might consider action in such places as “Finland, 
Korea, the Near and Middle East, and the Balkans.”90 On December 5, a 
National Intelligence Estimate concluded, “The Soviet rulers have resolved 
to pursue aggressively their world-wide attack on the power position of 
the United States regardless of the possibility that global war might result 
…. Further direct or indirect Soviet aggression in Europe and Asia is likely, 
regardless of the outcome of the Korean situation.”91 The next day, the JCS 
were suffi ciently concerned that they sent a personal “war warning” message 
to all theater commanders. “The JCS consider that the current situation in 
Korea has greatly increased the possibility of general war.”92  
Since Europe had, all along, been the area of greatest concern to US 
policymakers – except MacArthur – it is signifi cant that the decisions on 
rearmament included greater forces for the defense of Europe – and the 
actual deployment of troops to that continent. On September 9, Truman had 
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announced plans to substantially increase the number of US forces stationed 
in Europe. The JCS had wanted to shift two divisions from Asia to Europe 
as soon as Korea stabilized. And on December 19, after several weeks of 
delay, Truman announced the appointment of General Dwight Eisenhower 
as the new Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, the head of all the NATO 
troops.93 The war hero who shared Truman’s vision of strategy and who had 
long practiced deference to civilian control was going back to Europe, while 
the other war hero, prickly and insubordinate, remained in Korea. 
That war stalemated. MacArthur was fi red and returned to ticker tape 
parades in America and standing ovations in Congress. Truman’s popularity 
plummeted, but it was Eisenhower, not MacArthur, who succeeded him in 
the White House. Meanwhile, the military buildup envisioned by Nitze and 
the Chiefs continued. By the end of Truman’s term, US military manpower 
had more than doubled, from the pre-war level of 1.5 million men and 
women to 3.6 million, and military spending as a share of GDP had nearly 
tripled, from 5 percent to 14.2 percent. America had rearmed.

Part III
The challenge of 
transformation

8 Theodore Roosevelt and 
military modernization
I will have no criticism of my Administration from you, or any other offi cer 
in the Army.
President Roosevelt to the Commanding General of the Army, 19011
If, during the years to come, any disaster should befall our arms, afl oat or 
ashore … the blame will lie upon the men whose names appear upon the roll-
calls of Congress on the wrong side of these great questions.” 
Governor Roosevelt in 1899 speech2 
Moderate in stature but brimming with radical ideas and outsized ambition 
for himself and his country, Theodore Roosevelt entered the White House 
with fi rm views on how to strengthen the American military. He brought to 
the presidency a breadth of understanding and experience rare for a 42-year-
old. As a student of history who wrote a well-regarded book on the naval 
aspects of the War of 1812, he appreciated the value of sea power and the 
advantages of technology. As the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the year 
before the Spanish–American War, he understood the ways of Washington 
bureaucracy. As a member of the National Guard and later a Colonel in 
combat in Cuba, he knew the frustrations of logistics and the terror and 
exhilaration of battle.
The story of civil–military relations under Theodore Roosevelt is a tale 
of bold ideas, experimentation, foot-dragging, and partial success. The new 
president was determined to modernize and strengthen the US armed forces 
so that they could bolster his expansionist foreign policy. He wanted to 
take full advantage of the emerging technologies which American industrial 
might was providing. As an exemplar of a younger generation, the fi rst post-
Civil War political leaders, he insisted on reshaping US military institutions 
and elevating bright, if iconoclastic, younger offi cers. These laudable goals, 
however, met powerful opponents: senior offi cers resistant to change and 
a Congress comfortable with its role and reluctant to cede power to the 
upstart president.
A sickly child, embarrassed that his own father had avoided combat in 
the Civil War by hiring a substitute, young Theodore seemed fascinated by 
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military things and ranked warlike qualities high in his table of virtues. He 
romanticized war, wished for war, and viewed peace “dull and effeminate”, 
as one biographer put it.3 Throughout his public service, he was a 
frequent commentator and vigorous advocate of US military strength and 
assertiveness.
One of the clearest expositions of his philosophy was in a speech at 
the Naval War College soon after becoming the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy in 1897. In it he set forth a detailed agenda for the armed forces 
and propounded themes that echoed throughout his life. He saw military 
strength as the means to achieve national greatness. 
“In this country there is not the slightest danger of an over-development 
of warlike spirit, and there never has been any such danger.”4
“This nation cannot stand still if it is to retain its self-respect.”5
“[W]e need a fi rst-class navy” that “should not be merely a navy for 
defense.”6
“It is necessary to have a fl eet of great battleships if we intended to live 
up to the Monroe Doctrine ….”7
“No master of the prize ring ever fought his way to supremacy by 
mere dexterity in avoiding punishment. He had to win by infl icting 
punishment.”8
“Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no force behind it; the 
diplomat is the servant, not the master, of the soldier.”9
In subsequent speeches, Roosevelt embraced the imperialism of the European 
powers and urged Americans to follow those examples. “We are a great nation 
and we are compelled, whether we will or not, to face the responsibilities 
that must be faced by all great nations”, he declared. “Where we have won 
entrance by the prowess of our soldiers we must deserve to continue by the 
righteousness, the wisdom, and the even-handed justice of our rule.”10 
He gathered around him men of ideas and accomplishment, often authors 
like himself. By 1890 he was in regular correspondence with other advocates 
of expansive nationalism and military preparedness like Alfred Thayer 
Mahan and Henry Cabot Lodge. They echoed and reinforced each other’s 
views, for they shared a common vision of America as a great power equal 
to the nations of Europe.11 They also succeeded in the political dialogue with 
the anti-imperialists and progressives who wanted America’s great national 
energies directed toward domestic reform.
Perhaps the most explicit articulation of his plans came, while he was still 
Governor of New York, in an April 10, 1899 speech to the Hamilton Club 
of Chicago, where he declared 
that our country calls not for the life of ease but for the life of strenuous 
endeavor. The twentieth century looms before us big with the fate of 
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ease and ignoble peace, if we shrink from the hard contests where men 
must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, 
then the bolder and stronger peoples will pass us by, and will win for 
themselves the domination of the world.
In this speech, he also said “Our army needs complete reorganization – not 
merely enlarging – and the reorganization can only come as the result of 
legislation. A proper general staff should be established, and the positions of 
ordnance, commissary and quartermaster offi cers should be fi lled by detail 
from the line.”12
Roosevelt anticipated that such changes would meet opposition in 
Congress, which he said “has shown a queer inability to learn some of the 
lessons of the [Spanish–American] war.” He warned that “If, during the years 
to come, any disaster should befall our arms, afl oat or ashore … the blame 
will lie upon the men whose names appear upon the roll-calls of Congress 
on the wrong side of these great questions.”13
The accidental president never doubted his abilities or his authority. “I 
believe in a strong executive; I believe in power”, he said.14 While he saw the 
necessity of working closely with the Legislative Branch on domestic issues, 
he felt differently about foreign policy. As he once told William Howard 
Taft, “You know as well as I do that it is for the enormous interest of this 
government to strengthen and give independence to the executive in dealing 
with foreign powers.”15 Never having served in a legislative body, he saw 
little need for compromise, particularly of his strongly held convictions. Yet 
he was a professional politician, who understood the necessity of building 
and maintaining, through consultation and patronage, a strong party 
organization.
Congress was comfortably in Republican control, but divided by sectional 
and substantive differences over Roosevelt’s programs. The House of 
Representatives during much of his presidency was under the iron rule of 
“Uncle Joe” Cannon, a domineering Speaker who ran a tight ship throughout 
the Roosevelt administrations. The president met frequently with Speaker 
Cannon, who used his offi ce as a clearing house to vet White House ideas. 
The Senate was controlled by “The Senate Four”, the powerful quartet of rich 
men – Aldrich of Rhode Island, Spooner of Wisconsin, Platt of Connecticut, 
and Allison of Iowa.16 They, too, met informally and worked collegially with 
the young president.
Reduced tariffs for products from Cuba and other newly acquired territories 
met the strongest congressional opposition, since tariffs were viewed as a 
domestic rather than foreign policy issue. When William Howard Taft, then 
governor of the Philippines, complained about Republican protectionists, 
the president strongly defended them. “With every one of these men I at 
times differ radically on important questions; but they are the leaders, and 
their great intelligence and power and their desire to do what is best for 
the government, make them not only essential to work with but desirable 
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to work with. Several of the leaders have special friends whom they desire 
to favor, or special interests with which they are connected and which they 
hope to serve. But, taken as a body, they are broad-minded and patriotic, as 
well as sagacious, skillful and resolute.”17
This was a time when congressional committees fashioned budgets 
through direct consultations with the executive departments, without much 
involvement of the White House. While presidents might, as Roosevelt did, 
recommend revised laws and new battleships, the key initiatives and follow-
through came from the cabinet members. The Legislative Branch took 
seriously its responsibilities to raise and support armies and provide and 
maintain a navy. And the Senate expected to give advice as well as consent 
to international agreements. 
The Senate’s Military Affairs Committee was chaired by Joseph Hawley 
of Connecticut, who was close to Secretary of War Root since both had 
graduated from Hamilton College. Every member of that committee had 
served in the Civil War, eight Republicans who had fought for the Union and 
four Democrats who served in the Confederate army.18
US armed forces were rebuilding after decades of neglect and trying 
to adjust to the new strategic situation following the Spanish–American 
War, which left the United States in charge of overseas territories and 
confronting competitive military powers in Europe and Asia. The army in 
1898 had been a dispersed and malcoordinated force of about 28,000 men. 
After surging above 200,000 to fi ght in Cuba, it was still an enlarged force 
of 85,000 when Roosevelt took the oath of offi ce. The navy, even smaller 
than that of Austria–Hungary or Turkey a decade earlier, was gaining new, 
modern warships each year, provided by a generous Congress. The 3,600-
man Marine Corps was seen as the navy’s onboard gunnery managers and 
offshore police force. It would soon grow into the navy’s army and be used 
repeatedly in military interventions in support of the Roosevelt Corollary 
to the Monroe Doctrine. It doubled in size by 1904 and was over 9,000 
when Roosevelt left offi ce.
Power struggle
Senior offi cials waged nonviolent but vicious guerrilla war against each other 
in the early years of the twentieth century. The Commanding General of the 
Army, Nelson A. Miles, was a celebrated offi cer who was much-wounded 
and decorated during the Civil War and later led forces to triumph over 
such Indian leaders as Chief Joseph, Geronimo, and Sitting Bull. As the 
senior serving offi cer, he became Commanding General on the mandatory 
retirement of his predecessor in 1895. Despite its title, that post had little 
real power. The Secretary of War ran the quasi-independent bureaus of the 
army in peacetime, and the president named fi eld commanders in wartime 
– as McKinley did in 1898, sidetracking Miles and letting Major General 
William R. Shafter command troops fi ghting in Cuba. 
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Tensions between the senior general and the Secretary of War had been so 
high, and so persistent, that two previous Commanding Generals had moved 
their headquarters away from Washington. Winfi eld Scott went to New York 
in the 1840s and William T. Sherman moved to St. Louis in 1874.19 Those 
absences, of course, only strengthened the civilian leader’s power over the 
rest of the army. The various bureaus were headed by permanently detailed 
staff offi cers, who were usually happy to escape the rigors of frontier life and 
relax in the comforts of the capital city. 
Miles himself had strongly differed with Secretary of War Russell Alger 
over how to fi ght Spain. Miles vigorously opposed any attack on Havana, 
or any invasion of Cuba during the rainy season, and instead badgered his 
boss with his own plan for invading Puerto Rico fi rst. He also objected to the 
Administration’s policy of accepting large numbers of volunteers for the war, 
fearing that the resources for training and equipping them would siphon 
away offi cers and supplies needed for immediate combat.20
Within days of the end of the fi ghting, Miles was giving interviews to the 
press with sharp criticisms of the War Department’s handling of the campaign. 
He complained that the Department had “mutilated and garbled” reports 
about the command issue and that it had suppressed his recommendation 
that US troops in Cuba be moved to healthy camps or evacuated to avoid 
disease. Back in the United States, he repeated his criticisms to a welcoming 
press corps. Despite speculation that he would likely be court-martialed for 
insubordination, Miles solidifi ed his standing in public esteem by testifying, 
before the offi cial Board of Inquiry investigating the war, about feeding the 
troops large quantities of what he labeled “embalmed beef.”21 
Miles had political ambitions, hoping to be nominated – by either major 
party – for president. He even approached Roosevelt to suggest that the 
New York Governor be his Vice Presidential running mate in 1900. When 
Elihu Root succeeded Alger at the War Department, the new Secretary, 
though warned Miles would be diffi cult to work with, nevertheless tried 
to cooperate with him, at least at fi rst. Root asked the general’s advice on 
offi cers to head volunteer regiments in the Philippines. Root wanted young 
and energetic offi cers but Miles recommended selection based strictly on 
seniority. The very next day, despite Root’s plea for secrecy in order to 
forestall an avalanche of applications, the matter surfaced in the press, and 
Root suspected Miles of the leak.22
Two days before McKinley was shot in Buffalo, Root wrote to the president 
complaining that Miles was trying “to promote his own views and undo 
my plans.” As McKinley’s successor, Roosevelt also had strong antipathies 
toward Miles, whom he had derided as “merely a brave peacock” in 1898. 
The commanding general later suggested in a public speech in 1901 that 
the then vice president had not even been at San Juan Hill.23 This further 
poisoned Miles’ relationship with Roosevelt.
The feuding pair had a shouting match at a White House reception in 
December 1901, after Miles had publicly criticized a navy board of inquiry’s 
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fi nding in a dispute between two admirals. The general came to a White 
House reception to explain, and the president bellowed at him: “I will have 
no criticism of my Administration from you, or any other offi cer in the Army. 
Your conduct is worthy of censure, sir.” Responding “You are my host and 
superior offi cer”, Miles bowed and departed, but the resulting publicity was 
sympathetic to the general.24 
Miles had cultivated good relations with members of Congress, and they 
came to his defense whenever Roosevelt contemplated ridding himself of the 
commanding general. One reason for Miles’ popularity on Capitol Hill was 
that he had resisted Root’s efforts to consolidate army posts throughout the 
country.25 
In the subsequent months the president and Root compiled a record of 
Miles’ misbehavior. In one such memorandum from the White House in 
March 1902, Roosevelt wrote:
During the six months that I have been President, General Miles has 
made it abundantly evident by his actions that he has not the slightest 
desire to improve or benefi t the army, and to my mind his action can 
bear only the construction that his desire is purely to gratify his selfi sh 
ambition, his vanity, or his spite.26
When Root advanced his proposal for a General Staff headed by a Chief of 
Staff early in 1902, Miles led the opposition. He believed he could administer 
the army without a staff and bragged that he had done that during the recent 
war without having to “get around a dozen or more majors.”27 Testifying 
before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, the commanding general 
noted that every member, like himself, was a veteran of the Civil War and 
then trashed Root’s plan as a revolutionary scheme that would abandon the 
lessons of history and “Germanize and Russianize the small Army of the 
United States.”28 He also doubted the wisdom of civilian control.
In fact, the general’s authority for initiative is taken away, and he can 
make no move without the direction or sanction of the all powerful 
General Staff, which, under the bill is subject to the control of the 
Secretary of War, whose knowledge of military affairs may be meager 
or nil.29
Miles’ comments on military inexperience were especially pointed, for 
Root, as a frail 17-year-old, had been rejected when he tried to enlist in 
1865.30
The immediate impact of Miles’ testimony was so powerful that the 
committee chairman announced that no favorable action could be expected 
on the general staff bill that year. Miles continued his campaign against 
the administration by disclosing information about US atrocities in the 
pacifi cation campaign in the Philippines. Roosevelt was tempted to remind 
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the world that Miles’ troops at Wounded Knee had “killed squaws and 
children as well as unarmed Indians”, but reconsidered and pigeonholed his 
letter.31
Roosevelt was so incensed by Miles’ actions that he prepared papers to 
force the general to resign. “General Miles’ usefulness is at and end and 
he must go”, he wrote to a friend. But he also acknowledged: “It is a great 
question, upon which I must consult two or three of the leading members of 
the Senate and House, as to whether it will not be well to avoid complicating 
passage of the Army bill … by refraining from acting … until that is out of 
the way.” Several Senators defended Miles and urged the president not to 
oust the general, saying that it would cause another bitter controversy, stir 
up bad feeling in Congress, and be injurious to the Republican party in the 
coming Congressional campaign. Roosevelt relented, but later complained 
that “the only matter of importance in which I have sacrifi ced principle to 
policy has been that of Miles.”32
 To assuage supporters of Miles, Root modifi ed his proposal to provide 
that the serving Commanding General would become the fi rst Chief of 
Staff, though in the end the law took effect only after Miles turned 64 in 
August 1903 and was legally required to retire. Root also got Miles away 
from Washington for several months, including the next winter session 
of the Congress, by sending him on an information-gathering trip to the 
Philippines, Asia and Europe.33
 Meanwhile, Root launched a public relations campaign “to start a 
backfi re.” He urged that several thousand letters be sent to members of 
Congress supporting army reorganization. He circulated articles to editors 
making the case for reform. He also arranged for supporting testimony 
before Congress from other retired generals, including Miles’ immediate 
predecessor as commanding general. Root even planted questions with key 
Senators to guarantee that the best arguments were aired.34 
Early in 1903, with Miles circling the globe and public opinion more 
sympathetic, Congress passed the General Staff bill. The measure was the fi rst 
of the four major modernization initiatives by the Roosevelt Administration, 
and it fulfi lled the vision the New York Governor had articulated in 1899. 
But it came only after a severe challenge to civil–military relations from the 
nation’s senior military offi cer.
Reorganization
Secretary of War Elihu Root was already developing radical plans to reorgan-
ize the US Army when Roosevelt took offi ce. The former New York lawyer 
had been named by President McKinley to fi x the numerous problems evident 
in 1898 – such as sending the expeditionary force to Cuba clad in winter 
woolen uniforms – but he and Roosevelt had a longstanding friendship and 
a close convergence on ideas for the army. The commander of the Rough 
Riders called for “a thorough shaking up” of the War Department during 
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the confl ict in Cuba and later stressed to Root his belief in the need for 
substantial army reorganization.35
Root’s plan ultimately had four major features: (1) Creation of a General 
Staff for the army; (2) Abolition of the post of Commanding General, 
replacing it with a Chief of Staff directly under the Secretary of War; (3) 
Centralizing control of the various army bureaus under the Secretary and 
Chief of Staff; (4) Creation of an Army War College. All of these measures 
required legislation, and only the last met little resistance.
Knowing that he faced strong opposition from “offi cers who had become 
entrenched in Washington armchairs”, Root initially proposed only the 
elimination of future permanent details to staff bureaus and cutting such 
assignments to four years. After Congress accepted this change in 1901, 
Root began pushing the idea of a General Staff to do war plans and a War 
College to do studies and education. He also recommended making the 
senior general the Chief of Staff and abolishing the post of Commanding 
General.36
The navy went through a similar reorganization struggle, though it was less 
visible because there was no counterpart to the commanding general. Even 
more than the army, the navy was organized into fi efdoms – eight bureaus 
– run by long-serving offi cials. No one was tasked with planning for war. 
Finally, Secretary John Long, by a March 13, 1900 directive, took a partial 
step in the same direction as the army was taking by creating the General 
Board to advise him on strategy, war plans, and ship designs. He named the 
popular Admiral George Dewey as the fi rst Board president.37 The US Navy 
did not acquire a senior offi cer and slightly less decentralized organization 
until the post of Chief of Naval Operations was created in 1915.
Long had wanted to have a general staff, but he ran into fi erce opposition 
from inside and from Congress. The Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs 
Committee, Eugene Hale of Maine, denounced the idea, as did Long’s own 
deputy and most of the bureau chiefs. When Long’s successor, William Moody, 
decided to press ahead with a very modest general staff proposal, for what 
he described as a purely advisory body, he was defeated by overwhelming 
opposition. His own Assistant Secretary, Charles Darling, testifi ed against 
the measure, saying “it savors too much of militarism.”38
Meanwhile, the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy moved to improve 
coordination between the Services by creating, in July 1903, the Joint Board. 
The new mechanism was born weak, however, lacking staff and prestige. It 
also fell into disfavor – and was sharply criticized by Roosevelt – when it 
failed to agree on the defensibility of Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1907. 
Nevertheless, it was a sign of the managerial revolution in American planning 
for war.
One effort at reorganization was particularly unsuccessful. Roosevelt, 
like many in the army, had little enthusiasm for the Marine Corps. Before 
becoming president, he had urged the amalgamation of the Corps into the 
Navy. He witnessed the service’s close ties to Congress and public opinion 
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and later admitted privately that “no vestige of their organization should be 
allowed to remain. They cannot get along with the navy, and as a separate 
command with the army the conditions would be intolerable.”39 In his fi nal 
year in offi ce, Roosevelt ordered marines off ships, purportedly to free up men 
to form units to seize advance bases, but Congress, persuaded intellectually 
and politically, passed a rider countermanding the president’s order.40
Rejuvenation
Although the senior leadership in the military and in the Congress had 
wartime experience, it was dated. As late as 1901, every general offi cer in 
the army, line and staff, had fi rst been commissioned before or during the 
Figure 8.1 Theodore Roosevelt reviewing naval parade off Long Island, 1903 
(Library of Congress)
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Civil War.41 Roosevelt himself had complained that the navy began that war 
with 70-year-old captains, a fact he blamed on “the shortsightedness and 
supine indifference” of politicians who opposed reorganization efforts a half 
century earlier.42 Both services promoted by seniority rather than merit, and 
those long-serving offi cers had more reverence for the past than excitement 
about the future.
The youngest president preached – and practiced – “the strenuous life.” 
He wanted to elevate vigorous young men to positions of responsibility 
and authority. Not just in the military: he wanted the new territories to be 
administered by “only good and able men, chosen for their fi tness, and not 
because of their partisan service.”43
Just as he had embraced civil service reform and merit promotions in his 
fi rst Washington job, as one of three Civil Service Commissioners, Roosevelt 
sought to rejuvenate the armed forces by promoting bright young offi cers 
faster than their more pedestrian comrades. He said “our men come too old, 
and stay too short a time, in the high-command positions.”44 He also tried 
to reduce the line-staff distinction by trying to give talented staff offi cers line 
commands. This also generated opposition from those who stood to lose 
from such changes.
His military aides served as conduits for new ideas from the lower ranks, 
notably William Sims, who persuaded the president to overrule navy offi cials 
and impose a new means of continuous aim fi ring.45 He repeatedly asked 
Congress to allow merit promotions in the services but met with fi erce 
opposition, in part because he elevated a disproportionate number of men 
from the cavalry compared to the other branches of the army. Eventually he 
allowed offi cers nearing retirement with 40 years of service to advance in 
rank upon retirement. He also began promoting promising young offi cers 
directly to brigadier general, nominating some 39 offi cers ahead of their 
seniors. In 1906, for example, he named Army Capt. John J. Pershing a one-
star general. By 1907, however, congressional opposition had become so 
strong that Roosevelt stopped the practice.46 
Roosevelt had a low opinion of old and overweight offi cers. Looking at 
his 300-pound commander in Cuba, Major General Shafter, Roosevelt told a 
friend that “men should be appointed as Generals of Divisions and Brigades 
who are physically fi t.” Later as president, he tried to weed out the unfi t by 
imposing tough new physical standards on the armed forces, ordering that 
each year navy offi cers walk 50 miles over three days and that army offi cers 
walk and ride horses for 90 miles over three days. When tired and blistered 
offi cers publicized their complaints, the president himself, with the press in 
tow, completed the army test in a single day!47 
Technological innovation
Roosevelt was an activist president, always in motion, fi lled with ideas, often 
impetuous. When it came to things military, he was often, in Matthew Oyos’ 
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phrase, the “Chief Dilettante.” Soon after becoming president, he urged the 
army to switch from its traditional dark blue shirt to a more neutral gray 
or brown, which he argued would make a less obvious target. Later on, the 
president suggested that cavalry offi cers switch to a smaller spur, to make 
walking easier. In 1905 he launched campaigns to get the army to develop 
new, more effi cient entrenching tools and to design improved bayonets for 
troops and swords for offi cers.48 
Organizational innovation also captured the president’s interest. Advised 
by a friend from 1898 that the army was resisting a proposal to develop 
a separate machine-gun corps, Roosevelt intervened and ordered a pilot 
project in one cavalry regiment and recommended an increase in offi cers 
to command machine-gun units. Congress never approved the added slots, 
however, and the army itself resisted setting up a separate branch.49 
Roosevelt’s most far-sighted efforts at technological innovation were 
focused on aircraft, submarines, and battleships. While in the Navy 
Department, he endorsed support for Samuel Langley’s experiments with 
heavier-than-air machines, which had broad political support in Washington 
but which crashed ignominiously into the Potomac River shortly before the 
Wright Brothers’ success. As president, he pushed the War Department to 
use discretionary money previously approved by Congress to fund three 
prototypes. Only the Wright Brothers delivered a usable aircraft, but its 
initial successes ended with a fatal crash in 1908.50 
The US Navy also had been slow to embrace new technology. In 1869 it 
had unceremoniously decommissioned the fastest warship in the world, the 
Wampanoag, with a record not equaled until the 1890s, and the sea service 
continued to resist building ships without sails and with steel hulls and steam 
engines until the 1880s. As the offi cers who recommended scrapping the 
Wampanoag declared: 
Lounging through the watches of a steamer, or acting as fi remen and 
coal heavers, will not produce in a seaman that combination of boldness, 
strength and skill which characterized the American sailor of an elder 
day; and the habitual exercise by an offi cer, of a command, the execution 
of which is not under his eye, is a poor substitute for the school of 
observation, promptness and command found only on the deck of a 
sailing vessel.51
Eventually, however, the navy was forced to accept ironclad, steam-driven 
warships. There was also enthusiasm in Congress for submarines, both from 
representatives from shipbuilding districts and from those who viewed 
them as an alternative to expensive battleships. Roosevelt was so excited 
by the prospect of these new boats that in 1905 he secretly boarded one for 
a tour and nearly an hour of underwater operations. Having survived, he 
told the press of his adventures, which the New York Times trumpeted as 
“President Takes Plunge in Submarine.” He went on, as with the machine 
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gun corps idea, to recommend more favorable pay and promotion treatment 
for submariners, who tended to be disparaged and discriminated against by 
the rest of the navy.52
Besides seeking more and bigger battleships, Roosevelt endorsed the idea 
of an all big-gun ship even before the British Dreadnought demonstrated the 
value of such a design and, in a single stroke, rendered all existing warships 
obsolete. In this case, the president sided with his naval aide, then commander 
William Sims, and against his friend and naval sage, Captain Alfred Thayer 
Mahan. When Sims and others later criticized the design of the new North 
Dakota class battleships, Roosevelt largely ignored their views in order not 
to delay construction.53
Expansion
The military program with Roosevelt’s most ardent and consistent support, 
and the most ultimate success, was increasing the size of the armed forces, 
especially the fl eet. A large modern navy was essential to his vision of great 
power America, particularly since the nation now had to defend overseas 
territories in the Pacifi c and the sea lanes to the forthcoming Panama Canal. 
When Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the fl eet was rapidly 
growing and had reached sixth in overall strength compared with other 
nations, with its fi rst generation battleships, the Maine and Texas, and three 
fully modern ones. By the time he entered the White House, the US Navy 
ranked fourth in the world, with nine battleships at sea and eight more 
authorized or at some stage of construction. When he left offi ce, there were 
25 battleships and ten heavy cruisers in commission and two more battleships 
fi nishing construction. Only Britain had more capital ships, though Germany 
had more tonnage.54 
He did not get all he asked for, or when he asked for it, because Congress 
had its own ideas about timing and affordability. The biggest fi ght was in 
1907, when Congress cut the president’s request for four additional battle-
ships in half, with even the naval affairs committee chairman lukewarm to 
the idea.55 Some legislators still resisted the costs of the military buildup, but 
few questioned Roosevelt’s standard – to have a fl eet as large as any compet-
itor other than Britain. 
Navy personnel also increased dramatically during Roosevelt’s presidency, 
rising from 20,900 in 1901 to 47,533 in 1909. But even these numbers fell 
short of the manning needs of the larger, more complex steamships.
Despite Roosevelt’s antipathy toward the Marine Corps, it also grew by 
65 percent while he was in the White House, from 5,865 to 9,696. The 
army was about 84,000 at the beginning and end of his term, but it declined 
during his presidency to a low point of 64,000 in 1907.56 
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Resistance to modernization
Roosevelt had an agenda for change for the US military, for change in 
organization, size, technology, and personnel. His motives were many – the 
goal of national greatness, the measure of merit in military power, a projection 
of ideas of manly virtue onto the global stage. He was strikingly successful 
in much of what he tried, but only after surmounting the predictable and 
recurring roadblocks to military transformation.
Innovation is particularly diffi cult for military organizations. A successful, 
war-winning force has no incentives to change, or even to risk unforeseen 
problems by altering its existing ways. Advocates of the status quo feel 
threatened, either directly by the loss of position or prestige, or indirectly by 
the prospect of uncertainty and adjustment. To impose change on reluctant 
military services, therefore, requires a strong advocate, supportive allies, 
adequate resources, and patience.
In most but not all of his efforts, Theodore Roosevelt served as that 
strong, steady advocate. Sometimes he lost interest or became preoccupied 
with other ventures, as one would expect of a hyperactive president who 
faced numerous domestic and international crises.
The opposition was predictable – from the offi cers “entrenched in 
their armchairs” and from Members of Congress who believed they had a 
preeminent Constitutional role in shaping the US armed forces and who had 
political incentives to support particular programs, whether or not they were 
consistent with the president’s proposals.
Where funds were required – or new laws – the Legislative Branch had 
the ultimate power. But where executive discretion was available, Roosevelt 
acted forcefully – such as in ordering tougher physical fi tness tests and 
in sending the Great White Fleet halfway around the world, and daring 
Congress to fund its return. 
Civil–military relations under Theodore Roosevelt were no more strained 
than usual, for many in uniform welcomed his efforts to remove deadwood 
from on top and embrace new technology, despite the griping of those 
uncomfortable with the changes. Congress was also more often than not an 
ally of the president, funding his expansion of the fl eet, even if not as fast 
as the president wished, and sharing his views on the need for a stronger 
military to play a global role.
9 The McNamara revolution 
To this day, I see quantifi cation as a language to add precision to reasoning 
about the world. 
Robert McNamara1 
[The Whiz Kids were] the most egotistical people that I ever saw in my life. 
They had no faith in the military; they had no respect for the military at 
all. They felt that the Harvard Business School method of solving problems 
would solve any problem in the world…
General Curtis LeMay2
In 1961 the Pentagon was not quite two decades old; the Defense Department 
housed within it was only a dozen years old; but many of the management and 
budget practices dated back to the nineteenth century. Robert McNamara, 
not yet 45 years old, arrived to change things. McNamara knew a lot about 
business but only a little about the military. He had served in the Second 
World War as an Army Air Corps statistician, analyzing how to improve 
US bombing missions in the Pacifi c. After the war, he became a rising star 
at the Ford Motor Company, which made him president just before John F. 
Kennedy recruited him to come to Washington. When McNamara claimed a 
lack of qualifi cations for the Pentagon job, Kennedy replied that there were 
no schools for secretaries of defense, or for presidents.
The Pentagon was ripe for change, and under strong political pressure to 
change. President Eisenhower had succeeded in 1958 in getting Congress to 
strengthen the powers of the secretary of defense, allowing him to transfer, 
reassign, abolish or consolidate functions “for more effective, effi cient, and 
economical administration and operation and to eliminate duplication.” The 
separate armed services were put clearly under the “direction, authority and 
control” of the Secretary of Defense.3 
Many members of Congress wanted to increase military spending to 
respond to the growing Soviet threat, including what was seen as an emerging 
“missile gap.” But even the proponents of higher budgets complained about 
the inter-service rivalry and wasteful duplication in weapons programs. They 
wanted, in the phrase of that era, a “bigger bang for the buck.” In 1959 
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the Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee wrote to 
the then Defense Secretary, Neil McElroy, seeking budget information for 
particular military commands and missions. The secretary’s staff responded 
that it was too diffi cult to get reliable fi gures – and that even if some numbers 
were developed, “there does not appear to be any agreed strategy against 
which the adequacy of the fi gures could be measured.” In fact, the staff 
admitted, “everyone has his own individual strategy.”4 
McNamara set out to change that, to bring everyone into a single, 
common method of determining needs and costs. The tools were available 
in the defense research community, such as the air force-sponsored think 
tank, the RAND Corporation. Economists such as Charles Hitch had refi ned 
the statistical methods of operations research into tools of systems analysis 
that could be applied to narrow issues of program management and to broad 
questions of military strategy. Anyone could learn the techniques, but the 
only ones who were already masters were the bright, eager, quite young 
civilian analysts who soon became dubbed McNamara’s “whiz kids.” They 
became the soldiers of McNamara’s revolution and they overpowered the 
senior generals and admirals who thought that their military experience 
should prevail over any civilian’s numerical calculations. 
Before 1961, the separate services decided the main outlines of most 
military programs and their associated budgets. The president set overall 
ceilings for defense and other activities, and the secretary of defense allocated 
the funds. Each service’s share, however, tended to stay about the same. 
Each service jealously protected its most favored programs and gave low 
Figure 9.1 Defense Secretary Robert McNamara (LBJ Library)
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priority to activities that related to the other services and contributed to 
joint warfare. The air force cared most about strategic bombers, not tactical 
fi ghters. The navy preferred aircraft carriers over submarines. The army was 
determined to maintain a full 14-division force structure even if many units 
were under strength and ill-equipped. Meanwhile, airlift and sealift were 
orphan programs, since the navy and air force were not especially interested 
in spending their limited dollars to buy ships and planes that would only be 
used to carry army soldiers and their equipment. 
The typical military answer to the basic question, how much is enough? 
was invariably “more.” Throughout the 1950s the services declared their 
force requirements were at least 25 percent above the levels budgeted for 
them. They also tended to discount the capabilities of their sister services. 
The air force planned as if it alone had to win a nuclear war with the Soviet 
Union. The army and air force each thought it needed enough tanks and 
close air support planes, respectively, to destroy Warsaw Pact tank forces 
that might invade western Europe. And in the anxiety provoked by the fi rst 
Soviet space satellites, each service was eager to push duplicative programs 
to see which would pay off quickest.
John F. Kennedy had pledged a “defense second to none” during his 
campaign and promised “arms … suffi cient beyond doubt” in his stirring 
inaugural address. He told McNamara to: “1. Develop the force structure 
necessary to meet our military requirements without regard to arbitrary 
budget ceilings. 2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible 
cost.”5 He could never avoid setting ceilings, at least for planning purposes, 
but he worked overtime to defi ne those military requirements and to make 
it effi cient as well as effective.
McNamara’s fi rst task as secretary was to craft a budget request to jump 
start the military buildup the president had promised. To help him, he 
recruited his own army of analysts. From RAND, he brought Hitch and 
Alain Enthoven to crunch the numbers. To manage various components, he 
recruited such later cabinet offi cers as Harold Brown, Joe Califano, John 
Connally, Paul Nitze, and Cyrus Vance.6 Later on, another future secretary of 
defense, Les Aspin, served as one of the “whiz kids.” McNamara had secured 
Kennedy’s promise of a free hand in picking Pentagon offi cials, and he used 
his authority rapidly and aggressively.
Processes of control 
The new defense secretary sought military advice, but found it defi cient. 
Shortly before Kennedy’s inauguration, he asked the Chiefs for any changes 
they might suggest in the existing Eisenhower budget. Their answers were a 
rehash of previously submitted requests for increases. “Do they think I’m a 
fool?” McNamara cried. “Don’t they have ideas?”7 He reacted by setting up 
civilian-run task forces.
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Ultimately he ordered nearly 100 special studies of defense issues, 
large and small. He immersed himself in briefi ngs on defense programs 
and capabilities and was sometimes surprised – or appalled – by what he 
learned. One of his early discoveries was that the “missile gap” that Kennedy 
campaigned about did not exist, but in fact was a gap favoring the United 
States. Naïve in the ways of Washington, McNamara told some journalists 
about this, thereby embarrassing the president. He was also troubled to learn 
of the large number of nuclear weapons being programmed for minor targets 
behind the Iron Curtain.8 
Just two months after taking offi ce, McNamara was ready with a compre-
hensive revision to the budget that President Eisenhower had submitted 
in January. His new plan called for over $1.5 billion in additional funds, 
compared to the original request for $41.8 billion for defense. About half 
the increase was slated for strategic nuclear programs, the other half for 
conventional force capabilities and personnel. The actual request to Congress 
sought only $650 million in new money, however, with the balance offset by 
program cuts and transfers from other accounts.9
McNamara asked for increases in the Polaris submarine program, more 
than doubling the rate of construction from fi ve to 12 submarines per year, 
as well as for a doubling of production capacity for solid-fuel Minuteman 
inter-continental ballistic missiles. He also sought to strengthen the bomber 
force by putting one-eighth of the force constantly in the air and half 
the fl eet on 15-minute alert. But he cancelled production of the last two 
squadrons of Titan missiles, which were liquid-fueled and more vulnerable 
to surprise attack. Preferring survivable missiles to slow-fl ying bombers, he 
cut one-third of the funds requested for the new B-70 bomber and turned 
the program into a technology development effort. He also cancelled the 
costly and unsuccessful effort to build a nuclear-powered airplane.10
The March 1961 budget amendments revealed the new administration’s 
quite different defense priorities. In addition to the less vulnerable strategic 
systems, Kennedy poured money into airlift and sealift and into additional 
weapons for limited wars and counter-insurgency efforts. He also sought 
an immediate increase of 13,000 personnel for the various services. The 
president’s message to Congress set forth strategic principles which would 
remain the touchstones of policy throughout McNamara’s long tenure in 
the Pentagon. Kennedy said that defense would not be “bound by arbitrary 
budget ceilings”; that future budgets might have to be increased further; 
that civilian control should be strong; that the United States needs increased 
capacity to fi ght limited and guerrilla wars; and that “Our arms will never be 
used to strike the fi rst blow in any attack.”11 When a crisis arose over Berlin 
in the summer of 1961, Kennedy sought further increases: another $3 billion 
for defense, two more army divisions, and the call-up of 150,000 reservists.
One important reason why McNamara succeeded in imposing tighter 
controls and even program terminations on the Pentagon was that he was 
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simultaneously increasing the overall budget. Extra spending also helped 
him win support on Capitol Hill.
After seizing power with demands for information, McNamara moved 
decisively to consolidate control over the Pentagon with new bureaucratic 
processes and new ways of thinking about defense issues. When the new DOD 
Comptroller, Charles Hitch, briefed him on ways to gather information and 
structure the review process and suggested some pilot efforts, McNamara 
ordered him to apply the new system DOD-wide in less than a year. He 
knew that delay could be deadly and that prompt action would catch the 
foot-draggers off guard. He believed in decisiveness: “I would rather have a 
wrong decision than no decision at all.”12 
Later he explained his approach. 
I was determined to subordinate the powerful institutional interests 
of the various armed services and the defense contractors to a broad 
conception of the national interest. I wanted to challenge the Pentagon’s 
resistance to change, and I intended that the big decisions would be 
made on the basis of study and analysis and not simply by perpetuating 
the practice of allocating blocs of funds to the various services and letting 
them use the money as they saw fi t.13  
He forced the military leadership to speak a new language, the language of 
numbers, of systems analysis, of cost-effectiveness. As he told his biographer, 
“Numbers, as you know, are a language to me.”14 Until then, the only 
numbers given much attention were the “us versus them” tables of weapons 
and forces and the bottom-line fi gures in dollars for defense. “This lack of 
quantitative standards of adequacy”, his whiz kids argued, “meant that, in 
many cases, ‘minimum’ military requirements were 30 percent more than 
what we had, whatever we had.”15 McNamara insisted that his subordinates 
speak to him in his language and make their case for their recommended 
policies in terms of costs and trade-offs. He wanted to know precise answers 
to the question, how much is enough?
Those who could speak in numbers were listened to; those who could 
not were ignored. That gave prominence and power to the whiz kids – the 
brash, young, civilian analysts – and reduced the infl uence of the career 
military whose experience was impressionistic rather than analytical. While 
McNamara acknowledged that assumptions drove results, he seemed to 
believe that numbers based on transparent assumptions were somehow 
dispassionate and truthful. As he later told Congress, “The basic objective 
of the management system we are introducing and trying to operate, is to 
establish a rational foundation as opposed to an emotional foundation for 
the decisions as to what size force and what type of force this country will 
maintain.”16 
Disputes over numbers, however, often became quite emotional. When 
the 34-year old Air Force Secretary, Harold Brown, slashed funds for a 
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new manned bomber, General Curtis Lemay exploded, “Why, that son of a 
bitch was in junior high school when I was out bombing Japan.”17 Another 
air force general was shocked when Alain Enthoven, McNamara’s leading 
systems analyst, tried to end an argument over nuclear war plans by saying, 
“General, I have fought just as many nuclear wars as you have.”18 
McNamara restructured the budget process to capture and control all 
of the major decisions on force structure and strategy. Centralization was 
extensive and deliberate.19 Instead of the annual review to develop the next 
year’s requests, he created a fi ve year defense program (FYDP), forcing 
the services to project their spending and acquisition into the future – and 
then forced them to live within their plans by requiring his approval for 
any major program change proposals (PCP). He created a whole Planning, 
Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) for reviewing budgets and programs 
– one which is still essentially the same in DOD and now widely followed 
throughout the Federal Government.
As Alain Enthoven, one of the most important whiz kids, explained, 
“The main purpose of PPBS was to develop explicit criteria, openly and 
thoroughly debated by all interested parties, that could be used by the 
Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress as measures of 
the need for and adequacy of defense programs.”20 But those measures 
ultimately had to be quantifi able – hard numbers to evaluate intellectual 
notions. While McNamara formally disavowed being a prisoner of 
numbers – “I am sure that no signifi cant military problem will ever be 
wholly susceptible to quantitative analysis”21 – the practical effect of his 
new processes was to relegate arguments without numbers to the realm of 
opinions, not facts.
The PPBS process followed a strict timetable of paperwork, from initial 
guidance by OSD to service comments to decisions by the secretary to 
submissions to the White House and eventual inclusion in the president’s 
budget. Instead of following standard bureaucratic lines, however, McNamara 
created new categories for analysis that covered more than one service. Air 
force and navy strategic nuclear weapons programs were lumped in one 
mission category for strategic forces, and that meant that bombers competed 
against missiles and navy missiles against air force missiles for extra funds. In 
conventional forces as well, programs were judged by their cost-effectiveness 
in achieving similar missions – such as how best to kill Soviet tanks, whether 
by aircraft or American tanks.
McNamara understood the “golden rule” of budgeting: “he who has 
the gold rules.” And his process guaranteed that he would make the fi nal 
decisions, regardless of the advice and recommendations provided along 
the line. The PPBS process changed the power balance in the Pentagon 
by reducing the infl uence of the services and the uniformed military and 
strengthening the role of the civilians within the Offi ce of the Secretary of 
Defense, which grew 50 percent while he was in charge.22 The new process 
shifted the competition for resources from an emotional fi ght among the 
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services, each linking past victories to promised future ones, to bloodless 
combat between number-crunchers, each claiming the mantle of truth. 
The new mission categories also changed the balance of power within the 
services, giving new standing and leverage to the less glamorous conventional 
warfare communities, who no longer were the neglected stepchildren 
dominated by their nuclear-armed siblings. Until McNamara’s time, the 
services regularly took cuts imposed from above and protected their fl agship 
programs while slashing the less-favored forces. There had been alternative 
budgets, with tiers of decreasing priority, so that offi cials could see what 
would be gained or lost by different funding levels – but the priorities were 
developed by each service, not by the Secretary of Defense.23 McNamara 
changed that.
Angry offi cers
Senior military leaders resented McNamara’s imperious style and the 
undisguised arrogance of many of his civilian aides. Fueled by frustrations 
over McNamara’s handling of the Vietnam War, their views became such 
a strong consensus among the offi cer corps that the Nixon Administration 
chose to dismantle the offi ce of system analysis and otherwise to downgrade 
the role of civilian analysts.
Two years after General Thomas D. White retired as Air Force Chief 
of Staff in 1961, he echoed the feelings of many offi cers in an article in 
a popular magazine. “I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, 
tree-full-of-owls type of so-called professional ‘defense intellectuals’ who 
have been brought into this nation’s capital”, he wrote in 1963. He called 
them “amateurs”, “temporary experts”, “termites at work”, and doubted 
that they “have suffi cient worldliness to stand up to the kind of enemy we 
face.”24 
General Curtis LeMay, picked by Kennedy as White’s successor in June, 
1961, had a similar reaction. He later said, “The Kennedy Administration 
came in and right from the start we got the back of the hand. Get out of 
our way. We think nothing of you and your opinions. We don’t like you as 
people. We have no respect for you. Don’t bother us.”25 
Kennedy downgraded the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff quite openly 
in July 1961 by naming retired Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell 
Taylor, as his personal “military representative” to the JCS. The president 
had long admired Taylor – an outspoken critic of Eisenhower’s defense 
policy – and he had lost confi dence in the existing Chiefs because of their 
muddled advice at the time of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. A 
year later, he named Taylor as JCS Chairman, thus formalizing his authority 
as Kennedy’s principal military adviser. Despite the awkwardness of the 
initial bureaucratic arrangement, Taylor’s relations with McNamara were 
“remarkably harmonious.”26 Their styles and policy preferences were quite 
similar. 
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The president and McNamara retained the other Chiefs until the end of 
their designated terms and then replaced them with men who remained loyal 
and supportive of the administration. Even the irascible LeMay was given 
another year as Air Force Chief of Staff despite his anger over cancellation 
of the B-70 bomber. He was viewed by the administration as an effective 
leader of the air force. The Chief of Naval Operations, however, was denied 
another term because he had greatly angered McNamara by his conduct 
during the Cuban missile crisis. Admiral George Anderson had resisted the 
secretary’s detailed and insistent questioning of naval blockade procedures, 
telling McNamara, “Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your deputy will go back 
to your offi ces, the Navy will run the blockade.”27
The civilians disagreed with the military over style and substance. 
McNamara and his people were intrusive, insistent, and not always respectful 
of the offi cers and their traditions. One incident reveals his pettiness in 
pursuit of greater commonality of equipment among the services. “Early 
on, McNamara held a ‘fashion show’ in his conference room attended by 
his civilian and military deputies. The different services’ belts and butchers’ 
smocks and women’s bloomers were modeled, as were jackets, caps, boots, 
and other things. As each item was shown, McNamara decided on the spot 
which of the versions would henceforth by used by all the services.”28 
Disputes were more serious and consequential on issues of nuclear strategy 
and ways to fi ght conventional wars more effectively. In these matters, 
McNamara dominated but did not always prevail.
Nuclear strategy
McNamara refl ected the growing consensus of civilian defense intellectuals 
who were applying new concepts to the new kind of war – concepts of game 
theory, and different types of deterrence, and escalation ladders. They were 
“thinking about the unthinkable” and coming up with interesting concepts 
and strategies. Men like LeMay had long believed that nuclear wars could be 
won – by striking fi rst with overwhelming power. But the new president had 
ruled that out in his fi rst defense message to Congress.29 Instead, the civilian 
war planners emphasized secure second-strike forces, weapons that could 
survive a surprise attack and still destroy the enemy as a functioning society. 
Since only a fraction of land-based bombers could be airborne in time to 
escape a sneak attack, they argued for quick-reaction solid-fuel missiles in 
hardened silos and missiles aboard submarines hiding in the depths of the 
broad ocean. They also believed in moving up the escalation ladder slowly, 
sending signals by not attacking certain targets or areas rather than retaliating 
with everything available. In time, these ideas became the new orthodoxy, 
embraced by military leaders and civilians alike. But in the early 1960s, they 
were points of contention.
Soon after taking offi ce, McNamara began hearing briefi ngs on US nuclear 
capabilities and war-fi ghting plans. One of the landmark achievements of 
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his predecessor, Thomas Gates, was the development of the fi rst SIOP, the 
Single, Integrated Operational Plan for the use of nuclear weapons, the fi rst 
time the navy and air force had to work together to plan which weapons 
would be used on which Soviet bloc targets. This avoided wasteful “overkill” 
as well as exaggerated “requirements” when each service planned to fi ght the 
war alone.
The briefi ngs did not reassure McNamara, however. He concluded that 
the US military still hoped to launch a full-scale fi rst strike, targeting millions 
of people who contributed little if anything to the Soviet war effort. He was 
determined to devise rational ways of calculating military requirements and 
war plans that gave the civilians control of the confl ict as long as possible.
By the end of March 1961, he was able to codify several of the administ-
ration’s new ideas in the president message on defense. Kennedy told 
Congress that nuclear weapons had to be under “civilian control and comm-
and at all times.” The president rejected the idea that the number of strategic 
weapons in each arsenal were the way to fi gure the balance of power. 
Instead, he said deterrence depended on having “suffi cient retaliatory forces 
… able to survive a fi rst strike and penetrate [enemy] defenses in order to 
infl ict unacceptable losses upon him.” In addition to increases in missile and 
submarine production, Kennedy sought added funds for warning system and 
command and control.30
In the following months, McNamara elaborated the concept of “assured 
destruction” and said the Soviet Union would be deterred from attacking 
the United States if surviving US forces could destroy 20 percent to 25 
percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of industrial capacity. The 
systems analysts later put a ceiling of 400 megaton-equivalent delivered 
warheads as an adequate minimum deterrent force because their calculations 
showed little increased damage from signifi cant additional warheads. Their 
charts showed a knee-bend of sharply diminishing returns at higher force 
levels.31
Throughout his subsequent years in offi ce, McNamara refi ned his thinking 
and oversaw revisions in the SIOP. As he became more concerned about the 
civilian casualties in a nuclear exchange, he shifted actual targeting toward 
“counterforce” capabilities – that is, Soviet military sites. But he moved away 
from the “no cities” doctrine he announced in a 1962 speech. He also wrestled 
with the question of defenses against nuclear attack – from the civil defense 
preparations strongly favored by the president to an anti-ballistic missile 
(ABM) system that emerging technology seemed to promise – and came to 
the conclusion that it would always be easier and cheaper for an aggressor 
to overwhelm any system than for the United States to upgrade it.32 These 
defensive measures were linked to his criterion of “damage limitation”, in 
contrast to the surviving offensive forces for “assured destruction.” Here 
as elsewhere, his choice of words tilted the argument in his favor: “damage 
limitation” is more tentative than “active defense;” “assured destruction” is 
more confi dent than “retaliatory capability.”
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McNamara succeeded in bringing nuclear strategy under his control 
through the SIOP and through his program decisions. Although he used very 
conservative force planning assumptions – even to the point of assuming that 
each leg of what came to be called the “Triad” of bombers, land-based and 
sea-based missiles had to be large enough to perform the assured destruction 
mission in case of war – he was able to cap those forces and reduce the share 
of the defense budget going for strategic forces. Between 1961 and 1965, the 
share of defense spending going for strategic forces dropped by more than 
half, from 27 percent to 12 percent.33 He also won the battle of ideas by 
installing his vocabulary as the language for analyzing and discussing nuclear 
war. For the rest of the Cold War, US policy stayed within the framework he 
established in the 1960s. 
Counter-insurgency forces
President Kennedy himself took the lead in pushing another revolutionary 
change in US military capabilities – the endorsement and expansion of 
special forces, the Green Berets. Indeed, the second national security action 
memorandum issued in his presidency, NSAM 2, ordered the Secretary of 
Defense to “examine means for placing more emphasis on the development 
of counter-guerrilla forces.” The president had concluded that the most 
likely future confl icts would be those peripheral wars between clients of 
the superpowers, or between friendly governments and their communist-
supported insurgents, and he wanted usable military power in the form of 
highly trained, culturally attuned warriors.34
The army already had some special forces units at Fort Bragg, NC, but 
there were fewer than a thousand men, and they were not given prestige or 
much resources until the president got personally involved and visited the 
base in 1961. Then they became – at least for a while – a favored, elite force. 
Kennedy went to surprising lengths to demonstrate his personal interest in 
the special forces and his strong support for them. He even summoned all 
of the major army commanders to the White House in November 1961 and 
ordered them to develop new counter-insurgency capabilities. He set up a 
special cabinet group, including his brother Robert, to oversee the army’s 
progress.35
Despite the president’s direct and personal involvement, the innovation 
had limited success. Additional units were created and given the right to 
wear the distinctive green beret, but the rest of the army was slow to develop 
doctrine for those forces and reluctant to include them in their war plans. 
One analyst of innovation concludes that the effort fell short because the 
army did not set up a special promotion path for offi cers in the special 
forces, and promotion boards gave little credit for “advisory” assignments 
rather than commanding US soldiers. Another explanation is that the army 
preferred to fi ght the escalating Vietnam War with its own regular forces, 
and the special talents of the Green Berets were insuffi ciently exploited. In 
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fact, there were never more than about 2200 special forces personnel in 
Vietnam at any time during the war.36
Air mobility 
A third major innovation under McNamara was the development of 
helicopters and the creation of new army divisions to exploit their capabilities. 
Here McNamara took ideas from within the army that had been resisted by 
higher authorities. His actions also challenged the air force, which tended to 
resist army efforts to acquire aircraft rather than relying on blue-suiters for 
close air support and transport.
Staffers from the Offi ce of Systems Analysis linked up with the army’s 
aviation mafi a and developed a concept paper with specifi c questions for the 
army leadership to answer. McNamara sent the paper to the Secretary of the 
Army in April 1962, along with a biting personal message. “I have not been 
satisfi ed with army program submissions for tactical mobility”, he wrote. “I 
do not believe that the Army has fully explored the opportunities offered by 
aeronautical technology for making a revolutionary break with traditional 
surface mobility means.” McNamara demanded “a bold ‘new look’ at land 
warfare mobility” and said that “bold new ideas … [should] be protected 
from veto or dilution by conservative staff review.” He even went so far as 
to name particular people, already known to be sympathetic to these ideas, 
as potential members of the review panel.37
The army group met the secretary’s expectations and recommended 
the creation of an airmobile division built around 450 helicopters. New 
air mobility concepts were also simultaneously being tested in combat in 
Vietnam, so the recommendations were practical and they fell on friendly 
ears. The army also helped assure the success of the new approach by creating 
attractive career paths for aviators.38 Nowadays, helicopters and air mobility 
are essential parts of both the army and Marine Corps.
Showdown in Congress 
McNamara succeeded in carrying out his revolution because he maintained 
strong support from the president and from the key leaders on Capitol 
Hill. 
Members of Congress were surprised and pleased to see a secretary of 
defense so knowledgeable and responsive. He had answers for every question, 
precise answers because he had numbers to back up his conclusions. This 
was rare in defense hearings. He brought fewer backup staff to demonstrate 
his own mastery of the subjects that might be raised. He deluged Congress 
with data. He expanded the secretary’s annual report from the 33 pages of 
his predecessor to 166 pages his fi rst year and to 280 pages by his last year.39 
He also included large sections on US foreign policy, though he claimed that 
he had shown them to Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
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He also cultivated some of the most powerful members of Congress. 
Before Kennedy’s inauguration he met with the longtime Chairman of 
the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Carl Vinson (D-Ga), who 
had been in Congress since before McNamara was even born. Although 
the new administration had been leaning toward a further, radical defense 
reorganization – abolishing the service departments and creating a single 
chief of staff, as recommended by a panel of Democratic defense experts 
– Vinson argued strongly against the idea and McNamara publicly pledged, 
“I will undertake no major reorganization of the Defense Department in the 
near future.”40 
Vinson in turn lavished praise on the incoming offi cial, saying “he’ll make 
the best Defense Secretary the country has had.” Later in 1961, McNamara 
spoke at a special dinner in Atlanta honoring Vinson and his Senate 
counterpart, Senator Richard Russell (D-Ga), calling himself “the newest 
pupil in the Russell–Vinson school for secretaries of defense.”41
It helped, of course, that McNamara was proposing increases in defense 
spending. He met his greatest resistance on those programs he tried to cancel 
or cut back. The biggest fi ght came over his decision to kill the B-70 manned 
bomber, the planned successor to the B-52. With Vinson’s strong support, 
Congress in 1961 had added $400 million to the budget for the B-70. But the 
administration refused to spend the money because it saw no need for such 
aircraft because of the promise of ICBMs and missile-carrying submarines. 
Vinson’s committee retaliated in 1962 by adopting a new bill, adding $491 
million for the aircraft program, and “directed” that it be spent.42
Fearing a Constitutional impasse as well as a political problem, McNamara 
met privately with Vinson and helped arrange a “walk in the Rose Garden” 
for the chairman with the president. Kennedy said, “Uncle Carl, this kind 
of language and my ignoring it will only hurt us and the country. Let me 
write you a letter that will get us both off this limb.” They exchanged letters 
and Vinson got his committee to drop the “directed” language while still 
authorizing added funds. Vinson’s biographer called this one of the few 
times in his long career when the Georgia congressman backed down from 
a big fi ght.43
Despite the fi ght over the B-70, Vinson remained an admirer of McNamara. 
“Anyone who makes decisions is bound to have people disagree with him”, he 
told reporters.44 Congress accepted most of McNamara’s budget proposals 
in the early years. His only other major confrontation with Congress came 
in 1967, when he overrode subordinate recommendations on the contract 
for a new multi-service tactical fi ghter, the TFX. Supporters of the losing 
contractor raised procedural and substantive arguments against the decision 
and subjected McNamara to weeks of well-publicized criticism.
By then, however, McNamara was busy as the secretary of war, and 
domestic opposition to his policies in Vietnam tarnished his reputation as 
the revolutionary manager of the Pentagon.
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McNamara’s legacy 
Before the Vietnam War diverted him, McNamara had succeeded in imposing 
far-reaching changes on the US military. He brought the armed forces 
until strong civilian control, control extending to the minutia of weapons 
development and to the targeting of nuclear weapons. He created a budget 
process and management techniques which have spread government-wide 
and are still in place, barely changed from his original designs. He forced 
civilians and the military to learn and think in and speak a new language 
of analysis, rooted in the economics of cost-effectiveness. He created the 
presumption, benefi cial to all his successors, that the Secretary of Defense 
was the ultimate authority for defense policy decisions and that military 
leaders were only advisers, whose advice could be rejected with cause. 
He set a new standard for secretaries of defense in dealing with Congress 
by providing vast amounts of information, exuding expertise and self-
confi dence, and challenging contractors and other parochial interests. In 
one signifi cant area, however, he failed to persuade the lawmakers to follow 
his lead. Despite the presentation of budget materials in terms of military 
missions, Congress still appropriates funds by traditional line items for each 
service and its historical spending categories. 
By 1965, the managerial revolution had been accomplished. New 
challenges, particularly a war in Southeast Asia, consumed McNamara’s 
energies and ultimately his power and person. As the ancient Greeks warned, 
men can be brought low by an excess of their virtues, by too much of their 
otherwise commendable qualities. McNamara became another tragic fi gure 
because of the Vietnam War. He stumbled there, but the revolution he had 
wrought in the Pentagon outlasted him.
10 The Goldwater–Nichols 
revolution from above
You know, this piece of legislation is so bad it’s, it’s … in some respects it’s 
just un-American!
Admiral James Watkins to Cong. Bill Nichols1
If the Pentagon is ever going to be straightened out, the only hope is for 
Congress to do it. The services are so parochial and powerful, there’s no way 
the executive branch will ever get it done.
Sen. Barry Goldwater2
We are all screwed up.
General David Jones to Secretary Caspar Weinberger3
Barry Goldwater and Bill Nichols didn’t plan to criticize the Defense 
Department, oppose its senior leaders, and impose far-reaching changes 
on the armed forces. But the momentum of the legislative process and the 
wounds of legislative-executive combat propelled them into the fi ght, and 
once engaged, drove them to seek victory. 
Their story is also the story of the ripeness of ideas in Washington – the 
way some ideas become noticed, and then discussed, and then embraced, 
and then fi ercely contested, before becoming accepted wisdom. 
Desert One legacy
On April 25, 1980 the United States armed forces launched a daring raid to 
rescue Americans held captive in Iran since the US Embassy had been seized 
the previous November. The plan had been developed over several months 
within the Joint Staff. It created from scratch a joint task force involving 
each of the military services, despite the absence of joint operating doctrine 
or cross-service experience. To maintain the tightest secrecy, units rehearsed 
separately, under their own commanders and following their regular service 
procedures. The on-scene commander at the Desert One staging area wrote 
of “there being four commanders at the scene without visible identifi cation, 
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incompatible radios, and no agreed-upon plan ….”4 When some of the 
helicopters got lost in a sandstorm, the mission was canceled, and eight men 
died when two aircraft collided in the confusion.
The embarrassing failure of the hostage rescue mission underscored organ-
iz ational problems in the Pentagon and prompted the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, to begin to consider signifi cant changes. 
Jones found an ally in Defense Secretary Harold Brown, but before they 
could act the 1980 elections brought a new team to Washington, Ronald 
Reagan and a Republican-controlled Senate.5 
The victorious Republicans had criticized the Carter Administration for an 
inadequate defense policy, exemplifi ed by the Desert One fi asco and low unit 
readiness rates. They promised a revitalized military and greatly increased 
spending on it. The Republican platform’s only mention of Pentagon organ-
ization called for less civilian interference with service policies.6 
General Jones believed that more centralization was needed. Early on, he 
concluded that the Chairman had to be strengthened, the Joint Staff enlarged 
and made more independent of the various services, and more emphasis 
placed on joint operations. In February 1981, he established a study group 
of retired offi cers under the leadership of a former DOD offi cial, William K. 
Brehm, to develop a plan for evaluating JCS organization.7 
When he approached the new Defense Secretary, however, he met fi rm 
resistance. Caspar Weinberger’s top priority was increasing the defense 
budget, and he wanted nothing to interfere with that. He also feared that 
criticism of Pentagon organization would prevent increases and lead to cuts 
by the Congress. “If we take on this issue, they’ll think we’re all screwed 
up over here”, he told Jones. The Chairman replied, “We are all screwed 
up.”8
Jones was a lame duck in the new administration. Many Republicans had 
pushed for his ouster even before his term ended in June 1982, because of 
his acquiescence in Carter Administration’s decisions such as cancellation 
of the B-1 bomber. Jones was allowed to stay, and he responded by keeping 
quiet and acting deferentially toward his new civilian superiors. 
He moved stealthily within the JCS system. His special study group reached 
some preliminary conclusions in December 1981, and began briefi ng them 
to the JCS members. The group favored strengthening the role of the JCS 
Chairman, giving him a deputy, reducing the need for JCS unanimity, and 
setting up a personnel process for joint assignments. Army leaders wanted 
to go further, but only the air force and Marine Corps seemed supportive. 
The navy leadership rejected both criticism of the current system and the 
proposed remedies.9
Jones decided that he had to go public on his own. At a February 3 
appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, he made a brief 
comment following the opening budget statement by Weinberger. “We do 
not have an adequate organization structure today [in the Pentagon]”, he 
said, “at least in my judgment.” He followed his testimony with an article in 
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the Armed Forces Journal that criticized the JCS as a “patchwork” system 
that failed to produce good, clear advice. “As would be expected”, he wrote, 
“papers produced by such a multiple committee process are often watered 
down or well waffl ed.”10 
The next month, Army Chief of Staff, General Edward “Shy” Meyer, 
weighed in with his own article, calling for the creation of a full-time advisory 
body of senior offi cers, a National Military Advisory Council, separate 
from the service chiefs. Meyer argued that dual-hatting of the service chiefs 
divided their loyalties and prevented them from giving “sound, usable and 
timely military advice.”11
At fi rst, only a couple of Congressmen took up the cause of JCS reform. 
Ike Skelton (D-Mo) had been the only House Armed Services Committee 
member to pick up on Jones’ February 3 testimony with a series of questions. 
Later, Cong. Richard C. White (D-Tex.), chairman of the Investigations 
Subcommittee, decided to launch a series of hearings on the issue. He had 
been prodded by a new staff member, retired Air Force Colonel Archie 
Barrett, who had just fi nished a study of Pentagon organizational problems. 
He told White, “Mr. Chairman, when the top military offi cer says that the 
JCS system is fatally fl awed, Congress can’t sit idly by.”12
Although White planned to retire from Congress at the end of 1982, he 
seized the issue and held 20 hearings with 43 witnesses between April and 
the end of July. The sessions built a solid foundation for reform. Ten former 
high ranking civilians were supportive, as were almost all active and retired 
army and air force offi cers and most marine witnesses. Only half of the navy 
witnesses – those who had signifi cant experience in joint positions – favored 
reform, however.13
By midsummer there had been a major turnover in the JCS. General Jones 
had been replaced as chairman by Army General John W. Vessey, Jr., and 
there were new men atop the navy and air force. When they testifi ed before 
White’s subcommittee, they withheld any strong opinions, saying that they 
had been asked by Secretary Weinberger to review the various proposals and 
report to him by October 1.14
White proceeded with a bill limited to non-controversial provisions, such 
as allowing the JCS Chairman to provide military advice “in his own right” 
but not designating him the principal military adviser, as later legislation 
would. The bill was approved unanimously by the full Armed Services 
Committee and passed the House a few days later by voice vote. Weinberger 
reported to Reagan that the measure was done “primarily as a courtesy” to 
the retiring subcommittee chairman and that it was “a much watered down 
version” of earlier proposals.15
The apparent death knell for reform came on November 22, when the 
JCS reported to Weinberger just what he wanted to hear – that “sweeping 
changes to title 10 USC [U.S. Code] are unnecessary.”16 It would take 
another year and more military disasters before Congress moved against the 
entrenched Pentagon leaders.
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Beirut and Grenada
Secretary Weinberger was fully occupied in 1983 defending his request for 
a 10 percent hike in the Pentagon budget and in securing support for the 
controversial MX missile and basing system. There was also considerable 
pressure for a “freeze” in nuclear weapons programs.17 When reorganization 
issues were raised in congressional hearings, he sidestepped them, arguing 
that no major changes were needed but that some modest changes were 
being reviewed. 
House members pushed a minor revision of the 1982 bill, adding the 
legislative tweaks endorsed by Weinberger. They held a meeting with the 
defense secretary and JCS chairman on May 18, when the Pentagon leaders 
reiterated their opposition to major changes. Weinberger declared that “[the 
present] system works and is satisfactory.” General Vessey said, “The JCS 
agreed that the law should not be changed with respect to the duties given to 
the JCS.” Nevertheless, the House committee made a few additional changes, 
and the full House passed the new measure by voice vote on October 17.18 
Events a week later gave new impetus to reform. On October 23, a suicide 
truck bomber drove to the front of the building housing US Marines sent 
to Beirut on a peacekeeping mission, killing 241 servicemen. Subsequent 
investigations revealed a dysfunctional command arrangement with 31 
different “stovepipes” reporting to the Pentagon as well as insuffi cient regard 
for the local threat of terrorism.19 
Two days later, when US forces were sent into the Caribbean island of 
Grenada to rescue American medical students threatened following a leftist 
coup, the operation revealed numerous organizational and operational 
problems. The army and Marine Corps had separate chains of command, 
incompatible radios, and outdated tourist maps. A few weeks later, Senator 
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) met some returning soldiers who told him that the only 
way one army offi cer could get naval gunfi re support was to go to a public 
telephone booth and call Fort Bragg using his AT&T calling card. Colin 
Powell, who was Weinberger’s senior military assistant at the time, later 
called Grenada “a sloppy success.” He said, “Relations between the services 
were marred by poor communications, fractured command and control, 
interservice parochialism, and micromanagement from Washington.”20
Beirut and Grenada strengthened the resolve of those in Congress who 
had been pressing reform. Instead of a hypothetical intellectual exercise, 
it became an urgent practical military necessity. Congressman Bill Nichols 
(D-Ala.), who had succeeded Dick White as chairman of the Investigations 
Subcommittee, had met with marines in Beirut only a few weeks before the 
barracks bombing. His subcommittee was charged with investigating the 
tragedy, and it discovered and reported a fl awed chain of command as well 
as serious errors of judgment. The events made Nichols a more committed 
reformer, who soon found new allies and entrenched adversaries.21
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Organized resistance
Caspar Weinberger opposed anything that would detract from his budget 
plans. As he later told Jim Locher, “Reorganization was put forth frequently 
by many people as a substitute for defense spending. They’d say, ‘If we just 
had reorganization, we wouldn’t need so much money,’ which was quite 
absurd.”22 That was certainly the motivation for some members of Congress, 
who seized upon management scandals – such as grossly overpriced hammers, 
coffee pots, and toilet seats – to discredit Weinberger’s budget requests.
But there were many others, particularly on the defense committees 
of Congress, who wanted to improve the war-fi ghting capabilities of the 
armed forces by reducing service parochialism and increasing inter-service 
coordination. They were fi ghting a less visible inside game to correct the 
fl aws identifi ed by General Jones and others, fl aws that had been part of the 
US military system at least since 1947.
Leading the fi ght against reform in the 1980s, as in the 1940s, was the 
leadership of the US Navy. After the Second World War, Navy Secretary 
James Forrestal and a host of admirals successfully blocked centralization 
of the armed forces. When Forrestal was then named the fi rst Secretary of 
Defense, he soon discovered that the post lacked the power to do bring 
the services into line under a common budget. Nor could General Dwight 
Eisenhower, as President in the 1950s, persuade Congress to take more than 
baby steps toward reducing service autonomy.
In the 1980s, the navy was led by John Lehman, a strong-willed, politically 
connected, seapower advocate. Even Admiral William Crowe, who became 
JCS Chairman in 1985, viewed Lehman as ambitious and ruthless, calling 
him “the ultimate bureaucrat. He was unscrupulous. Didn’t hesitate to lie.”23 
Colin Powell called him “probably the best infi ghter in the building …. To 
him, the Navy position was always the Alamo.”24 
Lehman ran the navy as a very tight ship, often telling his offi cers, 
“Loyalty is agreeing with me.” He promoted those who shared his views and 
followed his orders. He ignored outside pressures, even from Weinberger, 
and single-mindedly maneuvered to increase the navy’s budget and guard 
against interference. To win friends on Capitol Hill, he launched a Strategic 
Homeport Initiative, seeking to disperse the fl eet into a dozen new bases. 
Ostensibly, this was to prevent any Pearl Harbor-like concentration of ships. 
In fact, it worked to increase political support for navy programs as numerous 
cities vied for the jobs and spending the homeports promised.25 
His arguments against strengthening the JCS Chairman and the Joint 
Staff were the same ones made over the years by other naval offi cials. He 
claimed there was too much centralization already. He warned against a 
“Prussian general staff.” And he blamed Congress for causing these problems 
and failing to fi x them by halting its micromanagement of the services.26 He 
repeated these points in a series of speeches and articles while legislation 
worked its way through Congress.
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Lehman also worked behind the scenes to set up roadblocks to reform. 
A retired marine brigadier general fed him insider reports on the Jones 
study group as it developed its recommendations. He pressured the Hudson 
Institute to establish a study group of anti-reform retired offi cers which 
ultimately issued a report echoing Lehman’s own criticisms of the reform 
proposals. And when the conservative Heritage Foundation was on the verge 
of releasing its own report that urged eliminating the service secretariats and 
other measures, Lehman succeeded in having the report’s release delayed for 
eight months.27 
The navy also had a friend in the Senate, the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, John Tower (R-Tex.) He was proud of his service as an 
enlisted seaman and otherwise supportive of Lehman and the navy. He also 
hoped to succeed Weinberger as secretary of defense and thus was careful 
about causing problems for the administration. In May 1982, he headed 
off an amendment by Sen. Nunn requiring a DOD report on JCS reforms 
by promising “hearings at the earliest possible date.”28 Nunn withdrew his 
amendment, but the hearing was not scheduled until December 16, shortly 
before Congress adjourned for the year.
In June 1983, to counter the House action on reform legislation, he 
announ ced a comprehensive series of hearings on DOD organization. His 
preference was for even less centralization, including dismantling the offi ce 
of the secretary of defense, but the staff went to work on its study with a more 
open mind. Hearings later on demonstrated Weinberger’s defensiveness and 
the growing chorus of critics. Former defense secretary James Schlesinger 
testifi ed on November 2 that the JCS structure was the “central weakness” 
of the system. “The unavoidable outcome is a structure in which log-rolling, 
back-scratching, marriage arrangements, and the like fl ourish. It is important 
not to rock the boat.”29 
In 1984, with politicians distracted by the presidential and congressional 
elections, little progress was made on defense reform legislation. When 
Tower had done nothing to get Senate action, the House committee added 
the previously passed Nichols bill to its broad DOD authorization bill, the 
principal annual vehicle for defense policy and budget legislation. When 
the Senate considered its version of the bill, Sen. Thomas Eagleton (D-
Mo.) offered an amendment to replace the JCS with an advisory council. 
Tower defl ected the proposal with a promise of later committee action. 
Joining the debate and pressing for some kind of action were Sam Nunn, 
who became the committee’s senior Democrat in September 1983 with the 
death of Sen. Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson (D-Wash.) and Barry Goldwater 
(R-Ariz.) who was expected to succeed the retiring Tower after the 1984 
elections.30
In the House–Senate conference on the authorization bill in September, 
Tower repeatedly blocked Nichols’ efforts to discuss the House-passed 
language. The Texan postponed action until 1a.m., following 15 hours of 
marathon negotiations on other issues. Angry and discouraged, Nichols 
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agreed to back down with report language promising action in 1985. But 
Nunn laid the groundwork for the next year with language requiring a DOD 
report answering detailed questions about organizational issues.31
Goldwater’s legacy
Ronald Reagan was overwhelmingly reelected and kept Weinberger as 
secretary of defense. Goldwater became Senate Armed Services Committee 
chairman, with Nunn as ranking Democrat. In the House, Les Aspin 
became chairman of the House Armed Services Committee after Democrats 
ousted the aging and ailing former chairman. The stage was set for serious 
consideration of reform issues.
Joining the chorus for change was a distinguished panel brought together 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which released 
a report on January 25, 1985, blaming inter-service rivalries for most of the 
problems in the Pentagon and recommending a stronger JCS chairman and 
joint staff. Hill members of the panel included Nunn, Aspin, Senator Bill 
Cohen (R-Me.) and Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.). The group’s report 
eventually won the endorsement of six of seven living former secretaries of 
defense – all except Don Rumsfeld.32
Criticism of Pentagon organization coincided with new horror stories 
about weapons program costs and mismanagement. Investigators uncovered 
$180 fl ashlights, $400 hammers, $7,000 coffee pots, $74,000 folding ladders 
– and the infamous $600 toilet seat. Offi cials on the National Security 
Council staff were concerned about Weinberger’s reduced credibility on 
Capitol Hill and the risks of punitive legislation. They decided to try to 
“seize the initiative from Congress” and develop a presidential proposal.33
What the NSC staff proposed, and the president endorsed, was a “blue 
ribbon commission” headed by former business and Pentagon executive, 
David Packard. Administration offi cials hoped to buy time pending the report 
by the new panel. As things turned out, the commission’s interim report, 
in February 1986, was supportive of the reforms then moving through the 
Congress.34
Meanwhile, both House and Senate committees pressed ahead with their 
investigations and hearings. Prodded by Les Aspin, his committee approved 
a tougher JCS reorganization bill on October 24, 1985. It designated the 
JCS Chairman as the principal military adviser to the president and made 
changes in the personnel system to encourage joint experience. The House 
passed the bill 383-27 on November 20. The administration opposed the 
measure, pleading with Congress to wait for the Packard Commission’s 
report.35 
In the Senate, Goldwater and Nunn teamed up to build a committee 
consensus in favor of reform. In typical fashion, Nunn had accepted minor 
victories, such as Tower’s promise of hearings, in return for not pressing 
for formal legislation. He also sought DOD reports that might help build 
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his case. For his part, Goldwater saw this subject as a fi tting one to embrace 
in his fi nal two years in the Senate and his fi rst as chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee. He came to reform instinctively, not bureaucratically, 
but his standing as an unabashed military hawk made his support all the 
more persuasive.
Goldwater established a nine-member task force in the committee to 
review the staff study being prepared by Jim Locher and others. The group 
met about once a week during June–October 1985 to review and discuss 
the staff ’s fi ndings. The effort was serious, but Senators remained unsure 
how far to go. As late as September, one thoughtful senator, Jeff Bingaman 
(D-N.Mex.), told Locher, “your arguments and proposals appear sound, but 
all the generals and admirals across the river in the Pentagon are against 
this.”36 
Soon after Labor Day, Goldwater and Nunn devised a careful rollout 
strategy for the reform ideas. They planned to start October 1 with a series 
of hard-hitting Senate fl oor speeches spelling out the problems found in 
the current DOD organization and processes. They scheduled a weekend 
retreat for the task force, joined by a number of defense luminaries, most but 
not all of whom were on record favoring reforms. They decided to release 
Locher’s study as a “staff report” to the committee rather than a report 
by the committee, thus preserving their distance and fl exibility. And they 
planned hearings with administration and other offi cials following release of 
the report. Actual legislation was postponed until 1986.
Figure 10.1 Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn (US Senate photo)
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The plan went smoothly and garnered signifi cant and favorable media 
attention. In the fi rst of six paired fl oor speeches, Goldwater warned, 
“If we have to fi ght tomorrow, these problems will cause Americans to 
die unnecessarily. Even more, they may cause us to lose the fi ght.” The 
conservative icon went on, “You will hear over and over again the old 
maxim: ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fi x it.’ Well, I say to my colleagues: It is broke, 
and we need to fi x it.” Nunn listed numerous Pentagon problems, but also 
acknowledged congressional trivialization and micromanagement. “We have 
found the enemy and it is us.”37 
Taking the task force to a weekend retreat at a Virginia military base also 
served to reenforce the criticisms of current law and build consensus for 
change. Most of the former offi cials and other experts in attendance echoed 
the fi ndings of the staff study. When Goldwater called on the senators for 
their views, many seemed emboldened by the company and for the fi rst time 
enunciated positions in favor of various reforms.38
In preparing to release the staff study, Nunn urged Locher to include 
some controversial recommendations that were no longer favored – so that 
the proposals could be dropped as a gesture of compromise. “We need staff 
recommendations that scare them so badly that when we do what we really 
intend to do, they will take out their handkerchiefs and wipe their brows and 
say, ‘Boy, we sure are lucky’”, Nunn advised. These measures also served as 
what one journalist called “bullet traps” that drew the fi re of opponents away 
from more fundamental changes. Locher says he kept seven such provisions 
in the fi nal report, including General Meyer’s idea of disestablishing the JCS 
and replacing it with a joint military advisory council and another proposal 
to make the unifi ed commanders senior in rank to the service chiefs.39 
Just before releasing the staff study, Goldwater and Nunn went to the 
Pentagon to brief Weinberger and the Chiefs. The meeting started politely 
but quickly deteriorated into a shouting match. Deputy Secretary Will 
Taft, whose nomination Goldwater had openly opposed the previous year, 
calling the lawyer unqualifi ed to manage the Pentagon, objected to the level 
of criticism of the Department. Goldwater fi red back, “Your operational 
performance has been so piss poor, you guys would have trouble defending 
the River Entrance [to the Pentagon] from an attack by a troop of Boy 
Scouts.”40 
The 645-page staff report received the expected favorable media coverage 
and led to a series of committee hearings with a range of witnesses. Weinberger 
continued to deny there were any serious problems affecting his department 
and rejected any suggestions for reform. John Lehman’s complaint that OSD 
had too much bureaucracy was rebutted by Nunn, who pointed out that the 
navy listings took up 52 pages in the Pentagon phone book, almost as many 
as OSD, JCS, and all the other services combined.41 
New to the ranks of reformers but unwilling to be outspoken, was Admiral 
William Crowe, who became JCS Chairman in October, 1985. Crowe earned 
a PhD at Princeton in addition to serving in a variety of naval assignments 
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as he moved up in rank. By the time he was the Pacifi c Commander, he 
had come to appreciate the need for greater inter-service jointness – and he 
recognized his own service’s opposition to collaboration.42
Once he became Chairman, Crowe said he had to “tread carefully.” The 
Chiefs felt unjustly maligned by so much criticism. But Crowe knew he 
needed a good working relationship with them, so he tried to stay out of the 
public debate, working behind the scenes to get the Chiefs to come up with 
things they could support instead of fi ghting all change.43 Most of the Chiefs 
remained adamant in their opposition.
Early in 1986, Goldwater and Nunn drafted a revised bill, still leaving in 
some lightning rod provisions they could drop when necessary. On February 
3, the day before the committee markup of their bill, they went again to 
the Pentagon for a meeting with the Chiefs. As before, the Senators met 
strong objections from Marine Corps Commandant, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, and the Army Chief of Staff. Army General John Wickham said 
bluntly, “This legislation would cripple the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”44 
The Senators tried to answer objections but ultimately realized the effort 
was futile. As they returned to the Capitol, Goldwater told Nunn, “If the 
Pentagon is ever going to be straightened out, the only hope is for Congress 
to do it. The services are so parochial and powerful, there’s no way the exec-
utive branch will ever get it done.”45
A month-long drama began the next day with the start of markup. Of the 
10 Republicans and nine Democrats on the committee, only nine Senators 
seemed fully supportive of the reform legislation. Goldwater assured Nunn 
that he could bring Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SoCar.) along, to provide a 
10–9 majority. When Sen. John Warner (R-Va.) took the mantle of leader 
of the opposition and offered a package of 13 amendments on the fi rst day, 
Goldwater announced that the committee would conduct no other business 
until it had completed the markup of the reorganization bill.46 
On the fi rst substantive vote, Goldwater phoned the absent Sen. Dan 
Quayle (R-Ind.) and threatened to take his subcommittee chairmanship 
away from him if he supported Warner. Quayle complied, but the threat 
increased tension among the members. Over time, the committee debated 53 
amendments by Sen. Warner and defeated the only three brought to rollcall 
votes. Some 60 percent of his proposals were adopted – including the Virginia 
senator’s far-sighted proposal requiring an annual national security strategy 
report by the president.47 Goldwater and Nunn used the amendment process 
to make revisions, garner support, and smooth ruffl ed feathers. 
Outside, the navy was running a crisis management center to help block 
the legislation. Alerted by a journalist, Goldwater called the navy offi ce and 
spoke to an unsuspecting staffer, who acknowledged their purpose. This 
incident of executive branch interference with the legislature also helped 
build unity in the committee.48 
On March 6, following the lengthy debates and votes on amendments, 
the committee voted on reporting the bill to the Senate. To the surprise of 
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all, the vote was unanimous. Even Warner and other navy stalwarts voted for 
the bill. The legislative process had turned them from staunch opponents to 
at least lukewarm and grudging supporters.
Administration opposition crumbled further when the president embraced 
the cause of reform – though he did it by offering his own proposals, without 
mention of the work already done on Capitol Hill. Reagan endorsed 
the Packard Commission recommendations on April 5. The Offi ce of 
Management and Budget announced support of the Senate bill, provided 
only that wording on the expiration of the JCS chairman’s term be deleted. 
The change was made and the bill went before the Senate on May 7.49 
Despite a last-minute attempt to kill the bill – Lehman asked Warner 
to offer an amendment exempting the navy from having to comply with 
its provisions – debate proceeded swiftly. Just before fi nal passage, Nunn 
offered an amendment to name the measure the “Barry Goldwater Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986.” Stunned into silence by the tribute, Goldwater 
was visibly moved. A few moments later, the Senate voted unanimously, 95–
0, to pass the bill. The opposition had vanished, driven away by the desire 
to honor the retiring chairman and the sense that the time for reform had 
come.
In the House, there was a similar drama. The day before markup on June 
25, Nichols and others met with the Chiefs in the Pentagon. Despite the 
changed administration position, some of the military leaders continued to 
object. The CNO, Admiral James Watkins, got red in the face and shouted 
at Nichols, “You know, this piece of legislation is so bad it’s, it’s … in some 
respects it’s just un-American!”50
When markup started, Chairman Aspin offered the fi rst amendment 
– to name their measure the “Bill Nichols Defense Reorganization Act 
of 1986.” Once again, the opposition vanished as the committee rallied 
around its member and his landmark bill. Few amendments were raised; 
most were withdrawn before a vote. The committee reported the bill by an 
overwhelming 39–4 vote.51
Nichols added his bill to the overall DOD authorization bill in August, 
and the two versions went to conference in September. The fi nal version 
tracked closely the original ideas of General Jones, but it had been vetted 
and massaged and modifi ed to answer the concerns raised over the years. 
Strangely, despite the White House’s earlier endorsement of reform 
legislation, Reagan signed the bill only at the last minute and without a 
formal ceremony with the chief sponsors.52
Impact
Admiral Crowe moved gingerly to take advantage of his increased powers. 
The full impact of the legislation strengthening the JCS Chairman did not 
occur until Colin Powell was appointed in September 1989. Almost overnight, 
however, the Joint Staff became a power center in the Pentagon. Service in a 
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joint position like the Joint Staff became, under the new law, a prerequisite 
for becoming a general or admiral, and the best and brightest young offi cers 
clamored for a chance to serve in such posts. Another lasting impact has 
been the increased infl uence of the regional combatant commanders, who 
now can offer their own budget and policy recommendations directly to 
their civilian leaders. The military operations conducted by the United States 
since 1986 have been signifi cantly better planned and organized – and more 
effective – as a direct consequence of Goldwater–Nichols.
An important lesson from this story is that Congress can transform the 
Pentagon, just as powerful secretaries of defense can. Congress in league with 
some senior military offi cers can prevail over the most determined opposition 
of the executive branch – and even over objecting military leaders. 
11 The Bush–Rumsfeld wars and 
transformation
I will give the [Defense] Secretary a broad mandate – to challenge the status 
quo and envision a new architecture of American defense for decades to 
come.
Gov. George W. Bush, September, 19991
The Constitution calls for civilian control of this department, And I’m a 
civilian.
Don Rumsfeld2 
JCS had a lot less of a voice in this administration. The Pentagon in previous 
administrations really had two voices. Not in this administration. It was just 
Rumsfeld.
Richard Haass, State Department, 2001–33
Texas Governor George W. Bush needed a national security speech for his 
campaign for the presidency. He knew what he didn’t like – the Clinton 
administration’s policies – and he asked his growing circle of advisors for 
their suggestions for alternatives. 
Condoleezza Rice, his closest advisor on national security issues, headed a 
group of eight experienced Republican policy hands who wound up calling 
themselves the Vulcans, after the Roman god of the forge and metalwork, 
whose statue loomed over Rice’s hometown of Birmingham, Alabama. 
Among this group were Paul Wolfowitz, Rich Armitage, Richard Perle, 
Steve Hadley and Robert Zoellick, all of whom had served in the Reagan or 
G.H.W. Bush administrations.4 
With Armitage writing the fi rst draft, the Vulcans produced a sharp critique 
of Clinton’s policies as well as a vision of a greatly changed US military. This 
appealed to Bush, who didn’t want the typical Republican rhetoric of “more 
is better and the generals know best.” He wanted to be the outsider with 
outside ideas.5 What Armitage offered were the ideas of a new group of 
defense intellectuals who had been developing the concept of a “revolution 
in military affairs” – which was immediately turned into a Pentagon-friendly 
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acronym, RMA. Few disagreed with the promising vision of an RMA; fewer 
still knew how to achieve it. 
As the speech went through successive drafts, it was shown to a wider 
circle of advisors, including the older, cabinet-level types like Dick Cheney, 
Don Rumsfeld, and Colin Powell. Several criticized its specifi city on some 
points, such as a call for spending fully 20 percent of procurement dollars on 
transformational programs. But Bush kept pushing for innovative ideas and 
insisted that that pledge be left in.6 
On September 23, 1999, the Texas Governor spoke at The Citadel, 
South Carolina’s military college. In his speech, he criticized the Clinton 
administration for over-stretched resources and lower morale. For himself as 
future President, he set three goals: to “renew the bond of trust between the 
American president and the American military”; to “defend the American 
people against missiles and terror”; and to “begin creating the military of 
the next century.” He also pledged “an immediate, comprehensive review 
of our military” with the goal of moving “beyond marginal improvements 
– to replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies. To use 
this window of opportunity to skip a generation of technology.” He also 
promised to his Secretary of Defense “a broad mandate – to challenge the 
status quo and envision a new architecture of American defense for decades 
to come.”7
This approach appealed to Bush. It took advantage of America’s 
technological strengths. It promised a much better defense capability for 
little or no extra spending. It allowed him to support a strong defense and 
major tax cuts without greatly increasing the federal defi cit. It even let him 
outfl ank Vice President Al Gore, who prided himself on his futurism but who 
advocated only a conventional, evolutionary approach to defense.
Advocates of revolution
The Citadel speech served its campaign purpose as a set of themes on 
defense, and as a set of marching orders once the governor became president. 
Probably Bush’s most consequential decision before his election was his 
choice of Dick Cheney as his running mate. The former defense secretary 
and former House Republican whip had instant credibility as a Washington 
power player. Once in offi ce, Cheney built an enlarged and activist Vice 
Presidential staff, with 13–15 people working on NSC matters, or as many as 
35 counting consultants and secondments, thus allowing him to monitor and 
be represented on a full range of issues.8 Even before 9/11, Cheney was often 
seen as Bush’s prime minister, not merely his potential successor. 
Bush chose Don Rumsfeld as defense secretary not only because of his long 
experience in security matters but also because he would be a counterweight 
to Colin Powell at the State Department. Bush had been expected to name 
Senator Dan Coats (R-Ind), one of the leading congressional sponsors of 
measures to push military transformation, but Coats failed to impress Bush. 
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Rumsfeld had prior Pentagon experience and long ties to Cheney. He was 
an advocate of missile defense and space programs, although not at fi rst a 
zealot for transformation. He seemed to accept RMA as an assignment. As 
he told the president, “If you want me to change the building [the Pentagon], 
I’ll change the building.”9 
The blueprint for transformation was taken from a 1997 report by the 
National Defense Panel (NDP), a group commissioned by Congress to give 
an outside, second opinion to place alongside the administration’s required 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Armitage had been a member of the 
elite, nine-member NDP, as had retired Army Colonel Andrew Krepinevich, 
a leading contributor to the RMA literature. The NDP was prescient in 
many respects. It forecast threats to American “domestic communities 
and key infrastructures” and urged greater attention to homeland defense. 
It dismissed as a “low probability scenario” the two major war planning 
assumption which Rumsfeld eventually discarded in 2001. “We are on the 
cusp of a military revolution”, the NDP said, because of rapid advances 
in information technologies. Those who would exploit those technologies 
could “dissipate the ‘fog of war’” and “gain signifi cant advantages.” The 
panel disparaged “legacy systems” which would increasingly be at risk and 
Figure 11.1 President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
(Defense Department photo)
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questioned the procurement plans of the services. Instead, the NDP urged 
a dedicated “transformation strategy” with at least $5 billion to $10 billion 
more per year devoted to new systems. 
These ideas appealed to the new president more than to his new defense 
secretary.10 Rumsfeld’s tentative embrace of transformation was evident 
in his confi rmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
He described his goal of transforming the defense establishment chiefl y in 
terms of a faster weapons acquisition process. He also hedged on skipping a 
generation of weapons by saying, “We cannot allow the effectiveness of our 
military forces to degrade while we are modernizing and transforming.” And 
his example of great technological change was merely the switch from diesel 
to turbine engines in the M-1 tank, something most observers considered 
evolutionary.11 
After a few months on the job, Rumsfeld further tried to dispel notions 
that he had come to the Pentagon with fi xed ideas for radical change. “Some 
people think I arrived in this job from the pharmaceutical business with a 
head full of plans, ready to bring it out, unwrap the cellophane package, 
and hand them over to the Pentagon”, he told reporters. “I didn’t. I am very 
sincerely trying to fi gure out what I ought to think about these things.”12
Civilian in charge
What the new defense secretary did have fi rm, fi xed views on, however, was 
the need for strong civilian control of the military. As he later told reporters, 
“The Constitution calls for civilian control of this department, And I’m a 
civilian.”13 At his fi rst meeting with the Joint Chiefs, he ordered a halt to 
efforts to brief Congress on the military’s wish list for $8 billion in extra 
spending. A few weeks later he went further and ordered senior offi ces to 
notify his offi ce a week in advance of all meeting with lawmakers.14 
Many in the new administration thought that Clinton and his cabinet had 
not exerted tight enough control over the military, and that the senior offi cers 
were not in step with the new leadership. The holdover JCS Chairman, 
General Hugh Shelton, later said, “I think he [Rumsfeld] felt like we were 
part of the old administration, that we were part of the problem, not looking 
for solutions. I don’t know why he thought that.”15
Rumsfeld set about to fi nd a new generation of senior offi cers. He made a 
point of personally interviewing all candidates for three- and four-star posts, 
and rejecting those he considered unqualifi ed. He even interviewed several 
dozen offi cers in order to fi ll each of the most important positions of JCS 
members and combatant commanders. In addition to vetting senior offi cers, 
he sought to increase the time in position of those selected so that they could 
better learn and fulfi ll their assignments. Rumsfeld and his people began a 
“silent purge” of other offi cers and civilians and seized control over senior 
appointments from the services.16 
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His style was provocative, even intimidating. Early in 2003, a New York 
Times reporter called his management style “equal parts debating club and 
wrestling match.” A senior offi cial said the secretary welcomed challenges 
to his views. “But those who challenge the secretary must be prepared 
for withering cross-examination in a style that some, especially military 
commanders who are used to a more respectful hearing, fi nd so abrasive that 
one senior offi cer has dubbed it ‘the wire brush treatment’.”17
His actions were also assertive and controlling. The new secretary angered 
the Chiefs early on by excluding them and the Joint Staff from the more 
than 50 studies he launched when he took offi ce. Following the pattern set 
by Robert McNamara four decades before, Rumsfeld commissioned reports 
from different groups of mostly outsiders, retired offi cers and former 
offi cials. “We’ve been kept out of the loop”, complained a senior general to 
the Washington Post. Rumsfeld retorted, “The people it [change] shakes up 
may very well be people who don’t have enough to do.” By May, 2001, the 
griping reached Capitol Hill and the press, and Rumsfeld made a point of 
meeting with the Chiefs and with members of Congress, so that they could 
present their views.18
Rumsfeld also disappointed the senior military by the way he handled 
the budget. Having heard the Republican campaign rhetoric “help is on 
the way”, senior offi cers developed information for an $8 billion increase 
prior to Bush’s inauguration. Rumsfeld silenced that idea, and the President 
decided against any immediate supplemental request, staying with the fi nal 
Clinton defense budget. The White House press secretary bragged that the 
new team would not “throw money in the direction of defense” until it had 
completed a full strategic review.19 The administration later relented and in 
June proposed an extra $5.6 billion, mainly for higher pay, readiness, and 
program cost growth. 
In the summer, Rumsfeld requested an extra $35 billion for the coming 
year, but accepted a reduction by Bush’s budget offi ce to an $18 billion 
increase. His failure to fi ght harder and get more money led leading 
conservatives to call for Rumsfeld’s resignation.20 In August, the president 
also dashed cold water on military spending hopes when he told reporters, 
“There is no question that we probably cannot afford every weapons system 
that is now … being designed or thought of.” He said the administration 
would take the ideas and “winnow them down.”21
Meanwhile, Rumsfeld encountered pushback from the Chiefs and the 
services. Several planners suggested cutting two-divisions from the army, 
which prompted a letter from 82 congressmen opposing any such reduction. 
Rumsfeld openly rejected and sent back for revision one group’s call for a 34-
carrier navy, compared to the 12 in the fl eet, and a doubling of production of 
the advanced but expensive F-22 fi ghter for the air force. By August 2001, 
he gave up on the idea of dictating the organization and weaponry of the 
forces and agreed to let the services make those decisions within his broad 
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guidelines. He defended his setbacks by repeating to the press, “Change is 
hard.”22 
By early September 2001, the Rumsfeld revolution in defense appeared 
to be a failure. There was press speculation that the defense secretary would 
be the fi rst to leave the cabinet. On September 6, a reporter asked, “Do you 
feel a little beat-up? Kind of a punching bag, you know, being hit from all 
sides?” The embattled secretary replied, “No … there’s a kind of rhythm to 
this whole thing. The new group comes in, everyone’s kind of nice for fi ve 
minutes, and then … they start throwing them in the barrel and beating them 
up a little bit, and life goes on ….”23
On September 10, 2001, Rumsfeld spoke to Defense Department 
employees, ostensibly to urge them to support management reforms. But 
his words had an edge, for he called “the Pentagon bureaucracy” – his very 
audience – “an adversary that poses a threat, a serious threat, to the security 
of the United States”, an enemy that “stifl es free thought and crushes new 
ideas.”24 
A few hours later, hijacked airplanes crashed into the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon itself, and Don Rumsfeld was transformed from a 
beleaguered Secretary of Defense into a commanding, admired secretary of 
war.
War on terror
After September 11, George W. Bush also was transformed, from a minority 
president, elected with fewer popular votes than his opponent, to the popular 
commander-in-chief, rallying the nation and ordering US troops into combat 
against the terrorists and their allies. As soon as he learned of the second 
plane striking the World Trade Center, he concluded that America was at 
war and had to fi ght. In his fi rst call to Rumsfeld, the president said, “we’ll 
clean up the mess and then the ball will be in your court and [General] Dick 
Myers’s court.”25
The commander-in-chief had very defi nite ideas about how he should 
act. His overall management style, derived in part from his Harvard MBA 
training, was to give guidance and then delegate operational responsibilities. 
But when Cheney suggested himself as head of a war cabinet that would 
develop options for the president, Bush rejected the idea. He wanted to run 
the meetings himself, wanted to show that he was in charge. He also wanted 
to avoid what he considered the errors during the Vietnam War. He did not 
want to micromanage operations or set tactics, but he wanted to guarantee 
that there was a “sense of purpose and forward movement.”26
The secretary of defense was also determined to assert tight civilian 
control over any military operations. Time and again in meetings, he would 
answer questions directed at General Myers or General Tommy Franks, 
the combatant commander for the Middle East (Centcom). After one such 
exchange, Bush asked Franks directly, “Tommy, what do you think?” The 
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general responded, “Sir, I think exactly what my secretary thinks, what he’s 
ever thought, what he will ever think, or whatever he thought he might 
think.”27
Rumsfeld refused to give subordinates negotiating authority for interagency 
meetings, thus clogging the process and forcing even minor issues to the 
senior leaders’ meetings. If DOD had a position, department offi cials had to 
defend it; if DOD had not yet developed a fi rm position, they were under 
orders not to preclude one by agreeing to anything else. As Richard Haass, 
Powell’s director of policy planning later said, “JCS had a lot less of a voice 
in this administration. The Pentagon in previous administrations really had 
two voices. Not in this administration. It was just Rumsfeld.”28
On September 12, the day after the attacks, the NSC convened and 
debated whether to go only after al Qaeda, or to pursue other terrorists as 
well. Rumsfeld even raised the question of going after Iraq. At Camp David 
on September 15, Rumsfeld and especially his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, again 
suggested attacks on Iraq. Such operations seemed more doable, more likely 
to succeed, while US troops could be bogged down in mountain fi ghting in 
Afghanistan. Bush listened, but decided to put a stop to such discussions. 
He wanted to avoid losing focus by trying too many things. He also turned 
down routine retaliatory strikes inside Iraq by the aircraft that had been 
patrolling since 1991. “We have to be patient about Iraq”, he said.29 
It was much harder to be patient about Afghanistan, but the US military 
did not have any ready options. At Camp David, outgoing JCS Chairman, 
General Hugh Shelton, presented three options: 1. A cruise missile attack on 
al Qaeda training camps. 2. Up to 10 days of cruise missile and bomber attacks 
on the camps and some Taliban targets. 3. The air strikes plus some “boots 
on the ground.” While the fi rst two seemed inadequate, the third would 
require at least 10–12 days to get initial forces in and to obtain necessary 
basing and overfl ight rights. Rumsfeld had earlier warned Bush that major 
operations could take up to 60 days to arrange. Now he disparaged the 
available military plans, “The military options look like fi ve or ten years 
ago”, he grumbled. He said he favored unconventional approaches using 
special forces.30 
CIA Director George Tenet, however, was ready with a bold plan using 
CIA personnel. His plan called for Agency-run paramilitary forces to aid 
and invigorate the Afghan opposition called the Northern Alliance. He also 
sought the president’s authorization for “exceptional authorities” to pursue 
and destroy al Qaeda cells throughout the world. To Rumsfeld’s dismay, Bush 
eagerly endorsed Tenet’s plans for immediate action.31 The defense secretary 
then pressed Franks to come up with good plans quickly. He also insisted 
that the plans be creative to deal with the distinctive nature of the enemy. 
“The Taliban and Al Qaeda do not have armies, navies, and air forces”, he 
said.32
Legally, the US chain of command runs from the president to the secretary 
of defense and then directly to the combatant commander, with the JCS 
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Chairman in the loop only to transmit communications. Rumsfeld and 
Franks quickly developed direct links and held frequent conferences, both in 
Washington and by video teleconference (VTC). As planning continued, the 
Centcom commander repeatedly complained of interference and unsolicited 
advice from the Chiefs. At one point, Franks called General Myers. “Dick, 
we’re gonna have to unscrew the Service contributions to this fi ght …. I’ll 
provide the command, you work on the Service Chiefs to get the unity of 
effort.” He later wrote that “a number of offi cers on the Joint Staff were on 
their own tactical wave length, and it was these offi cers who were the focus 
of my strategic ‘push’.”33
The civilian leaders wanted action faster than the military could deliver. 
The warriors needed to build up staging bases, needed on-the-ground 
intelligence to plan targets, needed to have Combat Search and Rescue 
(CSAR) units in place before launching air strikes, needed overfl ight rights 
from nearby countries. All this took time.34 Rumsfeld went to the region in 
early October to secure cooperation, notably from Uzbekistan.
General Franks developed an initial plan and briefed the president on 
September 21, just 10 days after the terror attacks. The fi rst phase involved 
completing the basing and staging arrangements. Phase II involved air strikes 
and the deployment of special forces teams to work with the Northern alliance 
against the ruling Taliban. The “decisive combat operations” of Phase III 
would involve local and coalition forces “to seek out and eliminate pockets 
of resistance.” Only about 200 special forces personnel were planned for 
phase II, and only 10,000–12,000 US troops in Phase III. The fi nal phase, a 
three–fi ve year effort in Franks’ estimation, was for strengthening the new 
government and helping its people – nation building.35
Neither the president nor his defense secretary had much interest in the 
idea of nation-building. Bush had criticized the Clinton Administration for 
the practice during the 2000 campaign. Rumsfeld told the press on October 
9, “I don’t think [defeat of the Taliban] leaves us with a responsibility to try 
to fi gure out what kind of government that country ought to have.” A week 
later the president interrupted an NSC meeting with the comment, “There’s 
been too much discussion of post-confl ict Afghanistan.”36 The low priority 
given to Phase IV was repeated again in Iraq, with painful consequences. For 
the combat operations, however, Bush was quite involved and supportive. 
“Tommy, are you getting what you need?” he asked Franks in early November. 
“I’m happy. I’m getting what I need”, the general replied. The president also 
reassured his commander, “We will be patient. This will take as long as it 
takes.”37 
Air strikes began October 7. In mid-October, after repeated delays in 
infi ltrating special forces, Franks came under heavy pressure to get boots on 
the ground. “This isn’t working”, Rumsfeld told him. “I want you to build 
options that will work.” These comments so upset the Centcom commander 
that he called the defense secretary and offered to resign. “It appears that 
you no longer have confi dence in me”, he told Rumsfeld. “If you have lost 
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confi dence … you should select another commander.” After a long pause, 
Rumsfeld replied, “General Franks, you have my complete confi dence. This 
operation will succeed.”38 
In mid-October, the defense secretary succeeded in taking over control 
of the CIA forces as well as the military ones. This had been a point of 
contention in the early weeks of the operation.39 And after another period 
of frustration, and press reports hinting at a “quagmire” – the code word 
for “another Vietnam” – Operation Enduring Freedom was successful. The 
fi rst major victory was the capture of Mazar a-sharif on November 9. The 
Taliban evacuated the capital of Kabul three days later. The last major city to 
be captured, Kandahar, was taken on December 6. The war then shifted to 
the mountains and caves of Tora Bora. On December 16, Rumsfeld fl ew to 
Afghanistan to proclaim the victory. “The President of the United States, the 
commander-in-chief, is determined to let the world know that our country 
cannot be attacked without consequences”, he told soldiers from the 10th 
Mountain Division, “and you are bringing the consequences.”
The Iraq option
On November 27, with much of Afghanistan in friendly hands, Rumsfeld 
called his commander with a surprising request. “The president wants us to 
look at options for Iraq. What is the status of your planning?”
 “We have a plan, of course. OPLAN 1003”, Franks replied. “It’s out of 
date, under revision because conditions have changed.”
 “Please dust it off and get back to me next week”, Rumsfeld ordered.40 
Over the next 15 months, Franks and his Centcom planners developed 
three revised war plans: fi rst, a large scale, “generated” buildup; second, a 
“running start” operation in case fi ghting began before the buildup had been 
completed, and fi nally a “hybrid”, with a quick start of combined air and 
ground operations and follow-on forces. The fi rst draft plan called for a US 
force of 400,000. By February 2002, under pressure from Rumsfeld to be 
creative and make do with fewer troops, Franks cut the fi gure for the start of 
the war to 160,000 – but he still envisioned a buildup to 300,000 before the 
end of major combat operations. On at least six occasions during the course 
of the planning, the defense secretary insisted on further cuts in ground 
troops. The multinational coalition force assembled on D-Day, March 21, 
2003, numbered 290,000, and two weeks after the war began on March 21, 
2003, there were 310,000 US military personnel in the region involved in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.41 
Throughout the planning process, the defense secretary was “like a 
dentist’s drill that never ceased”, according to Franks. The Centcom staff 
faced a “daily barrage of tasks and questions [that] was beginning to border 
on harassment.” The Joint Chiefs, by contrast, were kept at arm’s length 
from the planning process. They were not formally briefed until September 
2002, nine months after Franks had been ordered to start revising the Iraq 
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War plan. While the Chiefs raised some service-specifi c concerns with Franks, 
and later with the president, they were supportive of the operation. In a fi nal 
warning shot to his civilian superiors and the Chiefs, Franks sent a formal 
“letter of concern” to the Pentagon leadership two days before the start 
of the war. Among other things, he objected to the presence of the service 
Chiefs at any of his video teleconferences (VTCs). Though politely phrased, 
the point of his message was “Leave me the hell alone to run the war.”42 
Bush told Franks directly that he didn’t want to be picking targets – one 
of his lessons from what he had been told about Vietnam. But he showed 
a strong interest in many operational details, as did Rumsfeld and his staff. 
Although the civilians considered starting the war earlier, the combatant 
commander convinced them in February 2002 that his forces could not be 
ready before October and that the best period for fi ghting in Iraq would be 
December through March. “We can go earlier”, he told the president. “What 
it would mean is it would be ugly.”43 
Franks also received Bush’s approval of his regional deployment and 
deception plans. The Pentagon transferred several hundred millions of 
dollars from other accounts in order to prepare airfi elds and bases for the 
deploying troops. Centcom planners scheduled exercises and spikes in troop 
presence to confuse the Iraqis about the number of American forces in the 
region and the actual timing of any combat. Rumsfeld himself interfered with 
the planned notifi cation of units required for activation by spreading out the 
deployment orders over several weeks, thus minimizing press coverage and 
public reactions.44 
While Franks dealt directly with the civilian leadership during the planning 
for the war, the Chiefs reportedly weighed in with some signifi cant advice. 
When pressure grew for an early attack during 2002, they sided with Franks 
in recommending a delay until a more formidable force could be built up. 
Military leaders also reportedly urged that congressional approval be sought 
for the attack – a position consistent with the US military’s post-Vietnam 
conditions for the use of major force.45
Congress intimidated
Despite his narrow electoral victory, Bush found Congress to be largely 
supportive even before September 11. Meeting with congressional leaders 
on September 12, the president sought endorsement of the use of force, 
but not a declaration of war as such. The White House draft language, 
however, was extraordinarily broad, authorizing the president “to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, harbored, committed or aided” 
the 9/11 attacks “and to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or 
aggression against the United States.” Some congressional leaders insisted 
on removing the blank check to conduct pre-emptive attacks and altered 
the fi nal language to authorize force only against those responsible for the 
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9/11 attacks “in order to prevent any future acts of terrorism.”46 Only one 
person in either chamber, a California congresswoman, voted against the 
measure. The lawmakers viewed their vote as the functional equivalent of a 
declaration of war.
Despite the strong support, the president and vice president remained 
highly suspicious of the Congress. When reporters were told of a classifi ed 
Hill briefi ng in which intelligence offi cials warned of a high probability of 
another terrorist attack, especially if the US intervened in Afghanistan, Bush 
decided to fi ght leaks by cutting off access to information. He signed an order 
forbidding the sharing of classifi ed information with anyone except eight 
lawmakers – the party leaders in both houses and the four senior intelligence 
committee members. After a few days of predictable outrage, Bush cancelled 
the order. But both sides remained on guard over access to information.47 
After the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Bush began building the 
case for further action. In his State of the Union address in January 2002, 
he spoke of an “axis of evil” including Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. A few 
months later, at West Point, he announced that the United States would not 
wait for terrorist threats to materialize before acting. “The war on terror 
will not be won on the defensive”, he declared. In his fi rst formal National 
Security Strategy Report two months later, he promulgated a doctrine of 
preemption – of launching preventive wars in anticipatory self-defense. “To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, 
if necessary, act preemptively”, Bush declared. “[T]he United States cannot 
remain idle while dangers gather.”48 While some in Congress criticized the 
doctrine, there were no legislative actions taken to try to limit its use.
On the contrary, Bush cleverly maneuvered the Congress into endorsing 
his planned attack on Iraq by preempting objections and forcing a vote in the 
heat of mid-term congressional elections. As the evidence grew of planning 
for war, congressional Democrats demanded that Congress vote on the issue 
and that the United States, as in 1990 and 2001, go to the United Nations 
for international legal and political support. In September 2002, Bush did 
both. He asked Congress for a vote, ostensibly to pressure Saddam Hussein 
to capitulate and avoid war. And he made an impressive address to the UN 
General Assembly, warning them to act to enforce UN resolutions or render 
the international organization impotent and ineffective. The president then 
indicated that if Congress wanted to fulfi ll its Constitutional role, it had 
better act before adjourning for three months in October. Democratic critics 
had no arguments left: Bush had gone to the UN and had asked Congress 
to vote – for war, yes, but as the last best chance to preserve peace. Those 
lawmakers who had argued during the Clinton years that diplomacy should 
be backed with the threat of force were driven to support the same principle 
for Bush.
Congress did force the Bush Administration to take one action that 
later proved controversial and embarrassing: it demanded a formal 
intelligence community estimate on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. 
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The last comprehensive assessment, done in 2000, spoke of Iraq’s intent 
and infrastructure to build such weapons but did not conclude that it had 
any at that time. By the summer of 2002, the president and vice president 
were forthright in asserting that Iraq had biological and chemical weapons 
– and that was the summary judgment of the Special National Intelligence 
Estimate (SNIE) hurriedly prepared to meet the congressional demand prior 
to the vote on war. But buried within the 92-page classifi ed document were 
many qualifi cations and hedges that came to light only later, after weapons 
inspectors failed to fi nd the expected arsenal and had to conclude, “We were 
almost all wrong.”49 
With the threat re-certifi ed, Bush pressed for a vote prior to the elections. 
White House offi cials even accepted some changes in its draft resolution 
to appease Hill Democrats. For example, they agreed to drop language 
authorizing force to “restore international peace and security to the region”, 
which many viewed as endorsing more widespread military action. They also 
agreed to include references to the war powers law, which no president has 
considered controlling on his warmaking authority. When several Senators 
pressed for further concessions, Republican leaders began moving their 
version of the legislation in the House, where they had the support of the 
Democratic leader, Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.), a prospective presidential 
candidate who regretted his 1991 vote against authorizing the fi rst Gulf 
War. After defeating all modifying amendments, the House passed the 
authorization of force 296–133. Ten hours later, the Senate overwhelmingly 
approved the same language, 77–23, also after defeating all modifying 
amendments.50 In the stark language of the joint resolution, 
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States 
as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to – 
(1) defend the national security of the United States against the 
continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions 
regarding Iraq.51 
That measure was clearly seen as the functional equivalent of a declaration 
of war.
Adding to the political pressure to support action against Iraq was the 
lingering dispute over creation of a Department of Homeland Security. After 
opposing such a department for nine months, arguing that an NSC-style 
committee was suffi cient, the Bush Administration announced a secretly 
drafted plan for a new department in June 2002. The bill got hung up in 
a dispute over whether to make airport screeners government or private 
contractor employees and several Democrats were targeted in the elections 
for failing to enact what the administration by then was calling vital 
legislation. Some lawmakers feared looking weak on defense if they criticized 
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both the Iraq War and the administration’s plan for homeland security. The 
administration fi nally accepted government employees as screeners and the 
basic legislation became law in November 2002.52 
Having voted for war, Congress had little to do during the fi nal buildup 
and later invasion. It held informational hearings – but was denied any 
signifi cant information on actual military plans. Congress later learned that 
the Pentagon had spent $750 million in operations and maintenance (O&M) 
funds for military construction supposedly related to the war on terrorism 
but without providing advance notice to Congress, as required by law and 
as repeatedly requested by the relevant committees.53 Only afterward did 
the lawmakers enact legislation restricting DOD fl exibility on construction 
funds. 
Planning failure
The executive branch had free rein in preparing for the war against Iraq, and 
the whip hand was Rumsfeld’s in the Pentagon. The defense secretary, arguing 
the principle of unity of command, had sought and received full authority 
over the process. And while Pentagon offi cials can demonstrate that they 
held numerous meetings regarding what to do after the expected victory 
over Saddam Hussein, it soon became clear that insuffi cient attention and 
resources were actually devoted to Phase IV of the war plan, Post-Hostility 
Operations for reconstruction and stabilization.
The decision to concentrate postwar planning authority in the Pentagon 
was made in October 2002, but not formalized in a presidential directive 
until NSPD 24 was signed on January 20, 2003, just two months before the 
war began. That document created the Offi ce of Reconstruction and Human-
itarian Assistance (ORHA), and retired Lt. General Jay Garner was promptly 
recruited to head it. The original plan called for ORHA to move in only 
about 60 days after the end of the war. The original expectation was that the 
primary task would be humanitarian relief, especially dealing with a fl ood 
of refugees and the consequences of Iraqi use of chemical and biological 
weapons and destruction of the oil fi elds.54
Rumsfeld and Franks were preoccupied with winning the battles, and the 
most senior US offi cials thought that would be enough to win the war. Vice 
President Cheney and others were explicitly optimistic: “I really do believe 
that we will be greeted as liberators.” That expectation permitted planners 
to scale down the planned occupation force to 50,000.55 But it also led to a 
bitter public dispute between the warriors and the politicians.
Pressed in a Senate hearing at the end of February, Army Chief of Staff 
General Eric Shinseki ventured the opinion that “a signifi cant ground 
force presence” would be needed to maintain order in the post-hostilities 
environment, “on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers.” Deputy 
Secretary Wolfowitz sharply disputed that fi gure two days later, calling it 
“wildly off the mark.” He said it was “hard to imagine” that more troops 
190 The challenge of transformation
would be necessary for stability than to bring down Saddam and his army.56 
This was only the latest in a long-running breach between the civilian 
leaders and the army, which Rumsfeld considered insuffi ciently committed 
to transformation.
The main combat operations went surprisingly quickly and successfully 
in a three-week war. Despite sandstorms and pockets of resistance, and 
commentators quick to label delays as an incipient quagmire, the US and 
British forces seized their objectives easily. The operations were capped 
by the toppling of Saddam’s statues in Baghdad on April 9. The president 
fl ew in a jet fi ghter to an aircraft carrier to proclaim the end of major 
combat operations on May 1. The baton was passed to those assigned to do 
reconstruction and stability.
ORHA tried to prepare for its assignment with its limited personnel and 
resources and then was denied entry into Iraq until after the major fi ghting 
was over. What Garner found, when he entered Baghdad on April 21 was 
that 17 of the 23 ministries he had hoped to restore under new leadership 
“were gone.” The buildings had been looted and the workers had fl ed. The 
widespread looting after the fall of Baghdad – which Rumsfeld dismissed 
as a sign of liberation: “Freedom’s untidy”, he said – was allowed because 
US troops had not been given orders to prevent or stop it, and there were 
probably too few troops to have much success had they tried.57
Three days after arriving in the Iraqi capital, Garner was told that he 
would shortly be replaced by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who would head 
a full-scale occupation government, the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA). Bremer reported to both Rumsfeld and the White House, and was 
obviously empowered to make decisions and take actions more broadly 
than Garner’s ORHA. Bremer worked closely with the senior US general 
in Iraq, but his staff remained largely within the secure “Green Zone” and 
had few people throughout the country. The CPA created an interim Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC), wrote the basic law for Iraq pending the drafting 
of a new constitution and the election of a new government, the Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL), and then declared that there would be a transfer 
of sovereignty on June 28, 2004. 
US offi cials defended their post-hostilities planning, but few foresaw the 
rise of insurgent forces and the diffi culties widespread violence posed for 
those who wished to build a new Iraq. The soldiers who had executed the 
war plan so swiftly and successfully were stymied by the new challenge of 
counterinsurgency. Early on, General Franks had warned of the possibility 
of “catastrophic success” – if coalition forces won too quickly58 – yet that is 
what happened. The victors in battle were unprepared to secure their victory 
in the war.
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Rumsfeld’s transformation
While US ground forces struggled with the Iraqi insurgency, Secretary 
Rumsfeld turned his attention back to his bigger goal of transforming the 
armed forces as well as the processes of the Pentagon. The war in Afghanistan 
had convinced him that military forces could be used in radically new 
ways, such as soldiers on horseback calling in air strikes. He decided to 
expand and improve the Special Forces by giving them the lead role in the 
war on terrorism. The war in Iraq convinced him that speed could be more 
important than mass, a lesson that made him even less supportive of the 
heavy-weaponed army. Nothing convinced him that he had made any errors 
of judgment or performance.
Even as the Defense Department rebuilt the section of the Pentagon 
damaged in the September 11 attack and sent troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the bureaucracy slowly maneuvered into line to advance toward Rumsfeld’s 
transformation goals. A special offi ce was set up to promote the new 
network-centric approach. That offi ce promulgated a fancy transformation 
strategy, complete with “four pillars” and “six critical operational goals.”59 
Each service in turn tried to promote and defend its own modernization 
programs by slapping on “transformation” labels and rationales.
In dealing with the army, Rumsfeld was particularly harsh. He made the 
innovative Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, a lame duck by announcing a 
successor 15 months before his term ended. He cancelled the new artillery 
program, the Crusader, and pressured the service to make a similar decision 
against the Commanche helicopter program. He fi red the civilian Secretary 
of the Army. And when it came time to name a new Chief, Rumsfeld rejected 
all the army’s serving generals and recalled from retirement a Special Forces 
offi cer, General Peter Schoomaker. The new Chief undertook a radical 
restructuring of the force from 15,000–20,000 man divisions into brigade 
units of action with 3500–4000 soldiers. Schoomaker did receive, however, 
a promise from Rumsfeld that the army would not be cut in size.60 
While many in the Pentagon saw transformation in terms of hardware 
and doctrine – promoting inter-service jointness and linking people and 
equipment with new technologies – Rumsfeld himself, the former CEO, 
wanted to change the whole way the Defense Department operated. Soon 
after taking offi ce in 2001, he demanded a briefi ng on the power centers in 
the Pentagon. “Where are the levers in the building?” he asked. “Not just 
where they are, but who pulls them? And what are they connected to?”61 
The resulting charts reminded him of disconnected factory production 
lines. 
I looked at all these conveyor belts that seemed like they were loaded 
six, eight years ago, and they were just chugging along, and you could 
reach in and take something off, or put something on, but you couldn’t 
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connect the different conveyor belts. Each process had a life of its own 
and drivers that were disconnected from the others …62 
After his initial setbacks in 2001, when he failed to impose his planned 
cuts and changes on the upcoming budget, Rumsfeld seized control of the 
processes to which the rest of the Pentagon was programmed to respond. 
He used the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 
subsequent Defense Planning Guidance to promote goals and establish 
criteria that he could use later in evaluating service programs.
In 2003 Rumsfeld began even more far-reaching changes in DOD 
processes. While many of the actions may seem to be only new labels on 
old conveyor belts, the unifying principle has been to centralize power 
in the hands of the Secretary. He dropped the Defense Resources Board, 
previously used for high level budget review, and instituted a Senior Level 
Review Group (SLRG) that made all major decisions – and met only when 
Rumsfeld was in the chair.63 He renamed the PPBS system PPBE, for Planning 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution and added new metrics and cost 
models. He also changed the budget process to link programs and budgets 
in a single timeline and to require biennial budgets, with only major changes 
allowed in intervening years.
He also superseded the JCS Chairman’s National Military Strategy 
(NMS) document, which had been the basis for Joint Staff-developed plans, 
with his own National Defense Strategy (NDS). It took a law by Congress 
to force Rumsfeld to let the CJCS submit his legally required NMS, and 
the Secretary followed with his own NDS shortly thereafter. The secretary 
also dropped the annual Defense Planning Guidance in favor of a biennial 
Strategic Planning Guidance from his offi ce. When he tried to merge the 
Joint Staff with the OSD staff, however, he had to back down.
Coupled with his careful vetting of senior offi cers, Rumsfeld used these 
revised processes to strengthen his control over every aspect of Pentagon 
activity and to enforce his vision of a transformed military. Not surprisingly, 
the Rumsfeld generals and admirals accepted it. As JCS Chairman General 
Richard Myers said, “There is not a DOD process of any sort that we haven’t 
turned on its ear in the past four years.”64 
Congress has also been largely supportive of the transformation efforts. 
Despite pressures from employee unions and uncertainty over how the 
system would work in practice, it repealed existing Civil Service rules 
for DOD civilians and enacted a new National Security Personnel System 
which gave senior management great fl exibility in assigning people to jobs 
and rewarding them with merit pay rather than time-in-grade pay hikes. 
Congress voted for another base reduction round in 2005 and accepted the 
relatively minor closings and realignments.
The clearest indicator of congressional support, of course, is approval of 
huge spending requests. After approving the requested 5 percent increase for 
defense for fi scal year 2002, Congress responded to the 9/11 attacks with 
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an immediate $14 billion supplemental appropriations for defense and then 
boosted 2003 fi scal year spending by nearly 23 percent. Additional defense 
supplementals of $14 billion for the 2002 fi scal year, $62 billion for the 
2003 fi scal year and $65 billion for the 2004 fi scal year were approved with 
only token cuts of less than $1 billion overall. By the 2005 fi scal year, regular 
defense spending, not counting supplementals for Iraq, was 25 percent 
above the pre-9/11 level. Not only did Congress approve most of the funds 
requested for war and transformation, but it also loosened the historically 
tight purse strings by allowing greater fl exibility for emergency spending and 
transfers between accounts.65 
Where Congress pushed back, however, is on issues that aroused public 
interest and concern. When troops in Iraq told loved ones back home that 
they lacked body armor, or that their vulnerable vehicles could use armor 
protection, congressional committees responded with sharp questions and 
extra money. When searing pictures of abuse of prisoners in the Abu Ghraib 
prison were publicized, the Armed Services Committees held hearings 
and demanded accountability. And when army offi cers complained of the 
problems caused by repeated deployments to the war zones, Congress forced 
Rumsfeld to accept, at least “temporarily”, an increase in army end strength 
of 30,000.
Bush–Rumsfeld legacy
When George W. Bush was reelected in 2004, many expected his defense 
secretary to leave offi ce after a few months, perhaps after completing the 
2005 QDR. But Bush wanted him to stay on, and Don Rumsfeld gave many 
indications that he believed he had just begun to succeed at the diffi cult job 
of Pentagon transformation. “Change takes time”, he told a writer. “Any 
CEO in a corporation, you ask him what the rough amount of time to do it, 
and it’s eight or ten years.”66 
The most important historical judgment on both men, of course, will 
be the outcome in Iraq and the level of US security over the next several 
years. What is more certain is the evaluation of their handling of the Defense 
Department and the US military. Bush and Rumsfeld set out to change the way 
America made war, and they succeeded in many aspects. They accelerated 
jointness and expanded experimentation and backed their new ideas with 
hard dollars.
They promoted a new generation of warriors, trained both to push back in 
argument and then to acquiesce in decisions quietly. The president restored 
civil–military respect while his defense secretary enforced a tighter degree 
of civilian control. The civilian leaders found a general to fi ght two major 
wars the way they wanted, and without the complaints that historically 
accompanied combat. But they remained stymied when a different enemy 
emerged from the rubble of their expected victory.
12 Conclusions
US civil–military relations under 
stress
Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be, the civilian 
view trumps it. Civilians should get what they ask for, even if it is not what 
they really want. In other words, civilians have a right to be wrong.
Prof. Peter Feaver1
In wartime the politicians have to do something important every year.
General George Marshall2 
This is the Way to have things go right: for Offi cers to correspond constantly 
with Congress and communicate their Sentiments freely.
John Adams, 17763
It is one of the greatest sources of frustration for soldiers that their political 
masters fi nd it diffi cult (or what is worse from their point of view, merely 
inconvenient) to fully elaborate in advance the purposes for which they have 
invoked military action, or the conditions under which they intend to limit 
or terminate it.
Prof. Eliot Cohen4
Warriors and politicians have different roles to perform in defending a 
nation. Democracies believe in civilian control of the military because they 
believe that the people are sovereign. The armed forces in democracies give 
at least lip service to the principle of civilian control, but each side may 
understand it differently. And those differences give rise to disagreements, 
sometimes even sharp confl icts.
Many commentators have argued that American civil–military relations 
have been under stress in recent years – in a “crisis” or even “out of 
control.”5 While some writers were quick to attribute the tensions to the 
particular character of Bill Clinton and his military policies, the evidence of 
civil–military disagreements under George W. Bush suggests deeper causes.
This book seeks to demonstrate that there are enduring and recurring 
patterns in US civil–military relations, patterns of confl ict and tension for 
predictable reasons. They are not unique to the post-Cold War world, or 
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even to the rise of large standing forces beginning with the Second World 
War. On the contrary, these tensions were visible in the earliest days of the 
Republic and have been evident throughout American history, albeit to 
varying degrees.
The simplest explanation for the confl ict is the political scientist’s notion 
that politics is a struggle over who gets what, when, and how – and that the 
institutions of government, including the military, are inevitably caught up 
in that struggle. It is true that the armed forces have a unique role, for they 
alone in theory have a monopoly of legitimate violence and must be strong 
enough to defend the state but not willing or capable of overthrowing it. 
One concern is that the US military may be becoming an “interest group” 
with parochial concerns that may be in tension with its role as guardian.
Nature of civilian control
Civil–military relations, as analyzed here, deal with the interactions among 
the top civilian leadership – legislative and executive in the case of the United 
States – and the senior military leadership, including both the members 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the major combatant commanders. 
These relationships encompass both the formal structures and the rules and 
procedures, as well as the comparative power and infl uence of the various 
entities. 
Civilian control is both descriptive and prescriptive, a measurable condition 
and a norm. The degree of infl uence can be calculated, for example, by 
noting who prevails when preferences diverge. As a principle for resolving 
disputes, civilian control offers a simple rule: the civilians are supposed to 
set ends, the military is limited to decisions about means, but the civilians get 
to draw the line between ends and means.6 
The tests for civilian control which I fi nd most persuasive and useful were 
devised by Allan Millett. He says 
civilian control requires that:
a. the armed forces do not dominate government or impose their 
unique (however functional) values upon civilian institutions and 
organizations.
b. the armed forces have no independent access to resources of military 
unity.
c. the armed forces’ policies on the recruitment, pay, education, 
training, treatment, promotion, and use of personnel are not 
inconsistent with basic civil liberties and individual rights – with 
some compromises for military discipline and combat effectiveness.
d. the use of military force is not determined by the values of the 
military establishment itself, either for or against military action, 
either in the conduct of foreign or domestic policies. Conversely, 
civilian decisions on the use of forced should not disregard the 
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relationship of policy ends and military institutional characteristics 
in terms of personnel, doctrine, training, equipment and morale.7 
By these measures, I believe most would conclude that the United States has 
a system of civilian control that has worked historically and currently. But 
these conditions also make clear that the legislative branch has a major role 
in providing the civilian control.
Using Millett’s criteria, one can see Congress as a major guarantor of 
civilian control. The armed forces do not dominate the US government, nor 
impose their values. They may ally with others who share their values, as they 
did when President Clinton tried to repeal the ban on gays in uniform. Large 
segments of the Congress would have blocked any change if the President 
had not retreated to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. 
The US armed forces do not have independent access to resources of 
military unity – except through the Congress, and only in accordance with 
close oversight. Even secret funding for military and intelligence activities is 
known to key congressional fi gures.
There may be more dispute on Millett’s third point – whether there is a 
balance between military needs for discipline and the individual’s basic civil 
liberties – but this is less an issue of civilian control than of civilianization, 
that is, the infusion of civilian values into military behaviors. On this 
question, key members of Congress have often allied with military leaders 
to slow or defl ect pressures to change military practices to refl ect civilian 
attitudes, for example, on gender issues. There is political support for 
military traditionalism, just as there is also support for changes designed to 
comport with civilian views. Here again, Congress is the venue for balancing 
the competing claims.
On the use of force, military values do not determine the choices, and 
civilian leaders have regularly considered military views. While I contend 
that the US military has a veto on the use of force, the practical effects are 
primarily to ensure consideration of the very issues Millett specifi es. Congress 
is involved only as a sounding board, if necessary, for military concerns.
By these tests, then, the United States has civilian control, and that control 
is exercised both by the President and Congress, though in differing ways 
and in differing circumstances. The most stressful situations are those that 
occur when troops are in combat.
Civil–military relations in wartime
Not surprisingly, civilian control is strong when the armed forces are engaged 
in major military operations. In war time, political leaders understand that 
the stakes are high and they will be held accountable. The warriors accept 
their role and hope to be given clear and reasonable orders. Presidents have 
usually shown strong leadership, though their decisions have been greatly 
infl uenced by domestic political calculations. Congress has tended to defer 
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to the Executive once major combat begins, while still conducting at least 
limited oversight. Tensions have arisen between the politicians and the 
warriors, however, over strategy and over the degree of military autonomy 
in planning and executing operations.
After the problems with command and control by committee during the 
Revolutionary War, described in Chapter 2, the Framers of the Constitution 
created a strong chief executive to conduct war after it had been declared by 
Congress. Presidents have taken seriously their mandated role as commander-
in-chief. George Washington led troops sent to quell the Whiskey Rebellion 
in 1794. James Madison briefl y paraded in uniform with the troops but then 
let his several secretaries of war plan battles directly with fi eld commanders. 
James K. Polk gave strong strategic direction to the war with Mexico, and he 
clashed repeatedly with his military commanders in the fi eld. As Chapter 3 
indicates, Abraham Lincoln and his Secretary of War practiced close oversight 
and involvement in the conduct of the Civil War. William McKinley ran the 
Spanish–American War from the White House with his cabinet making key 
decisions.8
The only anomaly in this historical record of active presidential control 
was Woodrow Wilson during the First World War. He and his War Secretary 
gave supreme authority for the conduct of US forces in France to General 
Pershing – although the President did insist on deciding all matters related to 
conditions for ending the war.9
Franklin Roosevelt was an undisputed commander-in-chief in the Second 
World War and Harry Truman, as Chapter 7 shows, asserted strong civilian 
control in the Korean War when his theater commander proved insubordinate. 
While these men were seen as effective leaders, Lyndon Johnson and Robert 
McNamara have been roundly condemned for their intrusive management 
of the Vietnam War. Richard Nixon used a lighter touch and was more 
responsive to military views during his phase of that war, but he frequently 
ordered military actions to bolster his peacemaking diplomacy.10
The presidents during the remainder of the twentieth century ordered 
numerous military operations but tried to adhere to the military’s preference 
for maximum fl exibility and minimal interference. George W. Bush and 
Donald Rumsfeld, however, restored the prior practice of intrusive civilian 
control, and even circumvented the Joint Chiefs of Staff and dealt directly 
with the regional combatant commander, as Chapter 11 describes.
Political considerations have, of course, often infl uenced presidential 
decisions in wartime. James K. Polk was concerned that his two senior 
generals, both from the opposition party, might use their victories to run 
for President – as in fact both of them later did. Lincoln feared that General 
McClellan might defeat him in 1864, but fi rst he had to overcome rivals in his 
own party. Harry Truman worried that fi ring MacArthur might undermine 
his presidency, as in fact it did.
Franklin Roosevelt used wartime secrecy to help conceal his deteriorating 
health in 1944, and he had desperately wanted the North African invasion 
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– the fi rst US attack on Hitler’s forces – to occur before rather than just after 
the midterm congressional elections in 1942.
Lyndon Johnson got the Tonkin Gulf Resolution authorizing war in 
Southeast Asia just before he began a presidential campaign pledging peace. 
As Chapter 4 shows, he told his generals they would have to wait until after 
the election to begin their war. His conduct during 1968 was also shaped by 
his political goals – of vindicating his policies and helping his Vice President 
succeed him. Richard Nixon and Melvin Laird took offi ce intending to 
have the war over by the 1972 elections, and they went far enough in that 
direction – with troop withdrawals, publicized peace talks, and an end to the 
draft – that he won overwhelmingly. 
More recently, Ronald Reagan withdrew troops from Lebanon before the 
failures there interfered with his 1984 reelection campaign. George Bush 
the elder resisted intervention in Somalia until after his defeat in 1992. Bill 
Clinton promised that US peacekeeping troops would be in Bosnia only 
one year, thus trying to remove that confl ict from the 1996 campaign. And 
George W. Bush used the pending midterm congressional elections in 2002 
as leverage to get Congress to approve military operations against Iraq. He 
then accelerated the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government 
in June 2004, so that he could demonstrate progress as his own reelection 
campaign approached.
Congress declared war in response to presidential messages on fi ve 
occasions and consented to fund other major military operations, at least 
Figure 12.1 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Richard Myers (Defense Department photo)
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after the fact. The votes were overwhelming on almost all occasions, 
although in 1812 they came entirely from the Democratic Republicans, 
Madison’s party, while New England Whigs were strongly opposed. The 
Democratic-controlled twenty-ninth Congress voted for war with Mexico 
in 1846, but two years later, the Whig-controlled House of Representatives 
approved, 82–81, a measure denouncing that war as “unnecessarily and 
unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States.”11 
On only four occasions have presidents sought congressional support 
for combat operations when their party did not control both houses of 
Congress – in 1983 when Ronald Reagan sought and received war powers 
authorization for 18 months for troops in Lebanon; in January 1991 when 
George Bush the elder asked for a vote supporting the ouster of Iraq from 
Kuwait; and after September 11, 2001 when George W. Bush sought and 
received congressional authorization for operations against terrorists and 
later Iraq. Despite some partisan disagreement, the presidents prevailed in 
each case.
The curious anomaly here is Congress’ indifference on the issue of 
declaring war in Korea. Truman’s advisors argued that it was not necessary, 
particularly since the UN Security Council had passed a binding resolution 
calling for armed forces for Korea’s defense. Truman met with congressional 
leaders, but only a couple of argumentative Republicans pressed for legislative 
action. With public opinion supporting the president at the time, the Senate 
Majority Leader decided not to recall his chamber from a July 4 recess. Later 
on, of course, Congress voted the necessary supplemental spending bills, but 
without ever legislating on the war itself.
Assertive congressional oversight – or “interference”, from the executive 
branch point of view – has been sporadic and inconsistent. Congress caused 
problems during the War of 1812 by lengthy disputes over the funding of 
the war and the acquisition of military supplies. The Joint Committee during 
the Civil War, as Chapter 3 describes, investigated widely, subjected combat 
generals to grueling and detailed hearings, proffered its own strategic advice, 
and had a marked impact on the war. Congressional committees used hearings 
to expose contracting and supply problems in the Spanish–American War, 
the First World War, and the Second World War – when Senator Harry 
Truman (D-Mo) earned a favorable reputation that propelled him into the 
Vice Presidency with his committee’s investigation of contracting abuses.
Only in more recent times have congressional committees tried to inquire 
into or to infl uence grand strategy. A joint Senate committee took several 
weeks of testimony from General MacArthur and others following his ouster 
during the Korean War, giving vent to MacArthur’s views as well as those of 
Truman Administration civilians and military leaders. As Chapter 4 relates, 
Senators Fulbright and Stennis used their committees to promote opposing 
strategic views on the Vietnam War. While Congress never succeeded in 
blocking military operations until after US ground troops had been with-
drawn from Vietnam, the repeated battles over antiwar amendments 
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constrained the conduct of the war in the Nixon administration. Congress 
was also supportive of the Afghan and Iraq Wars, devoting its investigative 
hearings to such issues as armor equipment for troops and the prisoner abuse 
scandal.
Despite congressional enactment of the war powers resolution in 1973 
over Richard Nixon’s veto, lawmakers have tended to be satisfi ed with 
the limited compliance shown by subsequent presidents. While none 
acknowledged the legitimacy of the measure, all have been willing to provide 
offi cial notifi cation of troop deployments. War powers arguments have been 
used by policy critics, but never pushed to the point of halting unpopular 
military operations. The basic rule remains: Americans support short and 
successful wars and tend to oppose long or unsuccessful ones, and Congress 
refl ects those opinions.
With Congress rarely interjecting itself into the chain of command 
during wartime, military leaders have accepted presidential civilian control 
without complaint. On those occasions when the warriors have become 
unhappy, however, they have regularly gone to the Hill – usually quietly 
and to their patrons – to complain. MacArthur did that during Korea; 
the Chiefs did during Vietnam. The practice is much more common in 
peacetime, including rearmament periods, when the different services fi ght 
for budget dollars.
On strategy, there has been a notable recurring difference between the 
warriors and politicians. Time and again – from the Revolutionary War 
through the Civil War to the Second World War and even into the Iraq Wars 
– the civilians have pressed for “attack, attack, attack”, while the generals 
have preferred defensive maneuvers and careful preparation for battle. 
As Chairman of the JCS, Colin Powell even acknowledged that he was a 
reluctant warrior because he wanted to be sure that America did not sacrifi ce 
its blood and treasure needlessly nor ineffectively. 
Civil–military relations during rearmament
Preparations for war tend to exacerbate a different set of civil–military 
tensions. The warriors are usually pleased to be getting additional resources, 
though they may compete with their rivals for the lion’s share. The politicians 
may clash, however, over which forces to acquire, or over the best strategy 
to pursue against the supposed threat. Various civil–military alliances maybe 
formed, and the resolution is usually similar to the outcomes of other 
political issues.
Political considerations tend to dominate rearmament fi ghts for both 
warriors and politicians. The very fi rst rearmament effort, described in 
Chapter 5, exposed deep political divisions over US relations with Britain 
and France. John Adams succeeded in winning even opposition support for 
a much larger standing army and more ships for the fl edgling navy by stirring 
nationalist outrage over the treatment of US envoys in the XYZ affair. To 
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his everlasting discredit, however, he used his favorable political momentum 
to enact the Alien and Sedition Acts, which were used chiefl y against his 
political enemies. Adams then sought a diplomatic settlement with France 
when he feared that he was in danger of losing control of the army to his 
Federalist rival, Alexander Hamilton. Peace in the quasi-war with France was 
not enough, however, to prevent his defeat a few months later by Thomas 
Jefferson.
To endorse rearmament, presidents have to determine, and then persuade 
the Congress, that there is an emerging enemy and that the nation must 
prepare for war at least to try to preserve peace and if necessary to fi ght and 
win the confl ict. George Washington avoided choosing between France and 
Britain in 1793, when he made his Neutrality Proclamation, but Adams had 
good reason to fear France more than Britain in 1797.
For the next 140 years, until the late 1930s, America rearmed only after 
war broke out. It had the luxury of time and the protection of distance to 
deal with its foes. And Congress proved willing, once the confl ict began, to 
fund the increases in personnel and equipment to fi ght the battles which 
followed.
Chapter 6 tells of Franklin Roosevelt’s astute political maneuvering to 
win support for a massive US military buildup and measures short of war, 
but just barely, in the years leading to US involvement in the Second World 
War. FDR made a political alliance with interventionist forces of both parties 
and had to fi ght isolationists even in his own cabinet. The two camps fought 
to win public opinion, and Roosevelt limited his requests and actions to 
measures which, step by step, the public was willing to endorse. His secret 
orders, however, were of questionable constitutionality and unrepeatable in 
an age of policy debates by press leaks. Military leaders supported Roosevelt’s 
policies for professional reasons and they often provided political cover, 
as when General Marshall took the lead in asking for conscription in the 
presidential election year of 1940.
Harry Truman, by contrast, was slow to embrace full-scale rearmament 
until after the Korean War broke out. But his subordinates prepared the 
ground and helped build the support that made Truman begin to reverse 
course a few months before North Korea attacked the South. Both parties 
supported rearmament, although lawmakers differed on how best to defend 
against the communists. Airpower advocates stressed nuclear weapons as the 
most cost-effective way. At fi rst, the navy fought the air force on this issue, 
then decided to embrace naval aviation to carry nuclear weapons. Former 
marines in Congress also fought Truman’s efforts to cut back the Marine 
Corps.
Rearmament struggles, in short, stimulate inter-service rivalries, which 
are often cloaked in terms of strategic debates. The warriors court their 
patrons and supporters in Congress and in the Executive Branch, and the 
politicians in turn echo the military’s logic, even when disputed. The result 
is varying cycles of buildup, driven by anticipated threats and patriotic 
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fervor and then reduction, when budgetary concerns and examples of waste 
become prominent.
Since the Korean War, there have been several oscillating periods in 
defense spending. Dwight Eisenhower slashed the army in order to save 
money and concentrate on the nuclear deterrent forces. John F. Kennedy 
was elected in 1960 in part because he promised to close the missile gap – 
which turned out to be nonexistent, since US missiles actually outnumbered 
Soviet missiles. Robert McNamara then used defense increases to suppress 
military resistance to his transformation efforts, described in Chapter 9. 
Spending then fell as the Vietnam War ended, only to begin rising in the 
Carter Administration in response to concerns about Soviet military power. 
Ronald Reagan accelerated the buildup, only to have it cut short after 1985 
by bipartisan congressional interest in reducing the soaring budget defi cits. 
Budget politics forced George Bush the elder to agree to new taxes and 
defense cuts in his administration. And Bill Clinton continued reductions 
until forced by readiness problems to allow some increases in the late 1990s. 
George W. Bush promised smaller defense increases than his opponent in the 
2000 elections, but then responded to the 9/11 attacks with a huge buildup 
both of military forces and homeland security activities. 
Military leaders seem to have accommodated these disputes by adherence 
to the compact described below. They have ostensibly supported the 
Executive Branch while providing the necessary ammunition to their friends 
on the Hill who want to help them. 
Civil–military relations during transformation
When political leaders seek radical change in the armed forces, they tend 
to meet with strong resistance from the warriors, who are conservative and 
evolutionary by nature and who resent outsiders presuming expertise in 
their profession. Here, as during rearmament, cross-cutting alliances may 
be formed, including factions in the Congress. Successful transformation 
requires either military acceptance of the changes or the creation of a self-
sustaining element within the military.
By transformation, I mean more than ordinary reorganization and restruct-
ured management techniques. I mean the fundamental wrenching changes 
made by strong leaders to embrace new strategies or technologies. Most 
signifi cant changes have taken place during the twentieth century, but one 
such change occurred during and just after the Civil War. America’s armed 
forces had remained small until the Civil War, then suddenly encountered 
the challenges of fi ghting with the newly available technologies of rifl es, 
railroads, and the telegraph. The Union acquitted itself quite well, and the 
postwar army, though once again very small, fashioned a new professionalism 
that allowed it successfully to expand to fulfi ll its new imperial role after 
1898. The navy also became more professional and gradually more accepting 
of the new technologies of steam, steel, and even submarines.
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The Spanish–American War exposed poor planning and coordination, both 
within and between the armed services, as described in Chapter 8. In response, 
a new team of reformers, led by Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root imposed 
a top-down transformation on the army. The navy was also expanded and 
modernized. Congress was supportive, but the greatest resistance came from 
army leaders – a typical reaction from an institution which, by its nature, 
emphasizes predictability and reliability of performance.
Most nations transform their military establishments after suffering major 
defeats. The US military, by contrast, has been largely successful in combat, 
though not always in the broader goals of war. Its most serious defeat, in 
Vietnam, was political more than military. On the other hand, the US military 
has often been forced by outsiders to embrace new technologies and new 
forms of organization. Reformers from within have often been discredited 
mavericks like airpower advocate Billy Mitchell, who have succeeded only by 
making strategic alliances with patrons in Congress or the Executive Branch 
who could direct resources to their fl edgling efforts.
The US military in the twentieth century was eager to adopt new technology, 
and American science and industry provided numerous opportunities. Far-
reaching transformation was more diffi cult, however, because that required 
changes in doctrine and organization that would take full advantage of new 
technology. Such a transformation usually required pressure from outside the 
military.
The usual pattern in the United States is for the innovation advocate – 
sometimes within the system, sometimes an outsider – to build a community 
of supporters who ultimately attract a patron who can nurture the idea as it 
gains more adherents. Resistance is natural from those who feel criticized by 
the proposed change, or who fear a loss of power or resources if the innovators 
should prevail. Those who resist do so usually with questions and delays rather 
than outright opposition, but those tactics may outlast the interest or terms 
of service of the patrons. Often the only way to create a lasting, successful 
innovation is to create a new and separate organization to implement it – 
special forces for counterinsurgency or an air force for strategic bombing.12 
This was an important lesson which Congress recognized in imposing the 
Goldwater–Nichols Act and the related legislation putting Special Operations 
Forces in their own budget category, as told in Chapter 10. Congress agreed 
to give innovative organizations their own personnel systems to reward and 
promote their members.
Robert McNamara, whose managerial revolution is described in Chapter 
9, exemplifi ed the most successful application of the American penchant for 
trying to impose private business practices on the Pentagon. He succeeded 
through persistence and longevity in offi ce, and because many in Congress 
welcomed either his effectiveness or the bigger budgets he initially secured 
for the military. Donald Rumsfeld’s imitation of many of McNamara’s 
techniques suggests that civilian leaders see these techniques as the best way 
to achieve transformation.
204 Conclusions: US civil–military relations under stress
Before and since 1961, prestigious commissions periodically have 
discovered the same old problems which somehow have not been 
satisfactorily addressed by earlier reforms. Civilians, especially those with 
business experience, fi nd it hard to tolerate the non-capitalist nature of the 
Pentagon. The warriors, drawing on their own professional experience and 
remembering the fi ckle public, tend to resist wrenching change.
The differences between civilians proposing change and warriors resisting 
it raise a moral issue: How can one put a price tag on death or defeat? There 
is no reliable measure in peacetime of how successful a particular set and 
number of military units will be in combat. Branches and sequels can be 
anticipated; simulations can be performed; troops can be trained, again and 
again, as they are supposed to fi ght. But there is still the chaos and friction 
of combat, the fog of war, and a reacting enemy which cannot be calculated. 
No leader can be sure that a decision to reduce forces, or to adopt a new 
technology, or to reorganize units used to a different arrangement will tip 
the balance between victory and defeat. Commanders view their people as 
their most precious asset. Thus, they do not wish to risk lives needlessly, or 
when other actions would greatly reduce those risks. That is why military 
professionals are usually slow to innovate, and why such wrenching changes 
often need to be imposed from outside. Even when the innovation advocates 
promise revolutionary advances – nuclear-powered submarines, aircraft 
invisible to radar, unmanned aerial weapons, precision-guided weapons, 
special counterinsurgency teams – their comrades may be suspicious, for 
they have heard hollow promises before.
Politicians tend to favor effi ciency criteria, which are measurable, to 
effectiveness ones, which are not, except in the crucible of war. Members of 
Congress will support new organizations and technologies especially when 
they promise jobs and contracts back home. Civilian executives will push for 
change both to achieve better results and to assert their leadership. The end 
result is confl ict and the outcomes sometimes depend on luck. 
Cultural differences pervade civil–military relations. Warriors and 
politicians thrive in different organizational cultures. Offi cers are used to 
established hierarchies and formal procedures. Civilian offi cials live in a fl uid 
world of shifting relations, where today’s adversary is often tomorrow’s key 
ally, and vice versa. Military offi cers demand decisiveness and clarity, while 
politicians tolerate ambiguity and often prefer incremental steps and hedging 
strategies. Military planners are taught to anticipate future contingencies 
and begin preparing for them. People in politics, who often say that 24 
hours is an eternity, learn to wait until the last possible moment to commit 
themselves. These differences make it harder for warriors and politicians to 
understand, empathize, and work closely with each other.
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Shortcomings of existing theories
Many scholars have broadened and deepened our understanding of US civil–
military relations, but most have tended to ignore the special signifi cance 
and impact of the dual nature of civilian control under the US Constitution. 
The “great books” of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz stimulated 
years of exciting scholarship by their students, but they are inadequate for 
addressing the changed world and new problems of the twenty-fi rst century. 
Huntington wrote in a tense, Cold War era of inter-service rivalry and 
prescribed an apolitical professionalism which had lasted for only a short 
period in US history. He also used loaded terms – “business pacifi sm”, 
“objective control” – to buttress an essentially political argument. Janowitz, 
as James Burk laments, has no answers for the era of the small volunteer 
army. Sociologists have since concentrated on practical issues of recruitment 
and training in the United States, and on civil–military issues facing emerging 
democracies.13
Political scientists – most with conscious emphasis on the “science” of their 
discipline – have followed in Huntington’s broad wake. Most interesting and 
prominent are: Eliot Cohen, Michael Desch, Peter Feaver, Deborah Avant, 
and Amy Zegart. 
Eliot Cohen, in his fascinating and provocative book, Supreme Command: 
Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime attributes the “normal” 
theory of civilian control to Huntington and then modifi es it to argue for 
a much more interventionist civilian leadership in wartime, with military 
commanders subject to a necessary but “unequal dialogue” with their civilian 
superiors. Cohen draws upon historical cases to prescribe a particular form 
of civilian control for normative and practical reasons. I fi nd Cohen’s work 
quite persuasive, but limited to the special cases of wartime command and 
control.
Michael Desch applies a structural, realist approach in his book, Civilian 
Control of the Military: the changing security environment. He argues that 
the structure of the international system, and in particular the degree of 
external threats in relation to internal threats, determines the degree of 
civilian control. While his analysis is interesting with regard to other nations 
and other times, and his catalogue of “Major US Civil–Military Confl icts, 
1938–1997” most helpful, his predictions are indeterminate for the current 
era of low internal and external threats in the United States. He says the 
best indicator of civilian control is who prevails when military and civilian 
preferences diverge. While this is a sensible defi nition, his deterministic 
analytical approach offers no guidance for preferable ways of obtaining 
civilian control.
Peter Feaver is a prolifi c and provocative scholar, a rigorous theory-builder 
who draws upon principal–agent analysis. Similarly, Deborah Avant and Amy 
Zegart have offered insights into civil–military relations based upon agency 
theory as part of their analyses of particular American cases.14
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While I fi nd much of their writings interesting and helpful, I have the 
nagging feeling that they are stretching the concepts to cover the peculiarities 
of US civil–military relations and that they do not adequately deal with the 
dual-principal nature of the American political system. Nor do they address 
why military advice is or is not accepted by civilian superiors.
Principal–agent theory, as elaborated by Feaver, Avant and Zegart, tries to 
explain how institutions like the armed forces are established and managed 
over time. This analytical approach highlights matters of delegation and 
incentives for compliance, along with problems of “shirking” and “moral 
hazard.” If one’s key question is how to maintain control over an institution, 
and especially how to impose innovation or other major change, this 
approach has valuable insights. But it tends to presume a single principal 
acting with only one or a very few goals in a linear action–reaction way. 
When there are multiple principals and numerous goals and a complex 
matrix of interactions, this approach is far less helpful.
Feaver calls civil–military relations as “a game of strategic interaction.” But 
his model is linear, with branches limited to the binary choice of “working” 
or “shirking.” According to Feaver, “Working is doing things the way the 
civilians want, and shirking is doing things the way the military want.” But 
he also calls shirking “part of a broader range of deviant behavior in which 
a soldier might engage.” He admits that the terms have colloquial meanings 
that are “unhelpful”, but even their specifi ed defi nitions create confusion. 
He says that end runs by the military to Congress “can reach the level of 
shirking”, whereas I would list that as an example of “working” for the 
alternate source of civilian control.15
The model seems to be limited to the implementation of orders, when 
the key tension in civil–military relations is often over the consideration 
of military advice prior to decisions and orders. Military resistance more 
often has been and is the result of disagreements over preferred courses 
of action. The principal–agent approach does not cover the complexities 
of the policy process, whereby ideas are advocated, debated, sometimes 
compromised, decided, and then re-decided perhaps numerous times during 
implementation. Compliance may be in degrees, rather than binary. 
The principal–agent theorists also have diffi culty handling the role of 
Congress as a second, competing principal over the military. Feaver, in 
trying to articulate hypotheses for testing, suggests, for example, that “The 
less unifi ed the civilian political leadership, the less the civilian delegation” 
and “Countries with divided civilian governments will have more inter-
service rivalry than will countries with unifi ed civilian governments.”16 But 
his model “assumes only two players, a civilian principal and a military 
agent.”17 
 Avant acknowledges congressional activity as a major component of US 
civil–military relations,18 but her focus has been on promoting doctrinal 
change, an area where the Congress has been less directly or regularly involved. 
Applying agency theory, she says that when there are multiple principals three 
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consequences follow: there are compromises that make policy less effi cient; 
the agent tends to act strategically and “play the principals off one another 
in order to gain support for its own preferences”; and the principals tend 
to require increasingly confi ning procedures to ensure control. These are 
signifi cant observations, but Avant found that her theory did not explain or 
predict US military interventions in the fi rst Clinton Administration. There, 
she concluded, “military advice has not driven policy.” But “Principal–agent 
theory would expect military advice to have the most impact on policy when 
civilians disagree.”19 I think we need to revise our thinking and theories to 
deal with the special role of Congress in US civil–military relations.
Zegart also deals explicitly with the role of Congress but reaches some 
conclusions which I fi nd unpersuasive. She argues that national security 
institutions and issues operate differently from the domestic ones to which 
the “new institutionalism” fi rst applied principal–agent theory. Her “strict 
new institutionalist model” hypothesizes that: Congress drives agency design 
and evolution and strongly oversees the bureaucracy. But for national security 
agencies, she argues, the executive branch is the driver, and “Congress 
exercises only sporadic and ineffectual oversight; legislators have weak 
incentives and blunt tools.” I believe that proposition is not confi rmed by 
the history of congressional activity in recent decades.20
A descriptive model of US civil–military relations
History shows variation and some evolution toward a new and stable 
relationship between warriors and politicians, especially in the decades 
since the Second World War. Instead of the incomplete model offered by 
the principal–agent theory, I think we need a revised model closer to the 
bureaucratic politics tradition. There are some testable propositions to 
support such a model, but few predictions, because most outcomes depend 
upon personality factors and changing power relationships:
The president and secretary of defense control the US military on the 
use of force, including strategy and rules of engagement.
The Congress controls the US military directly on matters of force 
size, equipment, and organization, and indirectly on doctrine and 
personnel.
The US military accepts both forms of civilian control in principle, 
but insists on offering advice that represents and tries to protect its 
institutional and professional autonomy.
On use of force decisions, the US military is treated by the president 
as having a veto.
Instead of exercising that veto, however, the US military insists on and 
is usually granted terms and conditions for the planned use of force.
By not resigning in protest, the US military leadership implicitly agrees 
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also recognizes an obligation to provide alternative personal views in 
response to congressional inquiries.
Congress exerts its controls with less regard to military preferences than 
to political considerations of individual members and committees.
When the president and Congress are in agreement, the military 
complies; when the two branches are in disagreement, the military 
tends to side with the branch that favors its own views, but never 
to the point of direct disobedience to orders of the commander-in-
chief.
I think that the evidence for these propositions is clear and compelling. 
For Constitutional and political reasons, there are two competing sources 
of civilian control of the US military – the president and secretary of defense 
for the executive branch and the numerous defense committees for the 
legislative branch. In practice, there is mutual recognition of each branch’s 
roles and little interference. The chain of command from the president 
controls the commitment and ordering of forces. The chain of command 
from the Congress controls spending but is otherwise less clear and direct. 
Congress’ command is less direct because the legislative branch issues its 
orders in the form of authority to spend money and of basic laws. The civilian 
leaders in the executive branch have some leeway in carrying out those 
laws and appropriations. Congressional command is less clear also because 
subunits in Congress – committees and individual members – give guidance 
in forms short of formal laws which may confl ict with other guidance from 
either Congress or the president. 
From the standpoint of the members of the armed forces, Congress is an 
escape valve, a locus for venting disagreements with the executive branch 
leadership, and a potential ally when warriors wish to challenge or change 
policy.
The existence of a strong legislature, and its functioning as an alternative 
source of civilian control, explain why the United States has been mercifully 
free from the threat of excessive military infl uence in government or 
anything approaching a coup – which are genuine concerns in many other 
nations. Is this “ineffi cient”, as Avant complains? Yes, if your standard is 
unilinear control and consistency. Do the agents – the military – play the 
principals off against one another? Sometimes, but not necessarily with bad 
consequences.
Despite ritual congressional protests regarding the Constitutional right to 
declare war, presidents have exercised broad freedom of action throughout 
US history. The only time Congress terminated a confl ict which the president 
wished to continue was the 1973 cutoff of funds to fi ght in Southeast Asia 
– an action which proved that the power of the purse, even when exercised 
over a veto, trumped the power of the sword in the hands of the president. 
Civilian leaders also delegated more or less control over the setting of 
strategy and rules of engagement, as they wished. As Eliot Cohen notes, it 
7
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is not unusual, and is indeed usually preferable, for presidents to question 
military plans closely and impose their own judgments.21
Congress exercises its civilian control by approving budgets and 
establishing basic laws governing the armed forces. While it tends to approve 
Executive Branch proposals, it frequently modifi es them to refl ect parochial 
and political concerns of infl uential Members. Congress also frequently 
allies with military leaders whose recommendations are disregarded by the 
president while coinciding with the interests of key legislators. In order to 
assert its controls, Congress uses a broad array of tools – from formal laws to 
committee reports and earmarks, to intimidating hearings and investigations, 
to delays or denials of military promotions.
The US military, like most governmental organizations, seek to maximize 
their autonomy and the resources they control. They have developed standards 
of professionalism which make it diffi cult for either source of civilian control 
to interfere. Unlike virtually all other departments of government, there is 
no mid-career lateral entry into the offi cer corps. 
This is not, however, the “objective control” favored by Huntington. 
He accurately described but deeply lamented the role of Congress. “The 
separation of powers is a perpetual invitation, if not an irresistible force, 
drawing military leaders into political confl icts. Consequently, it has been a 
major hindrance to the development of military professionalism and civilian 
control in the United States.”22 Huntington could not accept – although the 
offi cer corps has accepted – the competing sources of legitimate civilian 
control. He wants a greater consistency of purpose and action than the 
American political system can ever guarantee.
On use of force issues, there is strong evidence that US presidents, at least in 
the last half of the twentieth century, treated the US military as having a veto 
over action. Dick Betts found only one instance where military operations 
were launched when more than one of the members of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff were strongly opposed. That case was the peacekeeping mission to 
Lebanon in 1983.23 That exception may prove the rule, however, since it is 
also the only case where Congress formally approved the troop deployment, 
under the War Powers Act, for an 18-month period. Despite some doubts 
about the mission, the legislative branch sided with the executive, and the 
US military was forced to comply.
Peter Feaver also found evidence supporting the military veto hypothesis. 
He says that during the Cold War civilian preferences on use of force issues 
prevailed in 23 of 29 cases – and that the six contrary cases were when the 
US military successfully opposed combat action. He also supports the notion 
that the military prevailed on the terms and conditions of how force was to 
be used except in four cases, two of which involved General MacArthur, a 
highly exceptional circumstance.24 
I believe that miltary veto power exists because presidents recognize 
the prestige of the military and foresee high political risks if they disregard 
military advice. While good management calls for vetting ideas with those 
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who would implement the decisions, the US military has added power 
because it can go to the Congress when its views are disregarded.
Instead of resignations in protest or insubordination, US military leaders 
have insisted upon terms and conditions for the use of force which have 
generally been accepted by post-Vietnam presidents. Vietnam was the turning 
point because, until then, the US military had been generally successful in 
its confl icts. But the war in Southeast Asia seared a generation of offi cers 
who were angry at the lack of political support from civilian leaders. They 
resented the restrictive rules of engagement, the antagonistic reporting of the 
press, and the failure to provide the desired combat resources. In response, 
they came to espouse notions best articulated by former Defense Secretary 
Caspar Weinberger, whose six tests before using force included concepts of 
vital interests, clear missions, and an intent to win. Drawing upon German 
and Soviet military literature, the US Army in particular also developed 
doctrine for what was called the operational level of war – between grand 
strategy and local tactics – where military professionalism was supposed to 
dominate.
Those terms and conditions often followed what came to be known as 
the Powell Doctrine: overwhelming force, clear and achievable missions, 
predetermined exit strategies in case of success or failure, and robust rules 
of engagement. As will be shown later, recent presidents have tended to 
grant those terms and conditions as a means of securing military support for 
planned operations. 
Military support for Executive Branch policies also extends to the budget. 
Although US defense budgets since the Second World War have been set top-
down for politico–economic reasons, rather than bottom-up for strategic 
reasons, and although they have consistently been viewed by military leaders 
as insuffi cient to achieve declared goals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff with few 
exceptions have ritually defended the annual budget requests. Sometimes 
the Chiefs’ support has been obviously faint-hearted, and congressmen have 
obtained suggestions for additions to the offi cial requests. These behaviors 
may strike some as a minuet or kabuki dance – a ritual to imply disagreement 
without actually saying so. I see them differently – as the fulfi llment of an 
implicit compact to respond to both sources of civilian control with loyalty 
and deference.25 
By not resigning even if they view the sums as insuffi cient, the Chiefs 
are obligated to defend the numbers in Hill testimony. In return, however, 
they may express discomfort with the level of risk involved in the proposed 
budget and they may respond with specifi city to congressional questions as 
to how they would spend additional funds, if approved. This practice serves 
the interests of all three participants: it protects the president from political 
criticism for ignoring military advice; it protects the military leaders from 
having to disappoint either source of civilian control; and it enables some 
members of Congress to get grudging acknowledgement of some of their 
own arguments.
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The power to investigate – and therefore embarrass – the services or the 
president, also gives Congress infl uence. Vigorous criticism of the Tailhook 
sexual harassment scandal prompted the navy to impose tougher discipline 
than it might have preferred and may even have modifi ed the culture of 
naval aviation. Congressional views on other gender issues may also have 
imposed more civilian attitudes on a reluctant military.
Congressional preferences usually support vocal advocates within the 
services who feel ignored by their civilian superiors. The legislative branch 
functions well as an arbiter of confl icting views – unlike the executive branch, 
which thrives on hierarchical uniformity and is uncomfortable with dissent. 
Congress is also less concerned with – or able to practice – consistency of 
action, while consistency is prized in the executive branch.
Congress is far from a unitary institution. On military issues, majorities 
sometimes side with the President, sometimes with the military leaders. 
Sometimes members of the president’s party will join to support his policies, 
sometimes they will side with military opponents. Members of the opposition 
party may also switch sides, sometimes supporting the president on a bipartisan 
basis and other times embarrassing him by exposing disagreements by the 
military. The majorities line up on an issue-specifi c basis, and key members 
often push themes and policies that they have long favored, regardless of the 
changing political balance
In the three-way tug of war, the US military will accede to the views of 
civilians when unifi ed, as in Lebanon in 1983, despite their own professional 
misgivings. I think the same pattern was followed in Bosnia in 1995, 
when both the president and majorities in Congress favored some kind of 
intervention. The same logic applied to Iraq in 2003, where Congress voted 
for a war sought by the president, despite some dissenting views among the 
military.
When the president and Congress disagree, military leaders are freer to 
voice concerns to reinforce the views of the side with which they agree. 
Such agreement, however, is most vocal before fi nal decisions are made, 
and is rarely continued afterwards. The president can make fi nal decisions 
by issuing deployment orders, or Congress can make them by passing laws 
and budgets. Whether military views prevail or not depends upon the 
normal operation of the policy process and attendant politics. If military 
views are not fully accepted, the actual outcomes will be modifi ed in part to 
accommodate military concerns.
While these principles have been refl ected throughout US history, recent 
history has shown at least a temporary reversion to military quiescence and 
congressional acquiescence in strong executive branch control. Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld has groomed and selected a new generation of military 
leaders who confi ne their dissent, if any, to internal debates. The Congress, 
concerned about public support for diffi cult military operations and 
controlled by the same party as the president, has confi ned its oversight to 
the most egregious examples of poor planning. Although these developments 
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have reduced evidence of civil–military tensions, they have also furthered 
ominous trends toward partisanship in US civil–military relations.
The danger of politicization
In the early years of the Republic, partisanship was the rule, and offi cer 
commissions were a form of patronage. John Adams and Alexander 
Hamilton saw to it that Federalists dominated the expanded army in 1798, 
and Jefferson used his appointments to make the army a Republican bastion 
after he took offi ce. Thereafter, offi cers did not hesitate to use political 
means to pursue what they viewed as professional goals – such as career 
advancement and the interests of their particular branch of service – but 
they steered clear of domestic political controversies. In 1833 the Secretary 
of War tried to prohibit offi cers from visiting Washington except on offi cial 
business, but he had to cancel his order. An offi cer in 1855 explained the 
siren call of the capital: “I must get to Washington & try to get promotion 
…. There is nothing like being on the spot.”26 
Despite these pressures and practices, the offi cer corps did not become 
a force in American politics. As a leading historian concluded, “Although 
they resorted to political channels in seeking support for professional goals, 
most regulars avoided involvement in civilian controversies, viewed political 
parties and partisanship as divisive and potentially dangerous, and saw the 
army as a neutral instrument of government.”27
After the Civil War, and until quite recently, many offi cers followed the 
tradition of George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower and did not even vote. 
In recent years, however, US military offi cers have increasingly been willing 
to identify with only one political party, the Republican Party (GOP). As 
late as 1976, the largest segment of military offi cers described themselves as 
“Independents” – 46 percent, compared to 12 percent Democratic and 33 
percent Republican. By 1996, however, two-thirds of the offi cers surveyed 
called themselves “Republican”, surveyed called themselves “Republican”, 
with only 7 percent Democratic and 22 percent independent.28
There are, of course, many explanations for these trends. Offi cers are 
overwhelmingly conservative and disproportionately from the South, while 
the Democratic Party is more liberal and less strong is the South.29 But 
offi cers can be conservative and still nonpartisan, especially if they view their 
service as to the nation, regardless of which party controls the branches of 
government.
Younger offi cers also have more partisan role models. Bill Clinton sought 
out retired offi cers to endorse his candidacy in 1992, in part to offset doubts 
about his leadership, because of his avoidance of the draft and critical 
comments about the US military. Both major party candidates recruited 
retirees in the 2000 and 2004 elections, and the trend is likely to continue 
unless senior offi cers practice self-restraint.
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This trend toward overt partisan identifi cation encourages politicians to 
treat the military as just another interest group, one to be courted at election 
time as just one of many parts of a potential coalition. If Democrats view 
the offi cer corps as Republican, they are likely to be distrustful of its advice 
and insistent upon close supervision and perhaps even tests of loyalty. That 
could ultimately lead to the identifi cation of “Democratic” and “Republican” 
generals and the politicization of their protégés. By the same logic, Republican 
civilian leaders might also treat the offi cer corps as a political special interest, 
to be appeased occasionally but often ignored because “they have nowhere 
else to go.”
Either outcome would be corrosive of trust and dangerous to continued 
civilian control. Only an ethic of nonpartisanship protects military 
professionalism as a branch of public service. That ethic cannot be imposed 
from outside, but needs to be adopted and inculcated from within the offi cer 
corps. Until and unless that happens, the normal stresses in US civil–military 
relations will be in danger of an even greater fracture.
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